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It has been well said that the highest aim in education is analogous to the highest aim in mathematics, 
namely, to obtain not results but powers, not particular solutions but the means by which endless 
solutions may be wrought. He is the most effective educator who aims less at perfecting specific 
acquirements that at producing that mental condition which renders acquirements easy, and leads to their 
useful application; who does not seek to make his pupils moral by enjoining particular courses of action, 
but by bringing into activity the feelings and sympathies that must issue in noble action. On the same 
ground it may be said that the most effective writer is not he who announces a particular discovery, who 
convinces men of a particular conclusion, who demonstrates that this measure is right and that measure 
wrong; but he who rouses in others the activities that must issue in discovery, who awakes men from their 
indifference to the right and the wrong; who nerves their energies to seek for the truth and live up to it at 
whatever cost. The influence of such a writer is dynamic. He does not teach men how to use sword and 
musket, but he inspires their souls with courage and sends a strong will into their muscles. He does not, 
perhaps, enrich your stock of data, but he clears away the film from your eyes that you may search for 
data to some purpose. He does not, perhaps, convince you, but he strikes you, undeceives you, animates 
you. You are not directly fed by his books, but you are braced as by a walk up to an alpine summit, and 
yet subdued to calm and reverence as by the sublime things to be seen from that summit. 
 Such a writer is Thomas Carlyle, It is an idle question to ask whether his books will be read a 
century hence: if they were all burnt as the grandest of Suttees on his funeral pile, it would be only like 
cutting down an oak after its acorns have sown a forest. For there is hardly a superior or active mind of 
this generation that has not been modified by Carlyle’s writings; there has hardly been an English book 
written for the last ten of twelve years that would not have been different if Carlyle had not lived. The 
character of his influence is best seen in the fact that many of the men who have the least agreement with 
his opinions are those to whom the reading of Sartor Resartus was an epoch in the history of their minds. 
The extent of his influence may be seen in the fact that ideas which were startling novelties when he first 
wrote them are now become common-places. And we think few men will be found to say that his 
influence on the whole has not been for good… 
 
George Eliot, unsigned review in Leader, October, 1855 
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Abstract 
 
 
My study focuses on the literature of democratic morality, with specific reference to the question 
of “heroic individualism.” I attempt to elucidate the notion of heroic individualism by examining 
three modern democratic moralists whose work occupies the space between politics and 
literature: Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Carlyle and Friedrich Nietzsche. In brief, I conclude 
that the central aspiration of heroic individualism is to bridge the gap between writing and action, 
the Text and the Voice.  
The dialogue among Rousseau, Carlyle, and Nietzsche reveals that the problem of writing 
as action is central to heroic-individualist morality. Each of these authors demonstrates an 
abiding concern with the relationship between life and language that reveals, at a deeper level, 
their common sensitivity to the differences between the Text and the Voice, and to the dominant 
place of texts in modern democratic cultures, which are also print cultures. To postmodern ears 
the theme of the Text and the Voice rings familiar; I explore its prehistory in the dialogue among 
heroic individualists. 
In this study I highlight Thomas Carlyle, for three reasons: First, Carlyle’s place in the 
dialogue on heroic individualism has been ignored, or misunderstood, by political theorists 
especially. The habit of associating Carlyle’s writings with a grossly authoritarian “great-man 
theory” of politics and history leaves contemporary interpreters unaware of Carlyle’s 
qualifications as a democratic thinker. Second, Carlyle’s role as a critic and interpreter of 
Continental philosophy to the English-speaking world, and his influence on Emerson and, 
indirectly, Nietzsche, bespeaks Carlyle’s importance as a participant in this dialogue. Finally, 
 vii 
restoring Carlyle to his context can obviate the tendency of interpreters to discount his writings 
as products of a reactionary, fanatical doctrine of “hero-worship.” 
Carlyle’s philosophy of heroism is more subtle than most interpreters suppose. Here I 
attempt to sketch out the historical and philosophical circumstances in which Carlyle finds 
himself as an author and to which he hopes to reply constructively, with the aim of encouraging 
sympathy for the great man. By restoring this context, we can better acknowledge the presence 
that Carlyle still exerts as an educator of modern democratic culture. 
 1 
Chapter One: Writing and Action 
 The substitution of private German for public English reveals the depth of 
[Carlyle’s] personal anguish…. For the time being, his notebook was a solace. 
The very act of writing provided emotional relief, and his entries in the next few 
months exceeded in length those of the previous four years. A line of Goethe’s 
spoke to him with autobiographical intensity. The unhappy man is one “who is 
possessed by some idea which he cannot convert into an action, or still more 
which restrains and withdraws him from action.” Aristotle also came to mind: 
“The end of man is an Action not a Thought.” “How many eulogies of Activity, 
and Nothing acted!” On the same day, he quoted the German Romantic writer 
Ludwig Tieck: “My whole life has been a continued night-mare: and my 
awakening will be in Hell.” 
 
Fred Kaplan, Thomas Carlyle 
 
 
The Question of Heroism 
What place is there for heroism in modern democratic regimes? Is there any? The way we 
answer this question has consequences for our understanding of the nature of citizenship and the 
intention of modern democratic culture. To some end, it may even define what sort of ambition 
modern democracy can (and cannot) tolerate. 
 In this study, I limit my attention to the question of literary ambition. Literary ambition is 
the most particular form of heroism in modern democratic culture. This is true to the extent that 
modern democratic culture is the culture of print, the culture of practically universal literacy. 
Though distinguishable in thought, democratic culture and print culture are inseparable in reality. 
As early as 1840, Thomas Carlyle observed thus: “Printing…is equivalent to Democracy: invent 
Writing, Democracy is inevitable.”1  
My study focuses on democratic philosophical literature, with specific reference to the 
moral question of “heroic individualism.” I attempt to elucidate the notion of heroic 
                                                 
1
 On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History, ed. Carl Niemeyer (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 
1966) p. 164. 
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individualism by examining three modern democratic moralists whose work occupies the space 
between politics and literature: Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Carlyle, and Friedrich 
Nietzsche. In brief, I conclude that the central aspiration of heroic individualism is to bridge the 
gap between writing and action, the Text and the Voice.  
The dialogue among Rousseau, Carlyle, and Nietzsche reveals that the problematic 
relationship between writing and action is central to heroic-individualist morality. Each of these 
authors demonstrates an abiding concern with the relationship between life and language that 
reveals, at a deeper level, a common sensitivity to the differences between the Text and the 
Voice, and to the dominant place of texts in modern democratic cultures, which are also print 
cultures. To postmodern ears the theme of the Text and the Voice rings familiar; I explore its 
prehistory in the dialogue among heroic individualists. 
In this study I highlight Thomas Carlyle, for three reasons: First, Carlyle’s place in the 
dialogue on heroic individualism has been ignored, or misunderstood, by political theorists 
especially. The habit of associating Carlyle’s writings with a grossly authoritarian “great man 
theory” of politics and history leaves contemporary interpreters unaware of Carlyle’s 
qualifications as a democratic thinker. Second, Carlyle’s role as a critic and interpreter of 
Continental philosophy to the English-speaking world, and his influence on Emerson and, 
indirectly, Nietzsche, bespeaks Carlyle’s importance as a participant in this dialogue. Finally, 
restoring Carlyle to his context can obviate the tendency of interpreters to discount his writings 
as products of a reactionary, fanatical doctrine of “hero-worship.” 
Carlyle’s philosophy of heroism is more subtle than most interpreters suppose. Here I 
attempt to sketch out the historical and philosophical circumstances in which Carlyle finds 
himself as an author and to which he hopes to reply constructively, with the aim of encouraging 
 3 
sympathy for the great man. By restoring this context, we can better recognize the presence that 
Carlyle still exerts as an educator of modern democratic culture. 
Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche answered the call of literary ambition from a unique 
historical position: the birth of the modern world. A conspicuous tension between man’s 
historically natural, essentially aristocratic, recognition of greatness in human action, and the 
leveling and mechanizing tendencies of modernity define the cultural environment of their age. 
Each of these authors was profoundly sensitive to this situation, in a way that we, far off in the 
wake of these tumults, hardly can imagine. Living and writing about the “long” nineteenth 
century, each of these authors had firsthand experience of some of the major events that shaped 
the modern world in which we still dwell. 
Behind all these changes, of course, lay that original modern innovation: the printing 
press. A study of the hero as author, then, must be an extended investigation of the problem of 
writing as action, or of the relationship between writing and action. This is a problem that 
possessed Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche deeply. For each of them took up a peculiarly 
modern vocation, one that Carlyle dubs “man-of-letters heroism”:  
The Hero as Man of Letters…is altogether a product of these new ages; and so long as 
the wondrous art of Writing, or of Ready-writing which we call printing, subsists, he may 
be expected to continue, as one of the main forms of Heroism for all future ages.2  
 
Carlyle goes on to comment on the “curious spectacle” of a modern man of letters, “a Great Soul 
living apart in that anomalous manner; endeavoring to speak-forth the inspiration that was in him 
by Printed Books.”3 The attempt to communicate with one another, about questions of good and 
evil, especially, is an essential aspect of man’s life as an active, political being. The ability to 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., p. 154. 
 
3
 Ibid. 
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communicate across larger expanses of space and time through printed texts significantly 
modifies how we conduct this basic activity. Writing changes the world of action. 
The phenomena of print culture are no less “curious” today, despite that they seem 
normal to most of us. Text and the technologies that it supports have altered permanently the 
landscape of human existence. This study revisits Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche with an eye 
to their contributions to the morality of print culture. I pay particular attention to Carlyle, whose 
place in this debate has been either forgotten or ignored. By remembering the place of Carlyle, 
however, we can better understand the positions of Rousseau, and Nietzsche. 
 
Political Philosophy and Literature 
Occasionally political philosophers address directly the question of heroism, but more often they 
treat the heroic media: myth epic and tragedy. Political philosophers treat leadership in moral 
terms, undertaking to examine the relationship between leadership and character, both of 
individuals and regimes. From this perspective the heroic leader appears more often as an 
exemplary character than as an agent of historical change. Accordingly political theorists may 
discuss seemingly disparate cases of heroism—from Odysseus to Martin Luther King, Jr.—in 
similar terms.  
One recent example of this approach is Patrick Deneen’s The Odyssey of Political 
Theory.4 Deneen discovers a political theory in Homer’s Odyssey by paying close attention to the 
theme of exile-and-return, or of homecoming (nostos). In Vergil’s Empire,5 Eve Adler similarly 
proposes that Vergil’s epic theme in the Aeneid—founding a home in exile—implicitly replies to 
                                                 
4
 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000) 
 
5
 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) 
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Lucretius’ materialist and Epicurean argument in De Rerum Natura. According to Adler, Vergil 
accepts the philosophy of Lucretius but rejects the Epicurean tendency to passive resignation in 
favor of a philosophy of moral action. 
Carlyle is also this type of epic writer. The dynamic structure of exile-and-return informs 
much of Carlyle’s literary work. Moreover, Carlyle is to the Romantics as Vergil is to the 
Epicureans. His main message, summed up by his “gospel of work,” is that moral action is a 
better alternative than Byronic self-pity.  
A case in point is Carlyle’s “great man theory” of history. This so-called “theory,” 
identified most closely with Carlyle’s lectures On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in 
History, has been held to blame for inspiring fascist cults-of-personality. Yet close examination 
reveals that On Heroes is not a theory at all, but a literary reflection on exile-and-return in its 
modern form. In its modern guise, exile-and-return takes the specific form of a tension between 
the voice and the text. Carlyle calls the modern reader to return from the exile of literary self-
absorption. 
The modern Odysseus runs the danger of losing himself on the Calypso-island of the text. 
Modern, literate, man runs the danger of losing himself in the habitual activity of intense self-
reflection encouraged by print literacy. In both reading and writing there is an inescapable 
element of self-reflection that is not present, or not as intense, as in oral communication. In 
contrast to oral man—for whom communication always involves personal presence, who “is not 
so likely to think of words as ‘signs’, quiescent visual phenomena,” and for whom, as for Homer, 
words are “‘winged words’—which suggests evanescence, power and freedom,” literate man 
exhibits a 
 6 
complacency in thinking of words as signs…due to the tendency, perhaps incipient in 
oral cultures, but clearly marked in chirographic cultures and far more marked in 
typographic and electronic cultures, to reduce all sensation and indeed all human 
experience to visual images.6 
 
In writing, as opposed to speech, both the writer and the audience are not present to each other, 
but each must supply the presence of the other through imagination: 
The writer must set up a role in which absent and unknown readers can cast themselves. 
Even in writing to a close friend I have to fictionalize a mood for him, to which he is 
expected to conform. The reader must also fictionalize the writer.7 
 
In the personal diary, we see the extreme case of this mutual fictionalization, where writing 
approaches its ironic limits: 
Indeed, the diary demands, in a way, the maximum fictionalizing of the utterer and the 
addressee. Writing is always a kind of imitation talking, and in a diary I therefore am 
pretending that I am talking to myself. But I never really talk this way to myself. Nor 
could I without writing or indeed without print. The personal diary is a very late literary 
form…. [T]he kind of verbalized solipsistic reveries it implies are a product of 
consciousness as shaped by print culture. And for which self am I writing? Myself today? 
As I think I will be ten years from now? As I hope I will be? For myself as I imagines 
myself or hope others may imagine me? Questions such as this can and do fill writers 
with anxieties and often enough lead to discontinuation of diaries. The diarist can no 
longer live with his or her fiction.8 
 
Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche are writers who became obsessed with these paradoxes 
of writing. Here I argue that Carlyle’s “real” hero is his reader. Caryle’s authentic aim, in On 
Heroes and elsewhere, is to bring the modern reader home to the voice, from having been exiled, 
so to speak, in the text. Accordingly, Carlyle also emphasizes the personal presence of writers as 
actors in, not spectators of, political life. From the perspective taken here, then, Ferenc Fehr’s 
criticism of Carlyle’s politics merits our most serious consideration: 
                                                 
6
 All quotes in this paragraph are from Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word 
(New York: Meuthen, 1982) pp. 76-77. 
 
7
 Ibid., p. 102. 
 
8
 Ibid. 
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The synthetic authority of the new hero was supposed to replace the vanished authority of 
the Voice behind the Text. However, this was an unequivocally antihermeneutic subject, 
in addition to being a capricious-tyrannical one. The Hero of Carlyle, whose 
metamorphoses may become identical with World History, Siegfried, Zarathustra or the 
“New Emperor,” increasingly tended not just to lend an overtly arbitrary authority to 
shattered texts in their lightningly short appearance in the political theater, but to 
eliminate texts outright and replace them by these respective voices. Wotan in Wagner’s 
political mythology still had a shaky legitimacy of a kind. Siegfried had none apart from 
that of his sword. Zarathustra was a prophet (and a legislator) in a highly ambiguous 
constellation where the audience had to accept upon his word that God had died and—
perhaps—was resurrected in the voice of the prophet.9 
 
“Out of the anti-hermeneutic drive in the public space” continues Fehr, “charismatic 
politics was born.”10 This “charismatic politics” is of course the same type of politics identified 
by Max Weber in the early twentieth century. It is the politics of Hitler, Lenin, Mussolini, Mao, 
and a host of other petty-grandiose dictators.  
It is anachronistic, at least, to accuse Carlyle and company of begetting a type of media-
driven charismatic politics that was inconceivable at the time that On Heroes was given. The 
twentieth century ideological mass-movements were driven by the mass media, but print is the 
only medium that Carlyle and company are concerned with.11 However, Fehr seems to identify 
correctly what is at stake in the ambitious author’s attempt to reconcile the voice and the text. 
Nevertheless, Carlyle’s political-literary effort, shaped largely by his perception that a fanatical 
fundamentalism for “theories-of-government” fueled the Revolutionary mania, probably did 
more good than harm in terms of its impact on Victorian political culture.  
 
                                                 
9
 “Between Relativism and Fundamentalism” in Culture and Modernity, ed. Eliot Deutsch (Honolulu: U of 
Hawaii P, 1991) p. 180. 
 
10
 Ibid. 
 
11
 The first commercial telegraph was installed from Paddington to West Drayton in 1839. Carlyle 
delivered On Heroes in the spring of 1840. 
 8 
The Heroic in Political Philosophy 
With this general background in mind, let us consider heroism more directly from the side of 
philosophy. Recently one political philosopher has tried to vindicate a modern concept of the 
heroic. In Liberalism With Honor,12 Sharon Krause draws on the work of Montesquieu and 
Tocqueville in an attempt to vindicate the role of “honor” in modern liberal regimes. Krause 
fights this battle on two fronts. On the one hand, she faces the defenders of moral altruism who 
claim that honor is incompatible with the other-interested dictates of liberal ethics; while, on the 
other hand, she critiques the defenders of self-interest who contend that liberalism cannot tolerate 
so-called “altruistic” norms. Opposed to both of these theoretical fundamentalisms, Krause 
promotes a liberal version of honor that resides somewhere in between altruism and self-interest. 
In liberal regimes, she claims, it is permissible to pursue glory and a high reputation—the self-
interested goods we associate with honor—by risking oneself to champion the dignity of others. 
Heroes such as these are not altruists by a strict definition. Rather, they are motivated by the 
acute human desire to enlarge one’s reputation and to stand above the crowd. However, liberal 
heroes meet this desire by participating in the effort to achieve public recognition of the dignity 
of others. It is this interest in “otherness,” in particular, that makes for liberal honor.  
Krause’s arguments are refreshing and insightful; however, it is difficult to tell whether 
her liberal heroes are paragons of character in a classical sense or highly exalted cogs in the 
modern rights-machine. If the latter is true, then we must arrive at a point when both heroism and 
honor cease to be historically necessary; namely when civil rights have been extended to the 
utmost degree. The end of history would spell the end of honor. On the other hand, it seems 
possible that each of us must, in an appropriate degree, possess heroic qualities of character just 
                                                 
12
 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2002) 
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to be morally honorable people. Thus, in some form or another, the heroic would be an abiding 
impulse of human nature, one that must continue to manifest itself in some form or another. 
Krause’s portrayal of liberal honor in terms of heroism for the “other” conveys a 
significant insight regarding the peculiar nature of modern heroism. What does it mean to say 
that modern heroism issues from other ambition? Ancient heroism, by contrast, issues from self-
ambition—either the ambition for personal glory, as seen in Achilles, or ambition on behalf of 
one’s own family or people, as seen in Odysseus. Ambition on behalf of ones own is easy to 
understand. Ambition for the sake of the other is a difficult, abstract notion. The intensity of the 
debate over altruism itself is evidence of the intractability of the questions brought up by a 
heroism based on otherness.  
In particular, “otherness” is a highly abstract notion that seems to rely for its genesis on 
the abstract idea of the self intensified by the experiences of reading and writing. This returns us 
from the philosophical back to the literary side of the question. Perhaps Ong is right to suggest 
that literacy is key to understanding the differences between ancient and modern heroism (or 
antiheroism). If this is true, the phenomenological contrast between the voice and the text is not 
out of place in a discussion of heroism in modern democracy.  
Another political philosopher who sheds light on our question is Sheldon Wolin. Clearly, 
there is common ground between a concern with the heroic and Wolin’s interest in “epic theory.” 
Wolin shares the view that the methodological, or spectatorial, bias of modern political science 
has deep roots in modern philosophy itself. Against this methodological tendency Wolin posits 
the more publicly engaged, active, figure of the epic theorist.  
Although Wolin does not draw a clear connection between the idea of epic theory and the 
political philosophy of literature, or heroism, the very word “epic” reaches out to the imagination 
 10 
of action. Much like the term “heroic individual,” “epic theorist” is an evocative contradiction: 
epics are for singing, while theories appeal to the spectator; epics begin in medias res and 
proceed in an episodic manner, theories begin at the origin and proceed logically, or 
chronologically; epics appeal to the ancient economy of the voice, dialogue and rhetoric; 
theories, to the modern economy of the text, of formula and method. The construct “epic 
theorist,” then, communicates at the very least an impulse to relate the voice and text. 
In “Political Theory as a Vocation,” Wolin suggests that the choice of the methodological 
life “was a profound personal choice, perhaps the closest functional equivalent to a conversion 
experience that the modern mind can achieve.”13 As exhibited in the life of its prophet and first 
adherent, the vita methodica is intended “at the very least...as a form of re-education as the title 
of one of Descartes’ works, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, [implies].”14 Descartes takes up the 
vita methodica in order to circumnavigate the effects of personal prejudice and bias, and to 
correct for inherent weaknesses in the human intellect. According to Wolin, much the same 
intent animates modern “methodists” in the social sciences who forsake tradition in order to 
arrive at a secure, easily communicable and generalizable dialect of the truth about human 
things. 
Wolin suggests that the modern vita methodica takes the place of the ancient bios 
theoretikos at no small cost. The “cultural resources” that sustain the theoretical life, namely 
“metaphysics, faith, historical sensibility, or, more broadly…tacit knowledge” is a cargo to be 
dumped overboard if the ship of modern science is to progress toward the El Dorado of clear and 
                                                 
13
 “Political Theory as a Vocation,” The American Political Science Review 63:4 (Dec., 1969) p. 1067. 
 
14
 Ibid. 
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distinct knowledge.15 “Because these matters [of tacit knowledge] bear a family resemblance to 
‘bias,’ they become a sacrificial victim to the quest for objectivity in the social sciences.”16 
Against the tendency of “methodists” Wolin opposes the figure of the “epic theorist” and 
the vocation of political theorizing. Epic theory is distinguished from methodological theory, 
first, on account of the magnitude of the problems it addresses. While methodists hone in on 
particular elements of social theories or social organizations, epical theorists seek knowledge of 
the social whole. Secondly, epic theory is set apart from methodology by its “structure of 
intentions,” or, in plainer language, the public concern of the theorist. Whereas behaviorists 
focus on “problems-in-a-theory” epical theorists concern themselves with “problems-in-the-
world.” I think we can sum this up by saying that epic theorists attempt to merge the embodied, 
participatory character of the voice with the more disembodied, speculative character of texts. 
Rather than adapt itself to the facts, epic theory insists that the facts adapt themselves to the teloi 
affirmed by the theorist. Thus, epic theory relies on the theoretical imagination, to propose 
visionary or symbolic alternatives to a diseased state of affairs. Among such theories Wolin 
counts Plato’s city-in-speech, engendered by the crisis of Athenian Democracy, and Marx’s 
critique of capitalism, which issues in the Marxian vision of a “realm of freedom.” 
For Wolin, the contemporary dominance of methodists is explained by the unprecedented 
level of conscious organization in modern societies. Earlier societies, for the most part, 
conceived of themselves as subjects of mysterious historical articulations of character, religion, 
or tradition. By contrast modern states understand themselves to be “the product of design, the 
product of theories about human structures deliberately created rather than historically 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., p. 1074. 
 
16
 Ibid. 
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articulated.”17 This has the paradoxical effect rendering modern methodism into an anti-tradition-
tradition, suppressing the imagination of action, and relegating all thinking to the task of 
description rather than prescription. Strangely enough, a world organized so completely must 
protect itself from the very sort of thinking that made it possible, for theoretically armed 
imagination poses the greatest threat to the organizational status quo. 
 Yet, as Hannah Arendt has observed, the theoretical alternative to the epic imagination is 
not the avoidance of perplexity but the introduction of a new perplexity: 
For the great unknown in history, that has baffled the philosophy of history in the modern 
age, arises not only when one considers history as a whole and finds that its subject, 
mankind, is an abstraction which never can become an active agent; the same unknown 
has baffled political philosophy from its beginning in antiquity…. The perplexity is that 
in any series of events that together form a story with a unique meaning we can at best 
isolate the agent who set the whole process into motion; and although the agent 
frequently remains the subject, the “hero” of the story, we can never point unequivocally 
to him as the author of its eventual outcome. 
…It is noteworthy that Plato, who had no inkling of the modern concept of 
history, should have been the first to invent the metaphor of an actor behind the scenes 
who, behind the backs of acting men, pulls the strings and is responsible for the story. 
The Platonic God is but a symbol for the fact that real stories, in distinction to the ones 
we invent, have no author; as such, he is the true forerunner of Providence, the “invisible 
hand,” Nature, the “world spirit,” class interest, and the like, with which Christian and 
modern philosophers of history tried to solve the perplexing problem that although 
history owes its existence to men, it is still obviously not “made” by them.18 
 
Arendt’s great contribution to political theory has been to remind us of the primary place 
of action—“words and deeds”—as an essential aspect of human reality. Arendt’s notion of 
action, too, recalls the close relationship between action and the spoken word. Without the words 
and deeds of heroes there is no history to write. “That every individual life between birth and 
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death can eventually be told as a story with beginning and end is the prepolitical and 
prehistorical condition of history, the great story without beginning and end.”19 
 It is popular today to dismiss the question of heroism as a matter of merely adolescent 
concern, belonging to a certain psychological stage of development or an idyllic corner of the 
imagination. But our perspective changes if we understand the heroic in this way, as a function 
of the engaged moral/political imagination, the “epic theorist” that may be in every one of us. Of 
course, few reasonable people doubt that our ideas of heroism take shape in large part as a 
response to wish-fulfilling impulses that are aroused by, although they never can be satisfied 
under the circumstances of, lived reality. With this said, it is also true that the element of heroic 
imagination is lived reality, action. The heroic is the plane on which dream, or nightmare, and 
reality converge. It stands to reason, then, that the heroic in human nature is more than just an 
adolescent concern. It is a political concern, albeit mediated by imagination. In modern 
democratic culture, that mediation takes on a particular form: the politics of heroism is the 
politics of literature. 
 Our three principals—Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche—ought to be understood in the 
first place as representatives of the politics of literature and only secondarily as proto-fascists, 
democratic totalitarians and the like. While remaining alive to the unease that surrounds the 
connection between literary politics and modern aesthetic politics, we ought to keep in mind that 
these thinkers have made a broader, lasting, impact on our culture. Since the time of Homer, 
myth and poetry have played a significant role in politics; and since the time of Plato 
philosophers have voiced concern about the political affects of poetry. But Plato did not abandon 
literature, nor should we. Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche are literary philosophers who, despite 
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their disagreements, take seriously the problem of writing and action. Moreover, they attempt, as 
far as possible to act through their writing. In other words, the story of these ambitious authors is 
the prehistory of the idea of epic theory. 
 
Modern Science and Democratic History 
Having considered the concept of the heroic, let us turn to the matter of history. Critics of 
“progress,” not one of our authors views the revolutionary changes that ushered in modernity 
with unqualified optimism. Despite their obvious tendency towards individualism, Rousseau, 
Carlyle and Nietzsche evince a profound awareness of the trade-offs attending the rise of modern 
scientific civilization and the downfall of the ancient, feudal, regime. In this, they resemble one 
of the greatest sociologists of democracy, Alexis DeTocqueville, who without hesitating to offer 
advice to “friends of democracy,” nevertheless, counsels against democratic excesses. An 
example is Tocqueville’s notion of the tyranny of the majority: Revealing his own aristocratic 
sympathies, Tocqueville warns his reader time and again that the greatest danger to democratic 
society is likely to issue from an excess of democratic equality. 
 Tocqueville, on account of his judicious balance of criticism and amity towards 
democracy, retains a high place in the pantheon of modern sociologists. However, it is telling 
that a recent history of sociology dubs Tocqueville “the last gentleman.” For, Tocqueville is one 
of the last philosophers to adopt the aristocratic stance unapologetically. If the democratic stance 
towards history is typified by modern scientific objectivity, the aristocratic stance is 
characterized by a different focus; namely, on ambition and great actions.  
Although he is not a central figure in my study, Tocqueville’s prescient insights into the 
strange and somewhat paradoxical influence of democracy and science on our personal and 
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social self-understanding provide an instructive context for understanding the problem of modern 
democratic heroism. Specifically, Tocqueville observes a paradox in democratic ambition. In 
well best known work, Democracy in America, Tocqueville laments that democratic ambition is 
mediocre, despite that so many democrats are ambitious: 
I confess that I apprehend much less for democratic society from the boldness than from 
the mediocrity of desires. What appears to me most to be dreaded is that, in the midst of 
the small, incessant occupations of private life, ambition should lose its vigor and 
greatness; that the passions of man should abate, but at the same time be lowered; so that 
the march of society should every day become more tranquil and less aspiring.20 
 
This dread of mediocrity is common to critics of democracy from the French Revolution to our 
time. Carlyle and Nietzsche share in it, to be sure. It is not the democratic form of political 
association merely that Tocqueville diagnoses as detrimental to the modern spirit. For, coincident 
with the rise of democratic institutions is the near-universal sanction of the rationalist standpoint 
of modern natural science, a standpoint that, in democratic societies, penetrates to our historical 
self-understanding. “The historians who live in democratic ages,” writes Tocqueville, “are not 
only prone to assign a great cause to every incident, but they are also given to connect incidents 
together so as to deduce a system from them.”21 
 While historians in aristocratic ages normally produce narratives of great men and tend to 
disregard systematic causes, perhaps excessively, “those who write in democratic ages have 
another more dangerous tendency”: 
As it becomes extremely difficult to discern and analyze the reason which, acting 
separately on the will of each member of the community, concur in the end to produce 
movement in the whole mass, men are led to believe that this movement is involuntary, 
and that societies unconsciously obey some superior force ruling over them…. [T]he 
principle of free will is not secured… 
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Historians who live in democratic ages, then, not only deny that the few have any 
power of acting on the destiny of a people, but they deprive the people themselves of the 
power of modifying their own condition, and they subject it either to an inflexible 
providence or to some blind necessity.22 
 
To sum up: Even as our modern democratic form of social organization appears to bestow on 
human agents an unprecedented level of freedom, our modern democratic self-understanding is 
yoked more and more to necessity. Our age advertises the right of every person to stand as the 
author of one’s own biography, one’s own history. Yet, perhaps never have human agents felt 
more inclined to interpret themselves as the products of foreign powers. We moderns construe 
the self more and more as “caused” by external forces, than as “causing” its own destiny. 
Judging from modern historical narrative and the modern philosophy of history, “it would seem 
that man is utterly powerless over himself and over all around him. The historians of antiquity 
taught how to command: those of our time teach only how to obey; in their writings, the author 
always appears great, but humanity is always diminutive.”23 
 Tocqueville’s observations set the stage for an inquiry into literary ambition. As 
Tocqueville points out, the diminutive scale in which humanity appears in democratic historical 
narratives has another consequence; namely, it makes the author appear in gigantic scale. Thus 
the enlargement of the author proceeds apace with the diminution of the average man. 
Where writers like Hegel and Marx exhibit the ambition to reveal the hidden causes the 
move history, Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche figure the writer as a historical actor, in the 
extreme as a creator, of history. Men of bold ambition themselves, Rousseau, Carlyle and 
Nietzsche insist on exploring the possibility of self-creation; and assert in the face of intellectual 
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adversity that a serious encounter with the question of heroic action is vital to the health self and 
society. Accordingly each of them grapples with the modern problem of the heroic, with varying 
degrees of success and failure.  
 In their social and political context, these heroic philosophers criticize the middling 
tendency of democratic culture. But of course, they are not the first philosophers to recommend 
heroic virtue. In the distant prehistory of our problem lay the two initiators of Western political 
philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, for whom aristocracy, literally the “government of the best,” is 
the ideal regime against which all others should be measured. Let us briefly compare their views 
to those of the modern philosophy of history represented by Hegel and Marx. 
 The idea of accountability that we associate with the intuitive notion of agency implies in 
principle that the agent, the doer, behind any action can give an account of what he or she has 
done, and why. This suggests in turn the possibility of giving alternative accounts, and 
accordingly, the legitimacy of critiquing the moral choices of great leaders to asses the relative 
goodness of such choices. Of course the logic of accountability applies to all individuals, not 
alone to leaders of the community. 
We can construe Classical moral philosophy, from Socrates on, as the practice of holding 
(great) men to account for their opinions and actions. Plato’s dialogues refer directly to the great 
political men of Athens: Solon and Pericles, as well as lesser figures like Alcibiades, Polus and 
Laches. Moreover, to indicate that the political philosopher’s interest in great men is not 
restricted to “men of action,” Plato interrogates renowned wise men (sophistes) like Gorgias and 
Protagoras. Finally, the philosopher interrogates the poets, also. Plato-Socrates’ critiques of 
Homer, Hesiod and the tragedians are well known, and so is the attempt that Plato sustains 
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throughout most of his corpus to use Socrates as a foil to the great Homeric heroes, Achilles and 
Odysseus, and other popular heroic figures such a Hercules. 
Aristotle, too, situates the exceptional individual at the center of his moral and political 
thought albeit in a more abstract way than his predecessor, Plato. Instead of well-known 
personages, in Aristotle’s work we meet more often with “ideal types” of men, meant to serve as 
the models according to which the science of moral action is grounded. Examples of these 
include the Spoudaios, Phronimos, Megalopsychos, and so on. It is not clear whether Aristotle 
has any particular person in mind when he invokes these ideal examples. There is no doubt that 
Aristotle’s moral paradigms are the final reference points for moral action, however; in contrast 
to dogmatic rules or systematic imperatives. 
Revolving as it does around the exceptional person; the ancient approach is a double-
edged sword. One obvious benefit of it is that it is founded upon the commonsensical approach 
of evaluating moral action by reference to concrete moral agents instead of relying on abstract, 
speculative schemes. However, the drawback of this approach is evident in Aristotle. There is a 
conspicuous tension between Aristotle’s insistence on the engaged human agent as measure of 
moral action, and his unwillingness, or inability to provide concrete cases of such paradigmatic 
agents. This difficulty—and the possibility that its source lay in a deeper, pre-philosophical 
ambiguity about the nature of heroism—surfaces again in Aristotle’s account of ambition (the 
“heroic” virtue par excellence) in the Nicomachean Ethics: there are no names for the excess and 
deficiency of ambition, nor can the philosopher offer any. “As a result, the men who occupy the 
extremes lay claim to the middle position. We ourselves, in fact, sometimes call the middle 
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person ambitious and sometimes unambitious; sometimes we praise an ambitious and at other 
times an unambitious man.”24 
Over and against the ancient tradition, the nineteenth century orthodoxy represented here 
by Hegel and Marx attempts to circumvent the ambiguity mentioned above by appealing to 
abstract historical forces and substituting for commonsense agency a mechanistic notion of the 
human subject as a conduit of these forces. The Hegelian “cunning of reason” and the Marxian 
class struggle are classic cases of this approach. As the familiar modern adage has it, “there are 
no moral or immoral actions, only evaluations.” Moral praise and blame, then, are glosses 
merely, since actions inevitable issue from causes out of the individual’s control. 
Hegel’s gloss on the world-historical individual in the Philosophy of History sums it up: 
Such are all great historical men—whose own particular aims involve those large issues 
which are the will of the World-Spirit. They may be called heroes, inasmuch as they have 
derived their purposes and their vocation, not from the calm, regular course of things, 
sanctioned by the existing order; but from a concealed fount-one which has not attained 
to phenomenal, present existence—from that inner Spirit, still hidden beneath the surface, 
which, impinging on the outer world as on a shell, bursts it into pieces, because it is 
another kernel than that which belonged to the shell in question.25 
 
Hegel’s world-historic individuals include practical men of political expertise, to be sure. Also, 
such men are conscious of an aim: namely, in Machiavelli’s words, to usher in “new modes and 
orders.” But what Hegel is saying is that this is all that a world-historic individual is aware of. In 
other words, these supremely ambitious men do not answer the call of their age on account of 
some apperception of justice but because they are savvy enough to discern “what [is] ripe for 
development” at a particular time. “Such individuals [have] no consciousness of the general Idea 
they [are] unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of theirs; on the contrary, they [are] practical, 
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political men.”26 According to Hegel, such concrete personages are the measure of truth, at least 
for a particular epoch, in a physical rather than a moral sense. This recalls the equation between 
world history and world justice. Thus the classical dilemma is resolved: 
World-historical men…must, therefore, be recognized as its clear-sighted ones; their 
deeds, their words are the best of that time. Great men have formed purposes to satisfy 
themselves, not others…. For it was they who best understood affairs; from whom others 
learned, and approved, or at least acquiesced in—their policy.27 
 
Marx, following Hegel (or taking Hegel’s logic to its extreme) venerates the bare 
opportunism and ambition of a world-historic class, the proletariat. For our purposes, that Marx 
takes classes rather than individuals for the instruments of world-historical change is less 
important than his agreement with Hegel, to discount the problem of a morally accountable 
heroism. While Marx proposes strategies and scientific rationalizations for the communist 
struggle, he denies emphatically that philosophy can interrogate the question of moral greatness. 
Philosophical form merely follows world-historical function: “When people speak of ideas that 
revolutionize society, they do but express the fact that within the old society the [material] 
elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even 
pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.”28 
For the classical philosopher, political philosophy demands the interrogation of great 
leaders from the standpoint of a contemplative insight into the human good. To this end, classical 
philosophy falls back on examples, or constructions, of superlative men that can serve as 
paradigms of moral excellence. By contrast, the modern systems of history regard heroic 
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individuals as existing beyond the reach of philosophy. They are themselves the first 
manifestations of historically inevitable permutations of human subjectivity, heretofore 
unthinkable. It may be profitable to think of the doctrine of world-historical individuals (or 
classes) as the peculiarly modern version of so-called “onto-theology.” World-historic 
individuals are both indispensable and superfluous, from a metaphysical standpoint, constituting 
an impenetrable substratum of discourse in a given epoch. 
This broadly-sketched divergence frames the discussion Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche 
to follow. As we have said, these authors dissent from the modern orthodoxy in ways that incline 
towards the views of the ancients.29 Hence, an inquiry into their views is both timely, since the 
modern orthodoxy is subsiding, and perennial, since it can serve as a link between modern 
concerns and ancient, timeless themes. Finally, Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche occupy a space 
between ancient and modern that recommends them as representatives of a modern counter-
tradition. This is the tradition that I refer to as “heroic individualism.” 
 
History and Language: Vico 
Our discussion, above, of the voice and the text suggests that man’s manner of relating to 
language is an important aspect of the human world that helps to account for the historical 
evolution of consciousness. One early modern thinker in particular makes similar claims relating 
historical change and the development of language. This is G. B. Vico. Vico objects to the 
marked tendency among modern political philosophers to adopt the Cartesian, methodological or 
mathematic definition of science. Vico deploys his notion of scienzia in conscious opposition to 
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this prejudice of method; namely, that the only scientific truths are those than can be quantified 
or mathematized and situated within a grand theoretical scheme. 
 For Vico, mathematics does not offer the appropriate model for understanding the human 
world. Rather, the human world is constituted by language, which makes an understanding of 
poetic logic, or poetic wisdom, crucial to an understanding of history. Vico’s philosophy relies 
on the principle, verum ipsum factum: the true is the made. Because man makes the human world 
through language, it is possible for man to know the human world without the mediation of 
abstract formulas. Accordingly, Vico’s philosophy of history is a history of language. 
The three ages of Vico’s universal history—the divine, the heroic and the human—
correspond to three regimes of language. In the divine and heroic ages of history, poetic or 
metaphorical language dominates the scene. Only in the human age does the mathematical habit 
of modern science so dominate as to obscure from man the poetic origins of all language. For 
Hegel, the modern state represents the “end of history,” that is, the democratic state is the 
perfection of world-historical progress. By contrast, then, Vico portrays modernity as a “human 
age” that enjoys the blessings of scientific clarity and political equality, but also portends the 
danger of a loss of poetic wisdom that was accessible to earlier ages. This loss of poetic truth 
portends an egoistic “barbarism of humanity.”  
By recapturing the poetic or metaphorical insights of earlier ages—the “divine” and 
“heroic,” respectively—Vico hopes to avoid the descent into modern barbarity. Modern barbarity 
is a “civil disease” that reproduces the barbarism of prehistoric times by returned man, now 
depraved through reflection, to a bestial existence. As a remedy to this danger, Vico recommends 
not a return to heroic civilization, but the discipline of a heroic mind.  
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The Hero as Author: Rousseau 
Vico’s significance lay in his discovery of the constitutive role of language in human reality, 
over and against mere description. But the discipline of Vico’s heroic mind basically is 
contemplative. What sets apart Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche from both the modern theorists 
of history and from philosophers of language like Vico is their common endeavor to act through 
writing, in a sense, to realize the voice in the text, in a strange manner, to speak through texts. 
In our immediate context Rousseau’s importance is paramount. Briefly, the uniqueness of 
Rousseau flows from his ironic position as an author who addresses a public about the 
relationship between legislators and peoples. The irony here can be traced to the significantly 
different relationships between a “great legislator” and his people, and an “author” and his 
public. The legislator figures a personal, and particular, relationship to a particular people, while 
the author bears an anonymous and general (market-driven) relationship to the reading public. 
There is a virtual equality between an author and his readers that does not obtain between 
legislators and subjects: the reader can always become a writer, but there can be only one “great 
legislator.” If it is true that literacy is a great modifying feature of modern democratic culture, 
then the tension between the legislator-people relationship and the author-public relationship—as 
a particular case of the general tension of the voice and the text—points to a constitutive tension, 
even irony, in the modern democratic notion of authority.  
Rousseau’s modern renovation of the ancient institution of the great legislator in the 
Social Contract serves as the paradigm of the modern hero as author. One cannot fail to notice 
that the great legislator is not a mere stand-in for Rousseau as an author, however. To the 
contrary, the great legislator is an ideal-type of the citizen-author. Rousseau’s aim as the author 
of the Social Contract, then, is both to hold apart and to reconcile the appeal to personal or 
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charismatic authority represented by the great legislator, and the appeal to individual self-interest 
represented by the contract. Neither of these alone will suffice to establish a just and stable 
regime.  
It is for the reader to judge whether Rousseau succeeds at this particular attempt to 
reconcile the patriarchal intimacy of the legislator’s voice with the egoistic rationality of the 
contractual text, an attempt that resembles so many of Rousseau’s efforts at reconciliation 
through literature. That he makes such an effort is enough to qualify Rousseau as a founding 
father of the regime of writing as action, however. 
 In these pages, we shall not attempt to dissolve this mystery but to understand it better for 
what it is. The problem of self-creation in the modern sense dovetails with the question of the 
hero as author, and with notion of one’s self as being capable of authorizing one’s own destiny. 
This is close to what Carlyle means when he equates history and biography: “life-writing.” 
Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche merit our close attention because of the seriousness and 
intensity with which they think through the problem of life as literature. 
 
Carlyle and Nietzsche 
Both Carlyle and Nietzsche criticize the enlightenment at the same time as they criticize 
Rousseau. In particular, both thinkers reject the mathematical, mechanical view of nature in 
favor of one that is more “organic.” In On Heroes, Carlyle conveys this organic view through the 
Norse myth of the Tree Igdrasil. The tree figures human history, while the heroic impulse of 
human nature is “hero-stuff,” or in Shakespeare’s phrase, “the stuff dreams are made on.” More 
importantly Carlyle portrays the development of human language through the same metaphor of 
a tree:  
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“Considering how human things circulate, each inextricably in communion with all,—
how the word I speak to you today is borrowed…from all men since the first man began 
to speak—I find no similitude so true as this of a Tree. Beautiful; altogether beautiful and 
great. The ‘Machine of the Universe,’—alas, do but think of that in contrast!30 
 
These two applications of the tree-image convey the two facets of Carlyle’s literary objection to 
theories of abstract-mechanical causation in history. For Carlyle, history is nothing but the story 
of man’s natural impulse towards “the heroic” coming to expression in different ways. While 
chronologically earlier expressions condition later expressions of the heroic, the important point 
is that, fundamentally, each is a reappearance of the same human nature in a novel form.  
This true heroic essence Carlyle finally defines in terms of “originality,” or “sincerity,” a 
faithfulness to the moral law of the universe, the law of duty. In “The Hero as Poet,” Carlyle 
expresses a conviction in the identity of moral imaginations: both the prophet and the poet, he 
says 
have penetrated…into the sacred mystery of the universe, what Goethe calls ‘the open 
secret.’ ‘Which is that great secret?’ asks one.—‘The open secret,’—open to all but seen 
by almost none! That divine mystery, which lies everywhere in all Beings, ‘the Divine 
idea of the World,’ that which lies at ‘the bottom of Appearance,’ as Fichte styles it; of 
which all Appearance, from the starry sky to the grass of the field, but especially the 
appearance of Man and his work, is but the vesture, the embodiment that renders it 
visible…. [Both the poet and the prophet] is Vates, first of all, in virtue of being sincere. 
So far Poet and Prophet, participators in the ‘open secret,’ are one.31 
 
By asserting that a fundamentally identical heroic impulse animates great souls from Mohammad 
to Milton, Carlyle denies implicitly that heroic leaders must be active men, in the sense of 
homines politici. Rather, from the beginning of On Heroes, with its portrayal of Odin, Carlyle 
imagines the hero as both a thinker and a doer: Odin is a forest-feller as well as the inventor of 
runes. By the same token, Carlyle portrays Johnson, Rousseau and Burns, the heroic men of 
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letters, as valiant warriors fallen in the line of duty. At the most simple level, then, Carlyle blurs 
any hard and fast distinction between contemplation and action—at least contemplation that has 
entered public expression in the form of writing.   
Nietzsche, too, and to a greater degree in his writings, defies the boundaries between 
contemplation and action. Although Ralph Waldo Emerson is not represented adequately in the 
present study, his work serves as a bridge between Carlyle and Nietzsche.32 In fact, the reader of 
all three of these writers will find in Nietzsche, echoes of Emerson, which trace back to Carlyle. 
One fine example will suffice. In “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche, quoting from 
Emerson’s “Circles,” says that philosophy  
ought to be…something fearsome, and men called to the search for power ought to know 
what a source of the heroic wells within it. Let an American tell them what a great thinker 
who arrives on this earth signifies as a new centre of tremendous forces. ‘Beware,’ says 
Emerson, ‘when the great God lets loose a thinker on this planet. Then all things are at 
risk. It is as when a conflagration has broken out in a great city, and no man knows when 
it is safe, or when it will end. There is not a piece of science but its flank may be turned 
tomorrow; there is not any literary reputation, not the so-called eternal names of fame, 
that may not be revised and condemned; the things which are dear to men at this hour are 
so on account of the ideas which have emerged on their mental horizon, and which cause 
the present order of things, as a tree bears apples. A new degree of culture would instantly 
revolutionize the entire system of human pursuits.33 
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The continuity between this Emersonian-Nietzschean utterance and what Carlyle says of “Odin” 
in On Heroes should speak for itself: 
For the Norse people, the Man now named Odin, and Chief Norse God, we fancy 
was such a man. A Teacher, and Captain of soul and body; a Hero, of worth 
immeasurable; admiration for whom, transcending the known bounds, became adoration. 
Has he not the power of articulate Thinking; and many other powers, as yet 
miraculous?... By him they know what to do here, what to look for hereafter. Existence 
has become articulate, melodious by him; he first has made Life alive! —We may call 
this Odin, the origin of Norse Mythology: Odin or whatever name the Firs Norse Thinker 
bore while he was among men. His view of the universe once promulgated, a like view 
starts into being in all minds; grows, keeps ever growing, while it continues credible 
there. In all minds it lay written, but invisibly, as in sympathetic ink; at his word it starts 
into visibility in all. Nay, in every epoch of the world, the great event, parent of all others, 
is it not the arrival of a thinker in the world?—34 
 
 For Carlyle, as for Emerson, the turn from Romantic speculation to pragmatic history 
takes the form of a study of heroic historical actors. Yet Emerson’s heroes, his method of 
selecting and analyzing them, his whole purport is not quite the same as Carlyle’s. Both Carlyle 
and Emerson are more individualistic than authoritarian in spite of Carlyle’s use of theocratic 
language. For Nietzsche, however, Emerson’s less theocratic emphasis on the individual 
cultivation of greatness must have been a crucial difference. But it also portends the politically 
ominous figure of the superman. 
 
Democratic Perfectionism or the Doctrine of Supermen? 
Emersonian greatness prefigures the Nietzschean imperative, cited by John Rawls in his critique 
of perfectionism in A Theory of Justice,35 that 
mankind must work continually at the production of individual great men—that and 
nothing else is its task…. For the question is this: how can your life, the individual life 
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receive the highest value, the deepest significance? How can it be least squandered? 
Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable exemplars, and 
not for the good of the majority, that is to say those who, taken individually, are the least 
valuable exemplars.36 
 
Stanley Cavell, glossing Rawls’ choice of this particular passage, remarks: “This sounds bad. 
Rawls takes it straightforwardly to imply that there is a separate class of great men (to be) for 
whose good, and conception of good, the rest of society is to live.”37 If Nieztsche’s utterance has 
this straightforward meaning, then, according to Cavell, Rawls is correct to refuse perfectionism 
“as a principle of justice pertinent to the life of democracy. But…if Nietzsche is to be dismissed 
as a thinker pertinent to the founding of democratic life, then so, it should seem is Emerson…”38 
“Nietzsche’s Meditation on Schopenhauer is, to an as yet undisclosed extent, a 
transcription and elaboration of Emersonian passages.”39 We have just observed the additional 
layer of transcription from Carlyle. But what commonalities does this indicate? Specifically, 
Cavell claims that Emerson and Nietzsche share more than a common fund of rhetoric—they 
both endorse a teaching that Cavell calls democratic moral perfectionism. “Perfectionism,” as 
Cavell interprets it,  
is not a competing theory of the moral life, but something like a dimension or tradition of 
the moral life that spans the course of Western thought and concerns what used to be 
called the state of one’s soul, a dimension that places tremendous burdens on personal 
relationships and on the possibility or necessity of the transforming of oneself and one’s 
society…40 
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 In defense of perfectionism, Cavell critiques Rawls, whom, citing the Nietzschean dictum 
above, argues that perfectionism in the extreme is a dangerous form of elitism and cannot be 
circumscribed within a democratic theory of the just society. Even in milder forms, 
perfectionism, for Rawls, is a more-or-less comprehensive teleological principle that “[directs] 
society to arrange its institutions and to define the duties and obligations of individuals so as to 
maximize the achievement of human excellence in art, in science and in culture.”41 For Rawls, 
this teleological principle manifests an unjust (read: unfair) allocation of social resources.  
 Rawls misses the point, according to Cavell. By interpreting perfectionism as a matter of 
policy pertaining to the “basic structure” of society, Rawls neglects the perfectionists’ 
characteristic aloofness from the political institutions of one’s society. More importantly, Rawls 
overlooks the fundamental perfectionist attitude that the individual’s own “constitution,” (read: 
the soul) and not the social structure, is the authentic subject of justice. In light of these things, 
Cavell claims not only that perfectionism is compatible with modern democracy, but that a 
democratic perfectionism is indispensable to the (Rawlsian) endeavor to elaborate a critique of 
democracy from within. As I shall claim in the next chapter, this perfectionist critique-from-
within is precisely the standpoint of “heroic individualism.” Furthermore, this critical standpoint 
is characterized by the authorial practice of writing-as-action, of inscribing the exception within 
the rule, or representing the voice in the text. Heroic individuals are not “great men (to be)” but 
imagined figures, whose only existence belongs in texts. 
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Summary 
As I have said, a major aim of this dissertation is to revisit Carlyle in his proper context as an 
author who grapples honestly with the difficult problem of writing as action. Chapter two 
elaborates on the conception of the heroic individual as a literary figure and narrows in on the 
contemporary philosophical context of heroic individualism. There I continue with my 
discussion of Nietzsche and the contemporary problem of the aestheticization of politics. By way 
of a brief discussion of supererogation, I also try to show how the question of moral 
perfectionism is related historically to the moral and religious problem of the state of one’s soul.  
Chapter three addresses Thomas Carlyle’s historical context as member of the generation 
following the French Revolution. This chapter concentrates on two themes: the religion of 
literature and the language of religion. The first theme speaks to the immediate historical 
circumstances of a fully secularized society in the wake of revolutionary change, while the 
second reaches far back in history to recover the meaning of political-religious language. The 
chapter culminates in a discussion of what Carlyle meant when he posited that “All true 
Reformers…are by the nature of them Priests, and strive for a Theocracy.”42 
 In chapter four we delve deeper into the heart of the matter with an extended discussion 
of the roles of the “great legislator” and civil religion in Rousseau’s Social Contract. The great 
legislator and the civil religion form a side of Rousseau’s political thought that modern 
democrats tend to skirt around, while modern critics of fascism and democratic totalitarianism 
will see in these elements of Rousseau’s political philosophy ominous forebodings of horrors yet 
to come. In a sense, Rousseau’s great legislator is an archetype of the heroic individual, however. 
Thus, while I, too, am critical of Rousseau’s political philosophy, I think it is important to place 
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the problem of the great legislator at the center of this study. Rousseau revives the ancient 
institution of the legislator in a modern context, and his effort, in the Social Contract, to exploit 
the potential of heroic authority without violating the dictates of democratic equality is a 
paradigmatic instance of the authorial ambition to inscribe the exception within the rule. 
 Chapter five returns the attention to Carlyle, through a discussion of Carlyle and 
Rousseau. The focus of this chapter is the figure of the hero as king and the resilience of the 
moral appeal to ideal kingship. Both Carlyle and Rousseau make a literary appeal to ideal 
kingship as a moral standard. They both insist on the persistence of ideal kingship as an essential 
feature of democratic morality. However, this chapter focuses on the differences between these 
two authors’ appeals and more particularly, on Carlyle’s critique of Rousseau. 
 In chapter six, we revisit the theme of Carlyle’s historical position. Only here, I engage 
more directly Carlyle’s philosophy of history. Specifically, this chapter returns to the question of 
theocracy and the role of the literary “prophet” in modern secular culture. While Carlyle himself 
is hesitant to invoke God, he takes it for a truism that there is always a “godlike” in man’s 
affairs. 
 The tension between the text and the voice, in On Heroes especially, is the focus of 
chapter seven. The impression I hope to make with this chapter is that Carlyle is not an 
“ideologue,” precisely for the reason that he recognizes a need to address the tension between the 
voice and the text, but resists the urge to reconcile the two, or create texts that can communicate 
perfectly the voice. Carlyle intentionally leaves unresolved the tension between the hero as “man 
of letters” and the hero as “king” because he perceives the irony that keeps writing from being 
able to span the gulf between contemplation and action. At the same time, however, Carlyle 
 32 
resists the temptation that Marx succumbs to, of abandoning contemplation altogether for a 
project of revolutionary activism. 
 Finally, chapter eight returns to the beginning of our discussion by revisiting the Carlyle-
Nietzsche relationship. Recently, Leslie Paul Thiele has argued that Nietzsche’s “heroic 
individualism” is a far cry from Carlyle’s “hero-worship.” This is not so. Without denying that 
there are significant differences between the philosophies of Carlyle and Nietzsche, I want to 
suggest that we can better understand both authors by acknowledging what they have in 
common. In addition to having a common exemplar in Goethe and a common point of reference 
in Rousseau, Carlyle and Nietzsche—like Emerson—are possessed by a common problem; 
namely, the relationship of writing and action. They belong together in the context of a 
discussion of modern authorial ambition. 
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Chapter Two: The Heroic Individual 
 
For what is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. That one 
preserves the distance that divides us. That one has become more indifferent to 
hardship, toil, privation, even to life. That one is ready to sacrifice men to one’s 
cause, oneself not excepted. Freedom means that the manly instincts that delight 
in war and victory have gained mastery over the other instinct for “happiness.” 
The man who has become free—and how much more the mind that has become 
free—spurns the contemptible sort of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, 
Christians, cows, women and other democrats. The free man is a warrior. 
 
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols 
 
Virtue is its own reward, but in a very different sense than you suppose, Dr. 
Gowkthrapple. The pleasure it brings! Had you ever a diseased liver? I will 
maintain, and appeal to all competent judges, that no evil conscience with a 
good nervous system ever caused a tenth part of the misery that a bad nervous 
system, conjoined with the best conscience in nature, will always produce. What 
follows, then? Pay off your moralist, and hire two apothecaries and two cooks. 
Socrates is inferior to Captain Barclay; and the ‘Enchiridion’ of Epictetus must 
hide its head before Kitchener’s ‘Peptic Receipts.’ Heed not the immortality of 
the soul so long as you have beefsteaks, porter, and—blue pills. Das hole der 
Teufel! Virtue is its own reward because it needs no reward. 
 
Thomas Carlyle’s Journal 
 
 
What does it mean to be free? This is the fundamental question of modern, or liberal, political 
philosophy. That liberalism takes individual freedom as its first principle does not minimize but 
rather increases the importance of asking this question; we must pursue the meaning of freedom 
with infinitely greater vigor if we are going to stake our public life on it alone. Yet the meaning 
of freedom is elusive, and, if Nietzsche is right, liberalism completely misses it. Of course, one 
does not need to rely on Nietzsche for a critique of the ambiguity of liberal freedom. But 
Nietzsche’s argument is peculiar: more than a critique, it poses a challenge to the liberal regime. 
Every merely conventional idea pales in comparison to Nietzsche’s radical understanding of 
freedom. Freedom is creative force: crafting one’s own meaning, defining oneself at will, making 
up new identities, devising new moves. Freedom bears no traces of obedience to the law of 
another, and that includes other editions of oneself. Strictly interpreted, this Nietzschean freedom 
 34 
is as unattainable as perfect obedience to the moral law in Kant’s sense. If such a freedom even 
is possible it must be the preserve of a select few in the whole history of human experience. 
Democracies certainly cannot rely on it, let alone turn it out in the people at large. If Nietzsche is 
correct—if freedom just is this creative action—then authentic freedom necessarily opposes 
every sham-freedom endorsed by democracy, its flimsy pursuits of happiness, comfort, 
commodity, well-being, equal opportunity, and liberty of conscience. Democracy is the very 
antithesis of freedom; it is slavish obedience to sheepish conventions. 
Yet if it is not freedom, there must be something of adamantine strength supporting 
liberal democracy; for it has been able to survive the powerful and incisive criticisms of 
Nietzsche—and more than merely survive, democratic culture has been able to appropriate 
Nietzsche’s frantic thought and translate it into the apparently levelheaded talk about “values” 
that we participate in every day. This truly is an impressive feat considering that there is no 
reason to believe Nietzsche wanted to make bedfellows with liberal-democratic culture. After all, 
democrats regard it as a chief merit of our culture that it produces the sort of person who is 
reluctant “to sacrifice men to one’s cause, oneself not excepted.”1 What, then, accounts for 
democracy’s fascination with Nietzsche? If his thought is so antidemocratic—and it is—then 
why has he become a darling of latter-day liberal philosophy? Surely the answer is in his 
individualism.  
Nietzsche’s individualism is as obvious as his support for democracy is obscure. Of 
course his is not the sort of individualism that fixates on equal rights. On the contrary, Nietzsche 
insists that there is an order of rank, specifically, a hierarchy of wills. Freedom “preserves the 
distance that divides us”: This cryptic remark suggests that freedom is not a given, rather, it is 
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the supreme attainment of a self-sovereign will. Democracy is not an end in itself but a means to 
the end of sovereign individualism. Democracy is but the political attaché, the vehicle of 
individualism, desirable only because it brings into being the psychological and social 
circumstances in which the great individual can emerge. 
Thus, Nietzsche’s philosophy lends itself to an internal critique of democratic culture 
from the perspective of an idealized individualism. For Nietzsche, however, great men redeem 
democracy; it is emphatically not the other way around. The merely “democratic” individual is 
defective insofar as he imagines himself as a moral equal with the same rights and deserving the 
same freedom as every other individual. This encourages a facile mediocrity and discourages the 
will to become who one is. To the democratic individual “it seems sufficient…to get free from 
the overpowering domination by society (whether that of the state or of the church). He does not 
oppose them as a person but only as an individual, he represents all individuals against the 
totality.” The democratic individual is one among many identical atoms whose actions flow from 
identical motives and interests. He claims no particular status for himself: “he instinctively posits 
himself as equal to all other individuals; what he gains in this struggle he gains not as a person 
but as a representative of individuals.”2  
Nietzsche’s aim is to overcome this “herd instinct,” or “herd morality” that characterizes 
the democratic individual. One scholar has interpreted Nietzsche’s attempt to overcome this 
complacency as “heroic individualism.” Heroic individualism is antidemocratic, according to this 
author, yet it is not incompatible with democracy. Admittedly, heroic individualism “necessitates 
immorality by herd standards. It demands that the hero sacrifice himself for his own ideals.” But 
there is no political incompatibility with democracy here because the struggle, the “politics,” of 
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individuation is internal to the self. The soul is a multiplicity of conflicting desires, drives, 
“motives,” and “interests” that the heroic individual must subdue, so that he may become a law 
unto himself. “The [heroic] individual becomes his own moral legislator, his own taskmaster and 
most ferocious enemy, and his own physician. Success is not measured by a long life, moral 
capital, fame, or worldly power, but by the courage needed to sacrifice these goods in the pursuit 
of one’s autonomy.”3 
 The portrayal of Nietzsche as a heroic individualist is somewhat persuasive though it flies 
in the face of Nietzsche’s remark that freedom demands the readiness “to sacrifice men to one’s 
cause, oneself not excepted.” What type of individual is that? And can a democracy tolerate 
him? More importantly, how does it come about that the “free” man is “his own cause,” his own 
moral legislator, to whose sole purpose every sacrifice is consecrated? What accounts for this 
strange heroic ideal, neither classical nor Christian, though sometimes appearing in the guise of 
both; and most remarkably, as “Caesar with the soul of Christ”? Finally, is the idea of heroic 
individualism tenable? In order to answer these questions we will have to ask yet broader 
questions concerning the relationship between heroism and politics, and between heroism and 
moral freedom. 
 
Heroism and Politics 
Heroism is the literary way of talking about politics. The “heroic,” so to speak, is where the 
political regime meets the poetic and moral imagination. Stories about heroes, epic stories, are a 
basic mode of moral and political education. Because human beings are by nature tellers of 
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stories, and we first learn by stories, epic narratives have a powerful educative effect—for better 
or worse—on the listener. At least, this has been the conventional wisdom ever since Plato 
inscribed his famous quarrel with Homer in the Republic. The poets’ portrayal of heroes has 
remained a topic of vigorous debate in the Western tradition of political philosophy. Political 
philosophers try more or less to tame the hero, to domesticate him for the regime. Philosophy 
presupposes civilization. What civilizations need are not heroes, strictly speaking, but citizens or 
subjects. Generally one can say that by the time philosophy enters the scene, the heroic age has 
ended. 
This old wisdom needs a defense. For the modern viewpoint suggests that literature and 
politics belong to opposite realities. Political science, qua science, addresses itself to the 
external, objective world. This is a world made up of concrete goods regulated by positive law, 
or perhaps determined by sociological law. The literary mind tends to reach the same conclusion 
as the scientific, but for opposite reasons. Literature addresses itself to the interior realm. It is 
only tangentially related to the external world of behavior. The poetic imagination resists being 
defined or determined by the outside world. These two realities exist alongside each other, but 
apparently cannot speak on common terms. If heroism has anything to say to politics, political 
science is deaf to it.  
Perhaps the question belongs to political philosophy, if not to political science. Yet 
modern political philosophy rejects the entire discussion of virtue and the quarrel with poetry 
along with it, on the one hand; while, on the other hand, anti-modern philosophers of both 
individualist and collectivist sympathies commend activism of the sort one normally associates 
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with the heroic, that is, pre-philosophical, age of history.4 What has happened to paideia in all of 
this? Does the modern dispensation annul this old question, since individuals are free to choose 
any poet they like, because everyone ultimately gets to be his own poet? This fails to satisfy 
common sense. The way heroism speaks to politics may be radically different today, but it still 
speaks if we will only listen. To get ears for it we shall have to turn elsewhere, to ancient 
philosophy. 
 
Aristotle on Moral Action 
We are proceeding on the hunch that by thinking through the problem of heroism we can find a 
point of communication between literature and politics—in contrast to the voiceless relationship 
between facts and values. The first thing we must do, then, is clarify what we mean by heroism. 
The key to this is to distinguish between the hero as a (real or fictional) character, and the heroic, 
which, as a specific quality, pertains not to character but to action. In the Poetics, Aristotle 
rectifies the common error of mistaking the hero for what is heroic:  
The Unity of a Plot does not consist, as some suppose, in its having one man as its 
subject. An infinity of things befall one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to 
unity; and…there are many actions of one man which cannot be made to form one action.  
 
If not the life or character of the hero, what gives unity to the plot of an epic? Aristotle replies 
that it is the unity of action: 
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The truth is that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so 
in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a complete 
whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of 
any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole.5 
 
Aristotle comes shortly hereafter to a rather remarkable conclusion about the poet. “The poet,” 
he judges, “must be more the poet of his stories or Plots than his verses, inasmuch as he is a poet 
by virtue of the imitative element in his work, and it is actions that he imitates.”  
 What does Aristotle mean by the unity of action? What sort of thing is it that the poet is 
said to imitate? Aristotle does not give an account of action in the Poetics. To learn more we 
must turn to the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle talks a great deal about action.6 One might 
say that action is the chief theme of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics. It is here that Aristotle 
explores the faculty of practical wisdom, which is the ability to deliberate well and thus to make 
good choices. Action and choice are intimately related. “Choice is the starting point of action: it 
is the source of motion but not the end for the sake of which we act. The starting point of choice, 
however, is desire and reasoning directed toward some end.”7  
The unity of an action is moral unity. Actions are moral wholes to which we attach 
evaluative terms like “good” or “bad.” As agents responsible for moral actions we are subject to 
praise or blame since what we do reflects the quality of our ability to deliberate, as well as our 
character. As moral agents all of us can make choices. We are the “starting point” of our own 
activity. But we do not choose arbitrarily; before taking action we consult any number of needs 
and desires, the various goods within reach, and the means at our disposal. “No one deliberates 
about things that cannot be other than they are or about actions that he cannot possibly perform.” 
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Rather, deliberation over potential actions takes the form of “reasoning directed toward some 
end.” In the process of deliberation we consult various desires and goods, ordering them toward 
a goal that is prescribed by nature or convention. All people are not equal when it comes to the 
ability to deliberate. To be morally good, an action has to be performed at the right time, in the 
right way, for the right reasons and so on. In turn, to act well one must be skilled in deliberation. 
The ability to deliberate well is called practical wisdom; “virtue makes us aim at the right target, 
and practical wisdom makes us use the right means.”8  
Practical wisdom is a unique faculty in that it connects the human intellect with the world 
of particular and changeable things; that is, the world of action. Practical wisdom “is neither a 
pure science nor an art. It is not a pure science, because matters of action admit of being other 
than they are, and it is not an applied science or art, because action and production are 
generically different.” 
What remains, then, is that it is a truthful characteristic of acting rationally in matters 
good or bad for man. For production has an end other than itself, but action does not: 
good action is itself an end. That is why we think that Pericles and men like him have 
practical wisdom. They have the capacity of seeing what is good for themselves and for 
mankind, and these are, we believe, the qualities of men capable of managing households 
and states.9 
 
A great statesman like Pericles deserves to be praised as a paragon of practical wisdom. The 
example of such men also affords the best education in practical wisdom. There cannot be 
theoretical knowledge of particular things, not even of the “ultimate particular fact, of which 
there is perception but no scientific knowledge.”10 “Therefore, we ought to pay as much attention 
to the sayings and opinions, undemonstrated though they are, of wise and experienced older men 
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as we do to demonstrated truths. For experience has given such men an eye with which they can 
see correctly.”11  
Returning to our main interest, the heroic, we now can appreciate that the poet’s imitation 
of action is not simply entertainment, but a mirror of moral reality. Accordingly the complete 
representation of an action will include all of the elements of deliberation just enumerated. A 
good poet must be able to distinguish between good and bad characters, deliberations and 
actions. This begins to account for the political relevance of poetry.  Since political life builds 
upon moral life, it is apparent that poetry is a medium of considerable relevance to the polis. 
Although one can disagree, as Aristotle disagreed with Plato, regarding the effect of poetry on 
the polis, one cannot deny this educative function. For this reason Aristotle concludes that 
“poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history.” History merely 
“describes the thing that has been,” but poetry, “a kind of thing that might be” (i.e. an action).12  
 
Nietzsche and the Aestheticization of Action 
There is no greater contrast than that between Aristotle’s rendering of action as the product of 
moral reasoning and Nietzsche’s depiction of action as a masterful exercise of the creative will. 
For Aristotle action springs from character; whereas for Nietzsche, characters are made by 
action.13 For Aristotle literature imitates moral life; for Nietzsche life is literature. Nietzsche 
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concludes that the moral reasoning described by Aristotle is no longer tenable; there is no longer 
a rational foundation for morality because there is no longer an invisible world of nature or god 
to back it up. All that exists is the world of appearances, nature is red in tooth and claw, and god 
has been murdered. Of course Nietzsche does not claim responsibility for this historical fact: the 
death of God for Nietzsche is a fait accompli. But rather than live out his inheritance in a world 
without meaning Nietzsche emerges as the prophet of his own divinity. The Nietzschean hero 
“refuses to be armed by the gods, as was the boon claimed by the greatest heroes of the ancient 
poets. The overman is the hero of an atheistic and morally destitute world; he presents the 
paradox of the avid pursuit of greatness when no transcendental standards exist.”14  
Human action appears in a radically different light depending upon how one conceives of 
the reality in which man acts. Accordingly, the wide gulf between Aristotle’s and Nietzsche’s 
concept of the heroic can be accounted for by the difference between the ancient and modern 
views of cosmology and human nature. For Aristotle man is a social and political creature; moral 
deliberation and action is a socially informed process. The social nature of action does not rule 
out the interpretation of moral virtue is a sort of freedom; in fact, Aristotle concludes that the 
human good is autarchia, or self-sufficiency, which is a sort of freedom. However, the ancients 
“define something as self-sufficient not by reference to the ‘self’ alone. We do not mean a man 
who lives his life in isolation, but a man who also lives with parents, children, a wife, and friends 
and fellow citizens generally, since man is by nature a social and political being.”15  
Aristotle bases his account of morality on the twin premises that “the good is the aim of 
all action” and that “politics is the master science of the good.” To be sure, a great deal of 
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uncertainty and disagreement attends any discussion of the human good. “Problems of what is 
noble and just, which politics examines, present so much variety and irregularity that some 
people believe that they exist only by convention and not by nature. The problem of the good, 
too, presents a similar kind of irregularity.” Yet, despite the relative imprecision of moral 
knowledge Aristotle insists that the good is by nature, for it is the discovery of nature (over and 
against convention) that underlies the philosopher’s authority. That we do not have demonstrable 
knowledge of the human good is no reason to deny its existence; all it implies is that knowledge 
of the good is mediated by experience and common opinion rather than “theoretical” 
demonstration. Moral knowledge is social knowledge; its object is moral and political action. 
The crown of moral virtue is justice, that is, virtuous action towards one’s fellows.  
Modernity turns Aristotle on his head. For Aristotle an action is the conclusion of 
reasoning process that reflects the quality of deliberation and character of the agent; and 
consequently deserves either praise or blame. But for the moderns, man is “really” an individual 
and not a social creature. “It is the interior world by which man defines himself and a command 
man addresses himself; he is at once sovereign lawgiver and subject. He becomes the man he is 
by giving himself the law which he obeys, and by obeying the law he gives himself.”16  
To abide by the rule of nature or any other man is to fall short of one’s own humanity. If 
every man is his own lawgiver, then human freedom takes the form of autonomy rather than 
autarky. Autarky was seen as the raison d'être of nature: self-sufficiency par excellence.  
Accordingly, the moderns characterize action as initiative rather than conclusion. As 
Hannah Arendt summarizes: “To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to 
                                                 
16
 Pierre Manent, The City of Man (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998) p. 126. 
 44 
begin…to set something into motion.”17 Qua individual, man is a legislative being and comes 
into his own only by asserting the autonomous will over and against nature. Modern man avows 
that no rule is legitimate which he has not imposed on himself. He is an entrenched skeptic, if not 
nonbeliever, with respect to the existence of an overarching teleological good. He will define the 
good for himself, according to his own lights.  
Nietzsche’s heroic individual is the most radical, not to say absurd portrayal of the type 
of heroism that results from this modern concept of man. Classical heroism necessitated a great 
public deed such as facing up to a king, founding, or saving a nation. Without this publicity—
confined within the individual alone—heroism makes little sense. Certainly the publicity of 
classical heroism is incompatible with the self absorption of modern individualism. It comes as 
no surprise, then, that the modern heroic individual has never appeared as an actor on the stage 
of world history but only in speculation or fiction, on the pages of books and in the eye of the 
mind. The modern heroic individual is only sovereign in the realm of imagination. 
Nevertheless the heroic individual is a politically significant fiction. Moreover, it not 
merely a Nietzschean idiosyncrasy, but a pervasive mood of nineteenth and twentieth century 
social philosophy with deep roots in our culture, that shows no sign of waning. We do ourselves 
a disservice to the extent that we let Nietzsche’s radical and idiosyncratic expression monopolize 
all thought on this subject. For, the difficulty we have encountered in interpreting Nietzsche’s 
political philosophy results precisely from his desire to unshackle the heroic individual from the 
imaginative realm and make it a socially operative principle. Paradoxically, this task required the 
absorption of all reality into Nietzsche’s aesthetic imagination. Again, all that is “real” for 
Nietzsche is the creative act. “The world, in [his] view, exists only as a ‘sign-chain’ awaiting 
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investment...” To the extent that Nietzsche actually succeeds at impressing the world with his 
own image, that image becomes meaningless, simply another object of interpretive violence. 
“Insofar as the audience does have a place in the Nietzschean paradigm, it is in the contemporary 
form of interpretivism: the audience is seen as an aggregate of interpreters or critics, each 
seeking to impose his own reading on any given performance.”18  
The heroic individual is a denizen of the literary intellect that emerges in one shape or 
another in countless modern minds. He is born of a virulent reaction against the shabby 
individual at the foundation of modern political philosophy. Modern political philosophy is most 
familiar with a different type of individual, a creature of formalism, animated by self-
preservation, motives and interests, defined by “freedoms from” and so on. This is the 
democratic individual we encountered earlier. The heroic individual looks down his nose at 
anyone so preoccupied with the base drive for survival; he would be willing to die for his cause. 
Nevertheless it must be emphasized that the heroic individual still is an “individual”—that is, an 
estranged creature of modernity, a “free man.” The heroic individualist may adhere to democracy 
but not for its own sake, nor that of “community.” He is possessed by a familiar concern about 
democracy: that democratic political emancipation creates a dangerously false, albeit attractive 
sense of freedom; and that under the pressure of this illusion and its egalitarian tendency to 
suppress distinction, authentic freedom—greatness—will disappear from the world.  
Understood in this way, heroic individualism relies on the elevation of the will (over 
reason and nature) initiated by Kant and Rousseau. These philosophers aimed to elevate the 
social contract morally by reinterpreting it as an ethical imperative of the universal or general 
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will that the individual can—indeed, must—obey without annulling his inherent freedom. Put 
over-simply, Kant’s and Rousseau’s theories would make of all men moral equals under the 
aspect of a Moral Law that each can respect because it respects the dignity of all. The heroic 
individualist merely collapses this scheme by asserting the sovereignty of the particular will over 
and against any corporate will, be it general or universal.  
Once Rousseau had pushed to its farthest limits by compressing it into extreme 
generality and extreme particularity, political philosophy abandoned the notion of 
contract. No other mind after him dared or was able to embrace such a contradiction. The 
way out could be sought in two directions: either from the side of pure particularity that 
would perhaps allow the will and nature to be reconciled in an unprecedented way; or 
from the side of pure generality which would necessitate at least a rupture of law with 
nature, even if the attachment had been tenuous and reluctant. The first is the path chosen 
by Nietzsche.19 
 
In its initial formulation social contract theory deployed a notion of legitimacy that for 
the first time made the individual the foundation of moral and political right; but this was 
purchased dearly, at the expense of the particular personality with all its distinction. In the early 
modern scheme the “individual” is an automaton motivated by his innate drive for self-
preservation and affiliated interest in the protection of property. This creature is not, as Aristotle 
has it, the deliberating agent responsible for his own actions but a mere pleasure-seeking-pain-
avoiding machine. The regime, which used to have as its first aim the formation of the character 
of citizens, is now a machine for the preservation of life, or property, or for the perpetuation of 
the Pleasure Principle. Contract theory elevates the individual only to submerge his particularity 
under the incalculable weight of communal necessity. Kant opposes this tendency of modern 
political theory by championing the good (moral) will; while Rousseau’s distaste for this 
ignobleness led to his famous “intoxication” with virtue.  
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We are still living in the wake of this revolution. To a great degree, its radical elevation 
of the will explains our contemporary intoxication with action. For if man is will, the life of 
action is the most appropriate life for man, rather than the life of contemplation. Contemplation 
is discredited as an activity. Hitherto “philosophers have only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point is to change it.”20  
Everyone is familiar with activism of the collectivist type. Collectivist activism takes the 
second path mentioned above; it radically interprets modern idealism “from the side of pure 
generality.” Consequently the heroic actor of the collectivist historical narrative is a whole class 
which, according to historical law, finally will effect man’s mastery over nature. The heroic 
individualist like Nietzsche takes the opposite route, and, rejecting law altogether, celebrates the 
irrationality of the will. The result, on the political side, is what has been called “prophetic 
irrationalism.”  
On the intellectual side, the result is a new aesthetic interpretation of history: for if man is 
will, human being essentially is historical being. Furthermore, if the will is “irrational,” then 
history also is somewhat irrational. History is the story of the will; history is moved by what 
most pleases the will. More specifically, then, history is the history of human greatness, or of 
“triumphs” of the will. History happens whenever humanity breaks its own mold. 
But what is “greatness”? Understood thus, greatness no longer appears to be a moral 
distinction. Was it ever a moral distinction?—moral categories apply to ordinary life but great 
actions are extraordinary by definition. Does action, in the most precise sense, transcend moral 
judgment? Is action answerable only to the aesthetic judgment, as Arendt, for example, suggests? 
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Arendt’s view of history is a much more sober counterpart of Nietzsche’s heroics. But Arendt, 
too, insists that human action—political action—is self-disclosure, the expression of one’s image 
in words and deeds. This creative activity is the real distinguishing mark of politics, the activity 
of making the world in common.  
Arendt rejects Nietzsche’s sovereign individualism because it is anti-political; hers is a 
non-sovereign, pluralistic view of political action, a “whole world of heroes,” to borrow Thomas 
Carlyle’s phrase. Nevertheless, Arendt sustains the aesthetic interpretation of 
freedom/action/history. Arendt curbs Nietzsche’s solipsism by introducing the role of the 
disinterested spectator as a sort of referee who judges action according to the common sense, or 
sensus communis. The spectator’s faculty of judgment, described in Kant’s third critique, is an 
aesthetic rather than a moral or intellectual faculty. Therefore action has its own idiom—
“virtuosity”—that is impenetrable to moral or intellectual considerations. “Freedom as inherent 
in action is perhaps best illustrated by Machiavelli’s concept of virtu…. Its meaning is best 
rendered as “virtuosity,” that is, an excellence we attribute to the performing arts…where the 
accomplishment lies in the performance itself and not in the end product which outlasts the 
activity…virtuosity of performance is decisive.”21  
 Is the free man, then—the genuine hero—a Machiavellian prince? This image may 
satisfy the literary imagination but it hardly does justice to the moral intuition which urges, at 
least, that a hero should not be a dissembler. We will return to this point much later. For now, to 
get a better grasp of the issue, we must recount the story of morality as it relates to freedom and 
to heroism especially. For the question seems to revolve around the proper manner of political 
judgment. “Whereas in the Aristotelian model it is the exemplary quality of the phronimos that 
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grants it validity, in the Kantian [Arendtian] model the ground of the validity of our (aesthetic) 
judgments is their universal communicability with the hope of winning the assent of all.”22 The 
relativization of the modern world compromises the Aristotelian model by bringing into question 
any context-bound standards of morality; while the aesthetic model threatens to unmoor us from 
moral standards altogether.  
 
Heroism and Morality 
The obverse of Nietzsche’s heromania is the notion that we are in a post-heroic (to some, anti-
heroic) age. Nietzsche seems to agree with this assessment, only he finds it so distasteful that he 
dedicates himself to combating it. Nietzsche’s literary manner of acting out heroic impulses is 
unique in that his own activity, his exercise of a freedom beyond good and evil, never actually 
occurs outside of his texts. Indeed, it may be that only a post-heroic culture can abide a doctrine 
of radical heroism like Zarathustra’s, since it is unlikely to produce any significant political 
consequences. Of course, this is highly debatable. In any case, the remainder of this chapter will 
consider the problem of heroism from the side of morality, or of the moral law. From this 
perspective the hero appears as a perennial difficulty of moral philosophy, suggesting that 
Zarathustra’s radical heroism is at the core of Nietzsche’s “immoralism.” 
 
The Taming of the Ancient Hero 
In its Homeric origins the word hero is an honorific affixed, not surprisingly, to the “free man.” 
Nevertheless, classical heroism is social, not individualistic: “hero” merely designates every 
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Greek who participated in the Trojan War. “Honorific” implies honor, and—as every reader of 
Plato knows—honor needs a public. It is the fickleness of public honor that encouraged the 
classical philosophers to reject political activity as the highest or, most free, way of life; they 
judged philosophical contemplation to be a higher pursuit than the active (political) life precisely 
because the pleasure of philosophy is more self-sufficient than that of politics, for its fulfillment 
does not require an adoring public. The classical philosophers meant to tame the hero for the 
sake of the regime. 
Although the status of heroism is often overlooked in moral and political discourse, one 
cannot deny that heroism—heroic courage and freedom of action—plays an important role in 
shaping civilization. Once civilization has been achieved and the hero’s work done, the heroic 
ideal continues to inform civilization in the literary mode of moral education. In civilized 
society, “heroism is the domain of the poet’s formation of the people.”23 But in heroic society, 
such stories constitute the moral dialect: they are the primary account of morality.  
A typical example of heroic society is ancient Greece before the rise of philosophy. At 
this time the authoritative account of moral life could be found in the Homeric epics and the 
cosmological poems. Such poems are more than mere allegory; they form a symbolic dialect 
coextensive with practical (moral) life, and descriptive of man’s place in the world, within his 
family and his society, and under the canopy of heaven. “What is involved 
in…understanding…the connections between courage, friendship, fidelity, the household, fate 
and death…? Surely that human life has a determinate form, the form of a certain kind of 
story.… [I]n their narrative form poems and sagas capture a form…already present in the lives to 
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which [people] relate.”24 Epic stories do more than just chronicle life; they give people their 
bearings in life. Once this has been captured in an epic narrative it can be conveyed, through 
tradition, to many generations, providing a sense of national identity. It is hard to overstate the 
importance of this development, for without the gigantic act of social cooperation required to 
build and sustain civilization is unimaginable. 
Even the philosophers honor Homer as the “educator of Hellas.” After all, philosophy 
owes its existence to heroic society. Accordingly philosophy credits poetry as an approximation 
of truth. Although philosophy claims superiority over poetry in closeness to truth, and thus holds 
poetry to a philosophical standard, philosophy does not reject the use of stories to communicate 
moral truth. Moreover, the morality of virtue (or excellence) enjoined by classical philosophy 
has as its backdrop the heroic view of life portrayed by Homer.  
Heroic society is hierarchical by nature, because its only standard is one’s ability to act. 
One is whatever one can do. “By performing actions of a particular kind in a particular situation 
a man gives warrant for judgment upon his virtues and vices; for the virtues just are those 
qualities which sustain a free man in his role and which manifest themselves in those actions.”25 
In theory, at least, there is no difference between the virtuous and the strong, between morality 
and social structure, right and might, in a heroic society. With classical civilization, however, 
this begins to change. Although classical society remains hierarchical, it refines the distinction 
between might and right. In the classical mind the virtues are appreciated for their own sake; 
accordingly, they suffer detachment from the particularity of a “free man in his role.” The 
“unfree” man basically remains unaccounted for in the classical view (except perhaps as the 
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“slave by nature”). The “free” man, no longer a hero, becomes a virtuous citizen. Classical 
morality encourages in the citizen (the free man) many of the aristocratic virtues associated with 
heroism, but citizenship in a regime is not sovereign heroism. “There are no more kings, even 
though the virtues of kingship are still held to be virtues.”26 
The heroic age comes to an end with the dawn of philosophy. The philosopher lifts the 
hero out of his circumstances and looks for the simple enduring essence of his greatness. Under 
the gaze of philosophy, heroism becomes moral virtue. If this abstraction seems awkward—even 
foreign—to the reality of heroism, that is because it is. After all, “the free man is warrior” 
passionately engaged in pursuing his object in a detailed world of diverse particular things. All 
of these particularities are “accidents” from the point of view of a philosophical spectator; they 
belong to the world of mere appearance. Philosophy interrogates heroism for its essential 
qualities, which are the virtues; and reduces the hero into essential greatness of soul. 
Furthermore, political philosophy defines the measure of greatness by reference to the aims of 
the regime, or of the laws, or ideal justice. This is the rationale behind the infamous censorship 
of poetry in Plato’s Republic: certain depictions of heroism are incompatible with the type of 
citizens desired in a perfectly just regime.  
 Of course, modern society is a great distance from classical and heroic society. In terms 
of morality, the key difference is that moderns assume that every human being by nature is (or 
ought to be) “free.” This assumption is manifest in the social contract view. In all its various 
forms the social contract consistently implies that man in his natural state is an autonomous 
moral agent. This makes individual consent the basic, apparently natural, measure of justice.  
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It is true that classical philosophy entertains some notion of a universal human nature; it 
does so merely by taking “man” as its object. But classical philosophy does not assert that man 
by nature is “free”—far from it. In the classical scheme, freedom is not the basic condition so 
much as the object or goal of a human life. Freedom, understood as self-sufficiency, defines the 
good life and is the highest possible achievement of virtue. “Courage,” “temperance,” “wisdom” 
and “justice” name hard-won freedoms over fear, passion, the appetites, ignorance and self-
preference. The virtues form the basis of ethics, whose aim is to prepare free men for the 
political activity of citizenship. 
The assumption that man is free by nature is a source of significant disagreement between 
modern and ancient political philosophy. If man is free by nature, then there is no natural 
hierarchy of human types; there are no “natural” leaders (or followers). All relationships of 
unequal status suddenly appear questionable and in need of justification. As Rousseau radically 
formulates the problem, “Man was born free, but everywhere he is in chains.” 
The assumption of man’s natural freedom reverses the classical scheme. Consequently 
the object of modern morality is not to so much to achieve freedom as not to lose it. The central 
concern of modern ethics is to avoid, as much as possible, having one’s liberty taken away (on 
account of the selfish designs of others, for example, or the structural inequalities of society). 
The morality of virtue or excellence does not suit this end nearly as well as the morality of rights 
and duties, which elevates fairness over merit. “For the classical philosopher, the virtuous man is 
one who transcends the world of claims and counter-claims, rights and duties. For the [modern] 
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deontological theorist, he is the person who is ‘conscientious and scrupulously fair’ in his 
conduct.”27  
If the ancient notion of the great man is the engaged man of action, the modern notion is 
that of the ideal judge or spectator, who observes perfectly the rules of fairness and objectivity. 
Both of these formulations put forward plausible rules of justice, but for practically opposite 
reasons. The old morality of virtue continues to have a strong hold on us because of its 
connection with strength of character and concrete achievements. The new morality of fairness 
aims to avoid the exploitation of the weak by the strong, but at the expense of any positive 
criterion of excellence save that of the perfectly objective spectator. This view implies a 
connection between justice and perfect passivity; or, at least, it obscures the meaning of action 
severely. To get a better grasp of this, let us survey the problem of heroism in contemporary 
morals. 
 
The Ambiguity of Heroism and Duty 
In contemporary morals, heroism belongs to a little-discussed category of acts known as 
supererogatory acts. “Supererogation” means giving more than what is due: supererogatory acts 
are acts that go above and beyond the call of duty. By definition, a supererogatory act is morally 
praiseworthy, but not obligatory. Accordingly, it is not blameworthy to forbear from a 
supererogatory act. This corresponds to our basic intuition that heroism is a species of 
excellence, is something extraordinary: most people will not act heroically (most of the time). 
But modern morality maintains that it would be unfair to hold someone to account for this 
failure, because we do not expect the mass of people to be morally excellent. We expect, rather, 
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that they will meet their basic obligations; and only in rare circumstances will anyone exceed the 
minimum.  
Such is our contemporary idea of heroism. But as it turns out, this idea may not hold up 
to philosophical scrutiny. The problem of heroism has only recently appeared in academic 
philosophy. In “Saints and Heroes,” J.O. Urmson proposes that heroism and saintliness are the 
paradigmatic cases of supererogation. To illustrate his theory of heroism Urmson uses the 
following example: imagine a soldier, who, during a training operation, notices a live grenade on 
the field and jumps on it, rather than letting his fellows perish. The soldier has performed a 
supererogatory act; the example easily satisfies the three conditions attaching to heroism: we 
consider the soldier’s action to be praiseworthy, all the while acknowledging that he was under 
no obligation to perform it; and we would not blame him—nor do we blame the other, surviving, 
soldiers—for omitting so to act. The remarkable correspondence between our pre-philosophical 
notion of heroism and the technical one here illustrated is almost enough to confirm that heroism 
really exists and can be classified as a moral phenomenon, as supererogation.  
But it is not that simple. “Anti-supererogation”—the argument that there is no 
praiseworthy act that is not also obligatory—has a long history. Furthermore, it exerts a 
surprisingly strong influence on modern moral philosophy. Anti-supererogationism constitutes a 
large body of philosophical and theological objections to this modern concept of the heroic. It 
will be easier to understand the widespread suspicion of supererogation if we have a better grasp 
of its history. Significantly, “supererogation” enters the moral vocabulary not by way of 
philosophy proper, but of Christian theology. In the Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas argues 
for the possibility of supererogation action by relating it to the difference between God’s 
counsels, and His commandments: 
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The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies 
obligation, whereas a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom it is given. So in the 
New Law, which is the law of liberty, counsels are fittingly added to the commandments, 
but not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage.28 
 
Commandments are obligatory. As the word “bondage” implies, one can rightly be coerced into 
observing, or punished for violating the commandments. On the other hand, counsels relate to 
the free choice, the liberty, of moral life. Thomas clearly advises that it in our best interest to 
abide by God’s counsels much of the time, though not always. Counsels are to be observed to 
varying degrees depending upon the person. The three areas of life to which God’s counsels 
apply are wealth, carnal pleasure and ambition.29 The three virtues that emanate from these 
counsels—poverty, chastity and obedience—typify the Monastic ideal. Certainly not everyone 
ought to be a monk. 
 Thomas’ account of supererogation obviously has an important place in the intellectual 
bulwarks of Christianity. The priestly or monastic life is not for everybody; nevertheless poverty, 
chastity, and obedience are praiseworthy virtues—in fact, they are supremely praiseworthy. In 
this sense everyone is called to sanctification, regardless of how many are chosen. Subduing his 
or her own worldly inclination, in obedience to the will of God and the supreme law of love, the 
saint enacts a most heroic accomplishment. The greatest liberty inheres in this inward discipline 
by which the saint overcomes bondage to the world.  
 Whatever the appeal of Aquinas’ view, it suffers the misfortune of having been 
implicated in the greatest political scandal of the Church in the eyes of the Protestant 
Reformation: the sale of indulgences. Although not designed for the purpose, the doctrine of 
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supererogation could be brought in to defend the sale of indulgences, since it ostensibly supports 
the Church’s claim to possess a capital of unspent good works that lesser souls could take 
advantage of in order to reduce their stay in Purgatory. As the sale of indulgences was abhorrent 
to the protestant reformers, the doctrine of supererogation endured devastating theological 
criticism. Luther and Calvin both strike at the very root of the idea by denying the basic 
distinction between God’s counsels and God’s commandments; for the reformers, all divine law 
has the force of a commandment or imperative. To the extent that one has liberty, it is the liberty 
to believe (and so abide by the whole of) the revealed law of God, or not. This has the effect of 
writing supererogation out of existence, but it also tends to identify the natural obligations of the 
individual with obedience to the divine law of love. It ought to be observed, then, that the denial 
of supererogation tends to increase, rather than lower what is required of the ordinary believer. 
Calvin’s famous dictum on the “utter depravity” of human nature is quite understandable in light 
of this strenuous interpretation of the scope of God’s commandments.  
On the other hand, by absorbing counsels into commandments, the reformers also greatly 
restrict the role of freedom within the realm of moral action, as mentioned above; this has the 
effect of obscuring the relationship between liberty and the law of love. Calvin claims that “the 
Schoolmen” turn commandments into counsels because “they seem too burdensome and too 
heavy, especially for Christians who are under the law of grace. Do they dare thus to abolish 
God’s eternal law that we are to love our neighbor?” The law, for Calvin, is a uniform code 
“delivered to all Jews and then to all Christians in common,” and making equal demands upon 
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all. “Either let them blot out these things from the law,” he complains, “or recognize that the 
Lord was Lawgiver, and let them not falsely misrepresent him as a mere giver of counsel.”30 
 Generally speaking, in the judgment of Reformation theology there is no morally 
praiseworthy act that is not also morally obligatory. “Given their position, the laws of God are 
obligatory without exception, and they are directed to all persons without exception.”31 The 
scope of our duty under God’s Law is so comprehensive that it is impossible to imagine any 
person achieving what it demands. In this light, the claim of supererogation appears not only as 
unrealistic, but arrogant, even deluded. In the radical perspective of Protestantism, the only 
person capable of a supererogatory act is God; and indeed He performs a supererogatory act by 
extending grace to human beings, when He has no such obligation. But it is precisely God’s 
supererogatory extension of grace that makes personal salvation from the worldly self possible. 
The human will is perverse; rectitude is predicated of the divine will working through the 
individual. 
Secular moral philosophy since the reformation generally adheres to the twin tendencies 
of interpreting morality in terms of universal law, and treating claims of supererogation with 
suspicion. That there are good actions which exceed the bounds of duty is a claim modern 
morality is hard pressed to accommodate. The two main schools of modern morals, Kantianism 
and utilitarianism, leave little or no room for supererogation. In Kantian (deontic) morality, 
whatever goes beyond duty is morally indifferent; on the other hand, for the utilitarian or 
consequentialist, whatever is good is also obligatory. Heroism appears not to fit with the moral 
law. But does that put it beyond morality? 
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This question is exceedingly complex. The moral idealism underlying modern democratic 
individualism retains a strong bias against greatness on account of the apparent connection 
between greatness and selfish ambition, or the blind drive for success, or the desire for public 
distinction, or for honor. Morally good acts, it is said, ought to proceed from an internal sense of 
duty: the inherent dignity of the individual, rather than the external drive for distinction. Modern 
democratic idealism insists that autonomy of the will is the essence of moral goodness as 
strenuously as the reformer insisted on the dependence of individual goodness on the will of 
God. On the surface there appears a complete reversal of terms, but in actuality an important 
coherence exists between the views of the reformer and the modern democratic idealist, both of 
whom agree on the endogenous quality of moral goodness. Put very simply, the democratic 
idealist merely replaces the divine will with formal notions like the will of universal humanity or 
the “general will” of society. In both cases moral goodness means voluntary obedience of the 
individual to the moral law. This obedience is an intentional determination of the soul, or of 
consciousness, that is strictly indifferent to external considerations.  
The public distinction associated with “greatness” thus renders heroism suspect not only 
as a moral but as an educational ideal. The ostensible hero might really be a Machiavellian 
prince, who merely cultivates the appearance of goodness as a contrivance designed to satisfy his 
real object; namely, personal ambition and lust for power. Kant, for instance, expresses a 
common fear of “non moral motives producing actions which appear to be highly moral. 
The pursuit of merit is regarded as a ‘pathological’ inclination. People are attracted by the 
fact that supererogation is not restricted by obedience to the moral law. But this is exactly 
the educational danger. Men should be taught that the moral worth of an action derives 
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from a ‘submissive disposition.’ A duty can be traced in any noble or magnanimous act, 
and it is that element of the act, rather than its merit, which should be emphasized.32 
 
No longer considered as a moral ideal or a useful element of character education, heroism seems 
to have escaped completely into the realm of literature, aesthetics, and the imagination. But it is 
not at all clear that this escape renders heroism as a phenomenon of merely literary interest. For 
we have seen that there is a longstanding connection between the heroic and the political; and, if 
this connection still obtains, then the literary fiction of the heroic individual is a political fact of 
considerable significance. Again we find confirmation of this possibility in the figure of 
Nietzsche, whose contribution to modern moral discourse is marked not only by his conception 
of ethically creative action, but also by his unparalleled defense of ambition. From the very 
beginning of his career, Nietzsche attempts to return humanity to nature by trying to inculcate a 
duty to be ambitious. Thus at the beginning of his career Nietzsche already is reminding the 
reader of the ancient imperative that “every talent must unfold itself in fighting: that is the 
command of Hellenic popular pedagogy, whereas modern educators dread nothing more than the 
unleashing of so-called ambition.”33 
 
Conclusion: Heroic Authority and the Philosophy of Literature 
Let us pause a moment and go over what we have said so far of the heroic individual. In the first 
part of this chapter we took up the question of heroism from the side of freedom, relying on the 
original (Homeric) designation of the hero as a “free man.” Heroism is broadly associated with 
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free action; but there is a great difference between the ancient and modern senses of action. For 
the ancients, action is the conclusive element of a moral or practical syllogism (and freedom is 
freedom from error), but the moderns see action in terms of initiative and creativity (and freedom 
in terms of virtuosity). The ancient archetype of the political actor is the phronimos, whose moral 
understanding derives from experience in practical affairs; alternatively, the modern archetype is 
the political artist, whose first exemplar is the Machiavellian prince. As a political artist, 
Machiavelli’s “armed prophet” supposedly constructs society from a standpoint outside of 
society, as if he were a painter or a sculptor—or perhaps, an engineer. 34  
In the second part we considered heroism generally from the side of moral philosophy, 
and then, in particular, the moral law. Here we find a thornier relationship between heroism and 
freedom, the history of which involves a gradual extension of the law over the field of moral 
action that culminates in the exclusion of greatness as a moral notion. In the first phase of this 
history, moral virtue is seen as a mark of distinction, and freedom is connected with superlative 
moral achievement. But in the second phase virtue is redefined as duty, meaning obedience to 
the moral law. By submitting to the moral law, each person can achieve moral freedom. In this 
final phase, at the culmination of enlightenment, moral freedom and submission to the law 
become identical. The sense of “greatness” in modern philosophy is almost exclusively aesthetic 
because goodness takes the place of greatness as the object of modern morality. 
Although some will argue that these developments warrant discarding heroism as 
uninteresting or irrelevant to political philosophy, I want to suggest that in actuality they make 
the question of heroism deeply interesting and awfully relevant. On the one hand, we accept as a 
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self-evident truth that all men are equal by nature and consequently believe that each individual 
possesses certain inalienable rights or freedoms; but, on the other hand, this same 
pronouncement of equal freedoms sounds uncanny when translated in terms of a “whole world of 
heroes.” However, if the ancient connection between heroism and freedom holds, then in an 
important sense, a world of heroes is a just interpretation of our modern democratic ideal. 
Without suggesting that these two senses of democracy are incompatible, it fair to say that 
investigating the democratic ideal under these two different aspects brings to view 
extraordinarily different features of democratic life.  
Democracy, understood as a “world of heroes” presupposes the heroic individual. But we 
have seen that the heroic individual is not the same as the democratic individual: to put it simply, 
the heroic individual—unlike the merely democratic individual—has what we would call an 
“identity.” This particular identity is not mere ornamentation, but embodies an indivisible claim 
of authority that may or may not be compatible with conventional democratic institutions. In 
Nietzsche’s case especially, the heroic individual seems to embody an authority that, while based 
on democratic (individualist) premises, outstrips the rationalistic authority of liberal-democracy.  
The first specimen of the heroic individual seems not to be Nietzsche’s, however, but 
Rousseau’s. Up to this point, we have viewed Rousseau and Kant equally as defenders of the 
modern view of morality as autonomy of the will. Kant’s dichotomy between heteronomy and 
autonomy of the will, necessity and freedom, is similar to Rousseau’s dichotomy between nature 
and humanity. “Both distinguish the humanity of man from his nature and define humanity in 
terms of human freedom.” Moreover, they both advance the claim that individual freedom (self-
rule) is the authentic determining ground of morality. But, there is a significant disjoint in the 
ways that Rousseau and Kant interpret the dichotomy between nature and freedom: 
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While for Rousseau nature versus humanity represents a sad choice between mutually 
exclusive and equally valuable alternatives, a choice between a happy life of 
independence and a sublime life of self-rule, for Kant, the choice between the two is clear 
and unambiguous. Goodness and virtue, independence and self-rule, which Rousseau 
divides between nature and humanity, are combined in Kant’s concept of autonomy, so 
that there is nothing of value left on the natural side of his dichotomy except pleasure.35 
 
Rousseau’s interpretation of nature and freedom, as two “mutually exclusive and equally 
valuable alternatives,” generates a problem for Rousseauean political philosophy that Kantian 
moral philosophy never has to address. For Kant the supreme value of autonomy of the will, 
humanity, or freedom need not be embodied perfectly in man’s social life and institutions. 
Given [Kant’s] dichotomy between noumenal freedom and phenomenal necessity…it 
would not be difficult to develop an argument that ‘true freedom,’ moral autonomy, has 
nothing to do with the ‘principles of political association.’ For the self-legislation that 
legitimates authority in the moral sphere can have no analogue in the political sphere, 
conditioned as it is by natural necessity. In politics we face each other as conditioned and 
interested individuals.36 
 
Kant’s philosophy arguably warrants a wall of separation between morals and politics. 
However, one cannot interpret Rousseau’s political philosophy in this manner. For Rousseau the 
equivalent of Kantian autonomy is citizenship; accordingly moral freedom has everything to do 
with the ‘principles of political association.’ For Kant, one might say, the individual approaches 
moral freedom by conceiving of himself as member of the universal “kingdom of ends.” The 
ability thus to conceive of oneself presupposes a native capacity on the part of individuals to 
apprehend the universal value of “humanity.” Rousseau doubts the existence of such a capacity. 
For example, that Rousseau’s dichotomy between independence and citizenship perfectly 
parallels the distinction between nature and convention implies that man and citizen are mutually 
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exclusive identities. The “man” is natural, while the “citizen” is artificial. This is confirmed 
further by Rousseau’s repetitious insistence that human nature undergoes “transformations” 
throughout history. The historical “revolutions” of human nature form the subject of Rousseau’s 
Discourses, while his Social Contract suggests the possibility of another transformation, wrought 
by the discovery of the proper ‘principles of political association.’ 
 The legendary figure responsible for adapting the true principles of political science to a 
particular political community is Rousseau’s “great legislator.” In Rousseau’s modern revival of 
this ancient institution we catch a revealing glimpse of the nature of the modern heroic 
individual, who turns out to be the figure at the center of what one might call “revolutionary 
literature.” The great legislator is a rare soul who possesses the strength to “win over” the people 
“without violence and persuade without convincing.”37 As this familiar dictum implies, the 
legislator is responsible for devising and adapting political institutions to a particular people; and 
more especially, for persuading the people to subscribe to them without using coercion—for that 
would violate the sacrosanct principle of consent—or rational demonstration—for that would 
require the people to understand the science of politics. If everyone understood the science of 
politics or if understanding the nature of law were the same as abiding by it, then the legislator’s 
art of persuasion would not be necessary. That Rousseau insists on reviving the legislator speaks 
volumes about his view of human nature. “A blind multitude must be made to sense the things it 
cannot see, and these things must be made agreeable to win consent.”38 
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Rousseau’s conception of the great legislator, then, prefigures the “aesthetic” model of 
political action brought up earlier in this chapter. “While the art of the ‘true political thinker’ 
may be philosophic, that of the legislator must also be, in Rousseau’s terms, ‘imitative’ or 
artistic.”39 The legislator combines the knowledge of a political seer with the aesthetic sensibility 
of a blind poet. Speech and deed are united in the text, which in Rousseau’s case aspires to 
inscribe the identity of a whole people. Until Rousseau, social contract theory had bracketed out 
the question of identity, but at once, with the great legislator, the political problem of the 
relationship between universality and particularity returns in its modern, aesthetic form.  
In order to appreciate more fully the heroic individual’s place in the scheme of modern 
democracy it will be necessary to investigate more deeply the imaginative and literary side of 
democratic thought. To this end certain “literary” philosophers recommend themselves; in 
particular Rousseau and Nietzsche, as well as Carlyle and Emerson, despite that the latter two are 
thought of more as writers than philosophers. One general trend marks the fate of the heroic 
individual from Rousseau to Nietzsche— what begins as Rousseau’s great legislator ends as 
Nietzsche’s iconoclastic contender. Only Carlyle and Emerson, by adhering to the principle of 
representativeness rather than identity, hold out a view of heroic authority that avoids implying 
the existence of a kind of aesthetic bellum omnium contra omnes in which individuals seek to 
create and impose their “identities” on one other. In this sense, I argue that Carlyle—and 
accordingly Emerson—have been unjustly overlooked as philosophers of democracy. 
Modern skepticism, the progenitor of both individualism and scientific “theory,” has cut 
off the old notion of the practical intellect at its knees. But the object of practical reason—the 
adaptation of universality to particularity—reemerges in literature. This development informs a 
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popular contemporary view of (moral) action, according to which each person is the hero of his 
or her own narrative.40 This theory may have promise, but it can be fulfilled only if a connection 
between the moral and aesthetic realm is made explicit. We have seen that Nietzsche’s heroic 
individualism, being radically aesthetic, denies any such connection. I propose that a broader 
examination of nineteenth century heroic individualism can offer insights into the nature and 
problems Nietzsche’s view.  
In principle it remains true that “heroism is the domain of the poet’s formation of the 
people.” Heroism is the poet’s way of informing politics, or of being a political actor. But how 
does this principle relate to practice in an age where the relationship between author and 
audience is brokered by the activity of private reading? Notwithstanding the truism that every 
novelist owes a debt to Homer, we must acknowledge the obvious differences between the 
worlds of Homer and, say, Cervantes: Achilles is no Don Quixote; ancient epic and the modern 
novel differ from each other as unity differs from diversity, peoples from persons. The epic 
speaks a whole society but the novel addresses itself to one individual reader. The society of 
readers (and writers) of books is real enough— but it differs from heroic society in its whole 
constitution. Rousseau laments this condition when he attacks printing as a “disease” that 
undermines civic virtue. But Carlyle puts the point more palatably: 
Printing…is equivalent to Democracy: invent Writing, Democracy is inevitable. Writing 
brings Printing; brings universal every-day extempore Printing, as we see at present. 
Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a branch of 
government, with inalienable weight in law-making in all acts of authority. It matters not 
what rank he has, what revenues or garnitures: the requisite thing is that he has a tongue 
which others will listen to…. The nation is governed by all that has tongue in the nation: 
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Democracy is virtually there… Democracy virtually extant will insist on becoming 
palpably extant.41 
 
In heroic society the free man is a hero; in post-heroic society, the free man is Homer.     
  The insight that literature is a diffuse source of authority in democratic culture serves as a 
starting point for a consideration of the hero-as-author; and of the author as bearer of a certain 
type of “heroic” authority that is peculiarly democratic because it is, so to speak, the authority of 
freedom. The first glimpse of this sort of authority is not afforded by Carlyle or Nietzsche, but by 
Rousseau. In a later chapter we will examine the tension between democracy and the heroic 
individual by looking into the relationship between Rousseau’s notion of heroism and his 
concept of the great legislator. In the following chapter we turn to events of generations spanning 
from Rousseau’s to Nietzsche’s: the French Revolution, the early stirrings of democratic culture, 
and the falling silent of God. 
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Chapter Three: The Hero as Author 
 
Because the Revolution seemed to be striving for the regeneration of the human 
race even more than for the reform of France, it lit a passion which the most 
violent political revolutions have never before been able to produce. It inspired 
conversions and generated propaganda. Thus, in the end, it took on that 
appearance of a religious revolution which so astonished contemporaries. Or 
rather, it itself became a new kind of religion, an incomplete religion, it is true, 
without God, without ritual, and without life after death, but one which 
nevertheless, like Islam, flooded the earth with its soldiers, apostles and martyrs. 
 
 Alexis deTocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution 
 
 
The Religion of Literature: 
 
In this chapter, we attempt to outline the role of the author, and of the religion of literature, as it 
appeared to Thomas Carlyle and his readership. To this end, we shall discuss here the emergent 
“religion of literature” in modern society, as well as the social role of religion in ancient, 
predominantly oral, cultures. Overall, the aim of this chapter is to put into context the entirely 
novel cultural situation faced by Carlyle and his readers. 
 Rousseau, Carlyle’s predecessor, deployed his epochal critique of the moderns in 
response to much the same conditions. But as we shall see later, Carlyle criticizes Rousseau for 
failing to escape the labyrinth of his own texts. Ultimately Rousseau ensnares himself in an 
attempt to institutionalize his own autobiography, to live according to the dictates of his own 
writings. In contrast to Rousseau, who wanted both to write and to hide, Carlyle wants to reveal 
authors—and readers—in their bodily presence as actors, agents called upon to judge and 
respond to new conditions and new insights emerging with each moment. 
 Before we enter into a more thorough consideration of the dialogue between Carlyle and 
Rousseau we must go back one step, however. We must begin with Voltaire. This is where 
Carlyle himself begins, for the discerning reader will notice that the opening lecture of On 
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Heroes, ostensibly about Odin, “The Hero as Divinity,” is equally concerned with the “divinity” 
of Voltaire, “the withered pontiff of Encyclopedism.” Is Encyclopedism a religion, as Carlyle 
implies? Did not Voltaire aim to rid the world of superstition? In Voltiare’s anonymously 
published Philosophical Dictionary we find the following entry confirming the “withered 
pontiff’s” idiosyncratic and of course unsympathetic view of religion. The entry, on “Abraham,” 
reads:  
Abraham is one of the names famous in Asia Minor and in Arabia, like Thoth among the 
Egyptians, the first Zoroaster in Persia, Hercules in Greece, Orpheus in Thrace, Odin 
among the northern nations, and so many others whose fame is greater than the 
authenticity of their history.1  
 
With this dubious “definition” Voltaire reduces Abraham to a national father figure, a patriotic 
caricature “whose fame is greater than the authenticity of [his] history.” In On Heroes, Carlyle 
performs a similar operation on Voltaire: “Truly, if Christianity be the highest instance of Hero-
worship, then we might find here in Voltaireism one of the lowest! He whose life was that of a 
kind of Antichrist,” Voltaitre’s cult of personality demonstrates, in spite of himself, that hero-
worship is a social fact. After all, the French “feel that [Voltiare], too is a hero; that he has spent 
his life in opposing error and injustice, in delivering Calases, unmasking hypocrites in high 
places;— in short that he, too, though in a strange way, has fought like a valiant man.” Carlyle 
concludes that the skeptical Voltaire “is properly [France’s] god—such god as they are fit for.”2 
For Carlyle, then, the religion of literature is a fait accompli. Hence, despite its own 
rationalistic pretensions, “Enclyclopedism” includes its fair share of superstition. “At Paris, 
[Voltaire’s] carriage is ‘the nucleus of a comet, whose train fills whole streets.’ The ladies pluck 
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a hair or two from his fur, to keep it as a sacred relic.” The fate—fame—of Voltaire only 
confirms Carlyle’s belief in the propensity of human nature for “transcendent admiration” of the 
great man. Perhaps only Rousseau can be definitively excluded from Carlyle’s verdict on the 
French: “There was nothing highest, beautifulest, noblest in all France, that did not feel this man 
to be higher, beautifuler, nobler.”3 
The project to build a statue of Voltaire foreshadows the transition from the Republic of 
Letters to the Religion of Literature. Subscription, a practice that came in with Encyclopedism, 
now was being turned to a novel use: 
Voltaire was the star, the media whiz of the 1760s and 1770s. While Diderot retreated to 
the small circles of friendship and the circulation of manuscripts, Voltaire took the 
spotlight. As Diderot’s work on the Enclyclopedie wound down, Voltaire’s campaign to 
ecraser l’infame heated up. When Diderot was venting his anger in the Apologie in the 
fall of 1770, Voltaire was calling for unity and friendship among the disarrayed citizenry 
of the Republic of Letters…. In the eyes of his contemporaries, he was, at the age of 
seventy-six, the living embodiment of the republic, so universally acclaimed that its 
leading citizens decided to erect a statue of him as a representation of the republic. The 
project to erect a full-length statue of Voltaire (the first time in modern history that any 
living person other than a reigning monarch was so represented) and to pay for it by 
public subscription was arguably the most important event of the year 1770.4 
 
On Heroes epitomizes of Carlyle’s struggle with a problem that epitomized his career: What is 
the moral and political role of the author? For Carlyle this is both a political and a religious 
question, for he takes it as an axiom that “every government is a theocracy.” In contrast to 
Voltaire—and Rousseau—Carlyle insists that society is a “standing wonder” that science never 
can explain adequately. In so far as it propounds a social philosophy, then, the aim of On Heroes 
is to shed light on nescience rather than to present yet another “scientific” theory of politics. 
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Hence, the common social sentiments that enlightened philosophy looks down on as superstition, 
Carlyle has sympathy for, as a type of reverence.  
This is not to say that Carlyle prescribes hero-worship in an unqualified sense, however. 
To the contrary, On Heroes warns against the potential danger of mistaking quacks for saviors, a 
danger of which Carlyle is acutely aware, and a warning that the twentieth century failed to heed. 
Indeed, Hero-worship, the product of an almost reflexive emotion of social hope, is no more 
natural than in times of desperation. And it is precisely such desperate times in which the danger 
of quack-worship is greatest. For the authentic hero always comes bearing a difficult truth, but 
most of the time, men would prefer the easy path. Only by awakening in the average man the 
capacity for authentic moral heroism is the victory of true over false leadership even possible. 
Hence, the heroism of the reader is Carlyle’s true object and this is what makes Carlyle an 
important philosopher of and contributor to democratic culture, if he is not a “democrat” in any 
simple sense of the word. 
One instructive example of Carlyle’s nuanced point of view is his reaction to the Saint-
Simonians, a movement with whom he, like J.S. Mill, had some flirtations. In fact, Carlyle was 
so fond of the Saint-Simonian’s hopeful ideals that he translated the Nouveau Christianisme into 
English. Having adopted from the Germans a historical (or more accurately, temporal) point of 
view, Carlyle could accept the idea that periodic redefinitions of “Gods’ Truth” are natural, even 
necessary. Accordingly, he hoped to encourage a revival of belief in his own century, as a 
corrective to the skepticism of the eighteenth. Yet Carlyle could not adapt his independent mind 
to the Saint-Simonians’ anthropomorphic superstitions: 
much as he agreed that the eighteenth century was one of ‘Denial, of Irreligion and 
Destruction; to which a new period of Affirmation, of Religion, must succeed, if society 
is to be reconstituted,’ he could not accept, could not even understand how the Saint-
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Simonians could accept, the key point of Saint-Simonian doctrine: that ‘God has returned 
to France in Saint-Simon, and France will announce the new God to the world.’ To 
Carlyle, the Saint-Simonian Analysis of what was wrong…was ‘scientific,’ by which he 
meant accurate…. But the Saint-Simonian prescription—a revival of Christianity with 
Saint-Simon as a latter-day Jesus Christ—seemed, like [Edward] Irving’s revivalism, 
sheer folly…. He could not understand how [their] moral precepts and…social 
doctrine…could be called a religion, since there seemed to be no ‘SYMBOL or SYMBOLIC 
REPRESENTATION’ of divinity. How could there be a religion without a God?5 
 
Suffice it to say that, from Carlyle’s perspective, the Saint-Simonians fell for the same facile and 
superficial notion of hero-worship that many of Carlyle’s critics assume to be his own.  
In sum, there is an abundance of reasons to disagree with Carlyle, but the shallow notion 
that he endorses “quack-worship” is not one of them.6 Nevertheless, it is difficult to get past the 
misunderstandings connected with the notorious phrase, “hero-worship.” In order to clarify this 
problem, Yoon Sun Lee has argued that we would do better to understand the Carlylean notion 
of hero-worship in terms of fetishism.  
“Without receiving the kind of insistent emphasis that turned concepts like hero-worship 
into bywords for Carlyle’s thought,” writes Lee, “the topic of fetishism becomes central to the 
ways in which Carlyle represents the act of reading, the practice of conservative nationalism and 
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the relationship between the two.”7 What, then, differentiates fetishism from Carlylean heroism? 
In short fetishism involves a phenomenon of unconscious absorption in the product of one’s own 
labor. By contrast Carlyle recommends a practice of conscious recollection of forgotten labor. In 
this context, Lee refers to Carlylean reading as “amnesiac labor.” In other words, Carlyle does 
not deny that symbols or symbolic representations of religious truth are human fabrications; but 
still, he insists on their authentically symbolic quality, manifested in the maker’s forgetting the 
work of symbol-production. It is worthwhile here to recall the distinction between symbol and 
allegory. People do not believe in allegories or poetic sport, Carlyle suggests; allegory, poetic 
fancy: these are the products of later epochs of a culture in which belief already is extant. The 
great error of enlightenment and romantic theorists of myth is the failure to recognize this, a 
failure that leads to their expecting more from allegories and lyrics than these modes can deliver. 
Allegory cannot create belief, and lyric poetry cannot transcend personal expression. The only 
activity where this “amnesiac labor” is possible, for Carlyle, is literature, and in particular, 
history.  
According to Lee, Carlyle created a “new national role” for literature as sort of civil 
religion. “Carlyle’s reader…figures the British subject contemplating his own sublime image of 
the nation, forgetting his own role in the creation of that plenitude.”8 Carlylean history is an 
answer to the problem of civil religion that emerges in the wake of the democratic revolutions. 
Religion, for Carlyle, is what a person believes practically; that is to say, religion is not 
necessarily the same as one’s “church-creed” or profession of faith. Rather, the manifestation of 
belief is one’s conduct. The religion of literature, then, corresponds to a set of beliefs and habits 
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conceived in the Renaissance and Reformation that crystallized in the Enlightenment. 
Importantly, these habits may be characterized specifically as habits of reading and writing. With 
the inception of cheap printed material, the religion of literature was spread far and wide. For 
Carlyle, this development was a key factor behind the democratic revolutions, especially the 
French Revolution of which he was a student. Of course Carlyle sees the revolution in part as a 
destructive movement, bringing an end to a period of unsettling that began when Luther 
stumbled upon a Bible and accidentally spurred on the Reformation. The French Revolution is 
the third and final act of this drama, with the Puritan Revolution in England coming between. 
Carlyle’s prophecy of a “world of heroes” figures his hope for the future, taking as its foundation 
this view of the irrevocable past. 
Voltaire is the anti-heroic foil against whom Carlyle deploys his notion of the heroic 
individual. For Carlyle, Voltaire illustrates the paradox of hero-worship writ small. Try as he 
might, man does not get along in this world without some kind of higher moral example; and as 
hard as a Voltaire may work to rid the world of ignorance and “superstition,” if successful he 
will be the initiator of a new sect but not the liberator of man from the facts of his condition. 
Voltaire aimed to bring the Enlightenment out of the salon. Along with Diderot and the other 
philosophes, Voltaire wanted to share the fruits of modern learning with the general public and 
promote the enlightenment values of autonomy and free inquiry. In the course of this project the 
philosophes essentially, if also accidentally, created the modern public, which would serve as the 
basis for the authority of modern public opinion as we know it. 
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Vox Populi, in Oculis 
In the years leading up to the French Revolution, a tremendous change in the order of authority 
was taking place in the society of the ancien regime. As the recently established community of 
critical intellectuals moved out of the salon and into print, a new type of public opinion began to 
take shape as an arbiter of mores. This was to the apparent advantage of men of letters, for whom 
an entirely new space was evolving, a new “invisible community” in which they could achieve 
precious goals: glory, honor, reputation. Formerly, to enjoy such symbolic goods in one’s own 
lifetime would have been difficult since memory, history, or posterity was the imaginative realm 
where immortal fame was achieved. But the popular press changed all of this and men of letters 
welcomed this change. “Men of letters…redefined public opinion to take the place of posterity as 
a living tribunal. The rationality and universality they claimed for it both legitimated it and made 
women, the monarchy and other ‘irrational’ and ‘subjective’ beings into nonparticipating objects 
of its judgment.”9 In newsprint one has the makings of the ultimate institutional church: scripture 
and inquisition combined. And, with the “public” standing as both judge and jury, perhaps it 
seemed as if many of the old problems of parochialism might be obviated. 
The one true faith that animated this movement is symbolized by the Encyclopedia. 
Enlightenment wishes and dreams of scientific cosmopolitanism, of a philosophy based on clear 
and distinct ideas, of an end to ignorance and superstition and of immanent improvement of 
society, were the immaterial soul around which the body of journalism grew. But to fulfill such 
dreams the philosophe would have to reorient his goals from the pursuit of truth to the service of 
“humanity.”  
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Suddenly, philosophy was torn asunder form its ancient roots in contemplation, and re-
cast in the mold of active citizenship: 
In 1730 the term philosophe evoked the figure of the sage or scholar; over the course of 
the years 1740-1770, it became a defensive term within a conflict between those who 
called themselves true philosophes and those who attacked them as ‘so-called 
philosophes.’ At the same time, the meaning of man of letters shifted from the educated 
amateur to the newly defined, newly militant philosophe who was proud to declare his 
independence [of the Academy and the absolute state]. In a third key, the term author was 
devalued and writer rose. When [Antione-Leonard] Thomas spoke of the ‘man of letters’ 
at the French Academy in 1767, the term resonated with the associated terms philosophe 
and writer. It was this man of letters whom he identified with the good citizen, and it was 
this identification that [was used] uncritically eleven years later.10 
 
With the publication of the Encyclopedia, the philosophes knew that they were effecting a 
change that would redefine authority in the Republic of Letters. Formerly, men of letters were 
bound to the academy; the state and the aristocracy were the elite patrons of literary culture. 
When Diderot proposed the Encyclopedia, however, he “was proposing a reformation of the 
Republic of Letters which would inaugurate a new era in its history… 
Diderot was now suggesting not only that the republic was no longer contained within the 
bounds of the academies but that the structure of the academy was not conducive to its 
work. He saw a new basis of unity in a new universal: not the academic language of 
Latin, but the universal concern for the good of humanity. And that concern would only 
be undermined by the limited interest of any corporative body…. Only the Republic of 
Letters was truly universal…11 
 
The philosophes’ aim was to create a new type of institution, in print, based on the 
modern republican values of liberty, participation, and freedom of conscience, as they had 
evolved inside the community of men of letters in the seventeenth century. As Dena Goodman 
has shown, these values are rooted in the habits and customs of published epistolary exchange 
that first made it possible for private persons to associate publicly and engage in mutual 
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discourse, using private, critical, reason. The open-ended nature of discourse and the mode of 
exchanging ideas in print, particularly in open-ended forms like public letters and editorials, 
contributed to the values of autonomy and reciprocity that are now a familiar aspect of 
democratic public culture.12 
  As an invisible community (of writers and readers), combined for the sake of promoting 
the general good, the Republic of Letters bears more than a trivial resemblance to the church. 
This is true of pre-Revolutionary France, especially. As Michael Burleigh observes in a recent 
history of church and state in the revolutionary era, the clergy, whom the philosophes were to 
upend, perhaps unwittingly, had an active role in promoting social welfare in France.  
“The French clergy were not like Lutheran pastors in Frederick the Great’s Prussia, who 
had become little more than state officials, but they had various quasi-governmental functions.”13 
Among these were education, record-keeping and the provision of public welfare. Moreover, the 
church served a valuable social purpose by diffusing throughout society a sense of moral order:  
The clergy were responsible for setting the moral tome in society in general, with these 
functional merits of religion being blindingly obvious even to skeptics such as Voltaire. 
There was virtual unanimity on the need for Hell to stop the servants stealing the spoons: 
anyone who cast doubt on the reality of eternal torment was certain to experience it.14 
 
Whatever merits the philosophes might have recognized in the church, it would be their lot to 
become its competitor, however. In hindsight, it is hard to imagine how things could have been 
otherwise. These critical intellectuals managed to form a quasi-cosmopolitan community based 
on the ideal of universality, that, having established itself on the printed page and transformed 
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itself into a public sphere, now exerted an impressive presence in historical reality as a 
community mobilized for meaningful action. “The Republic of Letters [has] both historical 
specificity and ideal universality—like the pre-Reformation church. Having gradually 
superseded the church as the home of European intellectual life, the Respublica literaria et 
christiania became simply the Respublica literaria.”15 
 Words, or symbolical actions, are the concrete currency of every moral exchange, divine 
or diabolical. One might conclude accordingly that there is an invisible element in any discourse, 
and especially that of the Republic of Letters. But we have come to learn that human words are 
not as clear and distinct as, at one time, some may have believed. The well-known contrast 
between orality and literacy is a good illustration of this problem. In oral exchange, for example, 
we lack the tangibility and durability of visual representations; but writing, on the other hand, 
distracts the reader from the immediacy of oral discourse, thereby blurring the connection 
between speech and action. Print exacerbates the shortcomings of writing by practically 
guaranteeing the absence of the author (who, in addition to being removed spatially from the 
reader, is dead in most cases). Of course, what we lose in terms of the author’s presence is offset 
by the enduring presence of written artifacts. Texts provide a locus of communicative association 
that defies the finitude of a mortal life. The absence of the author is only one aspect of print 
dominance, however. Another aspect is the substitution of the personal authority of the author 
with that of the tightly regulated, typically closed system. Walter Ong’s observations on the 
“closure” of print space resonate here: 
Eventually…print replaced the lingering hearing-dominance in the world of 
thought and expression with the sight-dominance which had its beginnings with writing 
but could not flourish with the support of writing alone. Print situates words in space 
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more relentlessly than writing ever did. Writing moves words from the sound world to a 
world of visual space, but print locks words into position in this space. Control of 
position is everything in print.16 
 
Although, arguably, the modern religion of literature is parasitic on the scriptural 
religions,17 the latter differ from the former insofar as they admit a categorical distinction 
between the divine Word of Creation, not the literal word of the text but a silent word that wells 
up in the soul upon contemplation of God’s infinite universe; and the human word that manifests 
a paltry ersatz-creativity, by comparison. Of course the human word is a fine tool for 
communicating meaning between human beings, but still, it is a poor, disfigured, all-too-mortal 
vehicle for expressing the truth of the creation. 
One of the most striking excesses of that great liberation from religious superstition 
called modernity is a stern refusal to acknowledge that there is any word but the human word. 
Divine or diabolical in its intention, deliberately polemical or hermetically systematic, this 
cacophonous human word aims, tragicomically, to be all, and in all. Often this aim is 
presupposed tacitly; for example, every time “ideology” passes the lips as a code-word for the 
scientistic reduction of belief to a mere allegory. 
Ideology is a political word, so in concluding this section let us spell out the political 
implications of this mechanical terminology. The student of “ideology” might well concur with 
Aristotle on the general principle that political philosophy relies on a view of human nature. Yet 
the ideologist would disagree with Aristotle that human nature is moral; “virtue” or moral 
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excellence is for the ideologist a “construct,” mere convention, supported by violence (the 
violence of coercion, the violence of the letter) and in principle alterable, given a complementary 
amount of violence in the corrective way, perhaps. Being indifferent to moral agency, then, 
ideology determines the true content of belief in terms of physical reflexes: Bentham’s “twin 
sovereigns,” fear of pain and desire for pleasure. Thus the “invisible reality” behind language 
just is power; or what one might be able to get by using language, how one can use it to 
manipulate, rather than to communicate or persuade.  
The ancient view of language was articulated by Plato, who describes the creation of the 
world as the victory of persuasion over force.18 The modern view is something else; among the 
first to articulate this view was Mary Shelley. As Frankenstein’s (ugly, unnamed) monster 
observes: “these people possessed a method of communicating their experience and feelings to 
one another by means of articulate sounds…[which] sometimes produced pleasure or pain, 
smiles or sadness in the minds and countenances of the beholders. This was indeed a godlike 
science.”19 
 
The Language of Religion: 
In fact it is memory—the most basic type of “writing”—that makes transfinite communication 
possible. Before Thucydides inscribed his history with the express intention of producing a 
“work for all the ages,” the Hellenic bards set to memory the great deeds of gods, heroes and 
kings. Such myths, lyrics and epics represent the earliest form of social constitution. 
“Constitution” in this sense, means any shared narrative, corresponding to beliefs and customs 
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that structure the relational reality of authority. For example, the narratives of Achilles and 
Odysseus, of King David, or of Gilgamesh, all serve to express a national consciousness, and 
more importantly, they provide cues as to the respective roles of god(s), kings, prophets, heroes 
and peoples in the order of authority.  
 A main objective of the discussion that follows is to clarify what Carlyle could have 
meant by the axiom: “every government is a theocracy.” This utterance has been misinterpreted 
widely. Before going on, then, it will help to explain the function of the language of kinship in 
ancient polities that were, in a noncontroversial sense, theocratic. 
In a recent study of the political theology of ancient cultures, Dale Launderville has 
mapped out the historic connections between literary, theological and political discourse. 
Launderville points out that several features surrounding the ancient theological notion of 
kingship served to inform and moderate political action in the ancient world. The first of these, 
naturally, is the notion of accountability of the king to God, or to the king of gods (e.g. Zeus). 
Ancient societies had no theory of divine right, quite the opposite is the case: “On the basis of 
the guarantee that the king was accountable to God or the gods, the community was able to take 
the risk of shaping its identity around the king.”20 The strength of this basic association between 
royal and divine authority did not rely on coercive power over life and death, salvation or 
damnation, attributable to the king as God’s earthy vicegerent, but on “the vitality of the 
metaphors symbols and narratives which delegitimated an unjust king just as they legitimated a 
just one.” 
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These ancient narratives, then, must be seen as a kind of dialect of the community’s 
authority whose morally regulative power worked itself out in the process of discourse. “The 
vitality of figurative language…was most favorably generated in a performative context where 
truth emerged in the interaction and dialogue of the participants. Metaphoric truth played a key 
role in freeing theology from the grasp of wooden ideology.”21  
The other features of the “traditional pattern” legitimating royal authority follow from 
this basic relation, or imaginative identification, between God, king and people. The second 
feature that Launderville addresses are those authoritative speech-acts that “operated in but also 
shaped the sociopolitical context in which [the king] ruled.”22 This is “royal speech.” Royal 
speech did not attach to the “officially” constituted king but to any leader in time of crisis: For 
example, in Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus manages to save the king, Agamemnon, from his 
botched attempt to use reverse psychology. Odysseus persuades the Achaians to stay and fight 
rather than to retreat, per Agamemnon’s absurd order.  
“The activities of performing good deeds and speaking inspiring words lie at the heart of 
authority,” Launderville observes, following Hannah Arendt.23 Royal or authoritative speech acts 
also bear a direct association with myth. Drawing on classicist Richard P. Martin’s definition of 
mythos as “a speech-act indicating authority, performed at length, usually in public, with a focus 
on full attention to every detail,”24 and John Searle’s analysis of speech-acts as an important 
feature of the human capacity to shape the world, Launderville concludes that in the culture of 
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ancient kingship, the “creative power of the speech-act, particularly a promise or declarative 
statement, indicates how an individual can have an impact on the world in spite of the many 
circumstances and forces to which an individual is subject.”25 The narrative of the myth was a 
dictionary, or dialect, for morally heroic action. 
The third dimension of kingship lay in the king’s role as a symbol of the people. To say 
that the king “is” the people is not the same as King Louis’s saying l’etat c’est moi, because the 
ancient king is not a modern sovereign, but symbolizes the life and character of the community. 
The person and actions of kings are meaningful in a more than material, more than allegorical 
sense. “The king was the chief redistributor of the material and symbolic goods in the 
community that exerted a centripetal force on the practices of the community…within the field 
mapped out by royal authority.”26  
As a “symbol,” the king could represent the participatory life of the community without 
necessarily demanding conformity to a rigid model. Kingship is not an allegory of citizenship, 
nor is citizenship a mimesis of ideal kingship (or ideal heroism). Rather, the person and actions 
of the king symbolizes the life of the human community existing in  a field of tensions, between 
the Divine and human; nature and culture; insider and outsider; noble and common; and life and 
death.27 
As the distinction between the body of the king, and the authority of royal speech-acts 
suggests, the ancient king is not supposed to contain a plenitude of knowledge or authority 
mystically in his person, nor has he any special mandate from, or ability to, communicate with 
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divinity, except of course that general mandate by which any king ought to act as a shepherd of 
his (and God’s) people. This brings up two related features of the pattern of royal authority. In 
the first place, the practices of memory, and narratives of the community’s past—of the exploits 
of its gods, heroes and kings—warded off the tendency to oblivion by constantly recreating the 
identity of the historical community in the imaginative and spiritual life of its members. These 
practices constitute a “visionary context within which to understand innovations within the 
continuity of the tradition.”28 Secondly, communication between the invisible divine realm and 
the king’s earthly realm could be mediated within this visionary context. “The authoritative king 
did not simply receive his divine election at the beginning of his reign, and report back to the 
king of the gods at the end of his reign.” In order to receive communications from god or the 
gods, “he called upon prophets, diviners and sages to assist him in gaining [divine] direction.” In 
discussing this point, Launderville notes that the ambiguity connected with prophecies, oracles 
and other such divinations is an important feature of ancient political culture. “The ambiguity of 
such divine communications and the politics of their reception and interpretation provided ample 
grounds for skepticism and questioning.” Often such communications provided an opportunity to 
reevaluate the possibilities for action. Launderville suggests that within this context it was 
possible to negotiate a fortuitous “combination of oracular knowledge and clever discernment” 
that enabled the king to continue leading his people with authority.29 The prophet plays a special 
role in this figurative economy: he presents his prophetic utterances as divine oracles, but with 
no other basis but his own, personal, credibility. “The proof of the divine authorship of an oracle 
could not have been verified before the authoritative command or exhortation in the oracle had 
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materialized in history; therefore, the prophet had to mount a persuasive case for the veracity of 
the oracle through his credibility as a spokesperson within the tradition.” Answering as it does to 
particular events, prophetic utterance is characterized by a “poly-vocality [that]…call[s] for its 
interpretation within the collective memory and current circumstances of the community.”30 In 
this way, the participation of prophetic speech in the nature of moral action is made clear. 
Finally, Launderville turns to the question of crises in royal authority. Both ancient and 
modern communities are familiar with the threat of crises so magnificent that they can call into 
question both the legitimacy of the regime and its leadership. We might think of these moments 
in terms of constitutional crises, which are, in the ancient culture of kingship, unequivocally 
religious crisis as well. “In extreme crises where an individual or a community saw no practical 
solution at hand to resolve their difficulties, they cried out to their gods in lament.” Lamentation 
is the attempt to get beyond an irreconcilable tension or contradiction through the very “act of 
crying out.” In the worst cases—where it is determined that the king has failed his divinely-
instituted charge to care for the people—there enters the possibility of regicide, which “was 
legitimate…if the gods approved it. A king’s unjust actions removed the legitimacy of his 
authority and so were grounds for a coup. Some coups were themselves unjust since they were 
fueled by the opportunism of aspirants to the throne.”31 
Evidently, the idea of royal authority did not demand thoughtless, slavish or self-effacing 
submission to the earthly king (as the caricature of “divine-right” theory implies). Moreover, the 
notion of royal authority has its roots in a shared sense of the ethical world order, not an amoral 
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scheme of power, and so applies to every sort of leader. We cannot overstress that royal authority 
was never connected arbitrarily to the person of the king. 
In ancient civilizations it was not the theory of divine right, but a “vision of ideal 
kingship” that served as a measuring-rod of political legitimacy. Such a vision was literary in the 
widest sense: 
The vision of the ideal king was necessarily shaped by symbols, metaphors, and 
narratives that created their meaning through engagement with an audience. Such a vision 
evoked the intuitive understanding of a larger world order…. The polyvalence of 
symbols, metaphors, and narratives respected the particularities of individuals’ 
experience; but at the same time, engagement with the same metaphors and narratives 
fostered a convergence of understanding among the various individuals involved. 
Nevertheless, it is also possible that these symbols, metaphors, and narratives, whose 
truth becomes manifest in the engagement provoked by the act of interpretation, could be 
used to manipulate the people or to create a false consciousness. Religious language is 
not free from ideological terms, nor is it defined by them.32 
 
To return our attention to the modern Republic of Letters, it is clear that this institution 
had more than just a memorializing or traditional aim. The prophets of enlightenment would 
make the public into an ideal king—final judge and arbiter of the ethical order—by inviting 
public participation in the various discourses of the sciences and letters. The easy circulation of 
print made it possible to construct a sort of paper agora, where criticism, discussion and debate 
on matters of present concern took place much as it had formerly in the academies and salons. 
Under the nose of the fatally disconnected monarchy at Versailles, the circulation of philosophes 
was creating a new type of political order, a literary republicanism. Their newspapers, journals or 
reviews, their Encyclopedia, constituted a new form of association, not less moral or political, 
but assuming a different aspect compared to all previous forms of association: 
The very means by which the Encyclopedie was marketed to the public brought together 
the notions of readership and association. Public subscription was a novel practice 
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recently imported from England, just like Chambers’s Cyclopedia… Those who decided 
to subscribe to the Encyclopedie were joining an association just as the contributors were, 
a voluntary association of contributors and subscribers, writers and readers; the 
Encyclopedie was the mark of their common commitment to its principles. Their 
commitment was not, of course, equal, and certainly many of the subscribers would deny 
any allegiance to the encyclopediasts. Implicitly, however, publishers, editors, 
contributors and subscribers were bound together in this special way through the project 
of the book, and therefore, the project took on public meaning and public value.33 
 
 
The Resurrection of the Reader 
Thomas Carlyle was quick to point out parallels between the old church of evangelists and 
believers and the new, democratic, church of writers and readers. For Carlyle, Diderot was the 
“apostle” of this new religion and Voltaire was its “pontiff.” Of course, in Rousseau, the new 
religion found its true “evangelist.” But this is not to say that these men had any intention of 
setting up a new religion; perhaps they believed merely that encyclopediasm and journalism 
would put an end to religion.  
As Tocqueville recognized, there is a kind of necessity about the religion of literature that 
escapes anyone’s control, however. For Carlyle, the religion of literature is an unintended 
consequence of print culture. In reflecting on this, Carlyle became one of the first thinkers 
seriously to consider the issue of writing as a type of action. Like all action, writing has 
consequences that escape the control of the agent. In his French Revolution Carlyle proclaims, 
with typical irony, the new age that has been ushered in by the press: 
One Sanscullotic bough that cannot fail to flourish is Journalism. The voice of the people 
being the voice of God, shall not such divine voice make itself heard? To the ends of 
France; and in as many dialects as when the first great Babel was to be built! Some loud 
as the lion; some small as the sucking dove….  
Folded and hawked Newspapers exist in all countries; but, in such a Journalistic 
element as this of France, other and stranger sorts are to be anticipated. What says the 
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English reader to a Journal-Affiche, Placard Journal; legible to him that has no halfpenny; 
in bright prismatic colours, calling the eye from afar? Such…as Patriot Associations, 
public and private, advance, and can subscribe funds, shall plenteously hang themselves 
out: leaves, limed leaves, to catch what they can!... Great is Journalism. Is not every able 
Editor a Ruler of the World, being a persuader of it; though self-elected, yet sanctioned 
by the sale of his Numbers? Whom indeed the world has the readiest method of deposing, 
should need be: that of merely doing nothing to him; which ends in starvation.34          
 
Carlyle’s aim can be characterized as the resurrection of readers. I mean, Carlyle draws 
attention to the fact that writing is a kind of acting, and as a writer, he is self-conscious of his 
own role as an agent. Moreover, Carlyle focuses on the relationship between writers and readers 
as a relationship of authority, a political relationship broadly speaking. The resurrection of the 
reader means raising awareness that writers make claims on readers: for “there is a divine right 
or else a diabolical wrong at the heart of every claim one man makes on another.”35 The result of 
this is a type of writing that is acutely aware of its political situation.  
In On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History, for example, “history” figures 
society or community; “hero-worship,” figures reading; and “hero,” figures the author, or his 
alter-ego, the reader. In turning towards history, psychology, and pragmatism to reply to 
contemporary conditions, Carlyle follows the general trend of the nineteenth century. Carlyle’s 
erstwhile foe is the great systematizer, Hegel. In order to understand the Carlylean axioms, 
“universal history is biography,” and “history is the biography of great men,” it helps to contrast 
Carlyle’s position with that of Hegel and Rousseau.  
For Rousseau biography means autobiography. Rousseau the author claims to be 
transparent to himself, the authoritative and infallible interpreter of his own being. Alternatively, 
Carlyle sees biography as pre-reflective (although not for that reason unintelligent) activity; a 
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process of self-making through action rather than self-knowing through reflection. Biography is 
a sort of writing (graphe) that one impresses on the world with one’s deeds. For “know thyself” 
Carlyle substitutes the Goethe-inspired maxim “know what thou canst work at.” For, there is no 
“self” to reflect upon, until first one performs a deed (or as the Romans had it, primum acti, 
deinde philosophari). 
  Similarly, Hegel’s philosophy of history purports to be the reflective autobiography of 
the world-spirit. For the first time, “World History” is supposed to have reached transparent self-
consciousness in the mind of Hegel. Therefore Hegel claims, for the first time, to have a 
transparent, scientific knowledge of history. For Carlyle, again, this is impossible. So long as 
dynamic time subsists, as the element in which we have our being, we will continue to make 
history. Only a disembodied consciousness can have the kind of knowledge that Hegel and 
Rousseau claim to have, and unfortunately, disembodied consciousness offers no way of 
translating the experience of embodied intellects that dwell on earth. For Carlyle, then, the 
authentic outcome of self-examination—conscious reflection on biography and history—ought 
to be nescience, or learned ignorance. “Science has done much for us; but it is a poor science that 
would hide from us the great deep sacred infinitude of Nescience, whither we can never 
penetrate, on which all science swims as a mere superficial film.”36 
A philosophy of mystery, Carlyle’s philosophy of history (and biography) is quite 
different from Hegel’s. For Carlyle “History” is a kind of literature; at bottom, history is a myth, 
or narrative, that manifests the self-expression of a community. Indeed, Carlyle tends to see 
history, religion and myth as different expressions of a common human nature that answer to the 
ultimate human mystery of transcendent meaning: 
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History has been written with quipo-threads, with feather-pictures, with wampum belts; 
still oftener with earth-mounds and monumental stone-heaps, whether as pyramid or 
cairn; for the Celt and the Copt, the Red man as well as the White, lives between two 
eternities, and warring against oblivion, he would fain unite himself in clear conscious 
relation, as in dim unconscious relation he is already united, with the whole future, and 
the whole past.37  
 
Human beings fabricate history as a way of coming to terms with the mystery of mortality, of the 
origin and end of human life. Since history is, in the first place, a “text,” history cannot become 
conscious of itself. How can a text, a monument, or a narrative become conscious of itself, unless 
it is a person? How can a person become transparent to himself without becoming an object, like 
a stone monument, or a text? History does not have a self-conscious aspect, like a person. Rather, 
history inscribes the process of human beings relating themselves to time and mortality, to the 
“two eternities” between which each soul finds itself, to the starry vault from which each issues, 
and to the grave that represents the mysterious, inexorable destiny of each. 
 It is no accident, nor is it a mere rhetorical flourish, that Carlyle associates written history 
with memorials like “earth-mounds and monumental stone heaps, whether as of pyramid or 
cairn.” Carlyle’s understanding of history is tied up inextricably with his view of spirituality and 
religion. “History,” in this sense, is the archetype of religion—it evinces the common spiritual 
denominator in human nature: 
In a certain sense, all men are historians. Is not every memory written quite full with 
Annals, wherein joy and mourning…manifestly alternate; and, with or without 
philosophy, the whole fortunes of one little inward Kingdom, and all its politics, foreign 
of domestic, stand ineffaceably recorded? Our speech is curiously historical. Most men, 
you may observe, speak only to narrate…. Cut us off from Narrative, how would the 
stream of conversation, even among the wisest, languish into detached handfuls, and 
among the foolish utterly evaporate! Thus, as we do nothing but enact History, we say 
little but recite it nay, rather in the widest sense, our whole spiritual life is built thereon. 
For, strictly considered, what is all Knowledge too but recorded Experience, and a 
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product of History; of which, therefore, Reasoning and Belief, no less than Action and 
Passion, are essential materials?38 
 
Carlyle refuses to make a strict distinction between philosophy and history because he 
understands both philosophy and history as species of narrative. Accordingly both philosophy 
and history rely on the human experience of meaning. Philosophy and history are similar, in that 
both are modes of recording and expressing the humanly meaningful content of experience. It is 
precisely this point of view that justifies Carlyle’s attitude of skepticism towards “theory,” and 
also towards theoreticians like Hegel and Rousseau. Carlyle is the first modern English-speaking 
author to insist upon the point that philosophy is a “kind of literature.” And again, literature is a 
kind of action. 
 There is yet another important philosophical axiom of Carlyle’s, regarding the 
insurmountable gap between narrative and action: “Narrative is linear, action is solid.” This 
counter-point to the identification of writing and action points to the existence of a fundamental 
dilemma. As Aristotle proposes, the end of man is an action in the present; however, narratives 
of the past are all we have as a guide to present conduct. Accordingly, the self-conscious project 
of writing-as-action requires Carlyle to avoid intently any desire to reduce lived history to mere 
narrative or to construct a meta-narrative that explains all history (i.e. a “system”). On the level 
of action, history is a process of experimentation, trial and error. On the level of narrative, 
history is our effort to understand, explain, justify and hopefully learn from past actions, that we 
might make more felicitous decisions in the future. Both history and biography have this double-
sense for Carlyle. They signify the “Action and Passion” of human life; and, from this side, the 
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meaning of existence, of lived experience, exceeds the possibility of perfected knowledge or 
expression.  
When Carlyle equates history and biography in On Heroes, his purpose it seems is to 
point out the limits of historical knowledge, not, as so many assume, to recommend the “great-
man theory” as a shortcut to moral or intellectual certainty. Moreover, Carlyle asserts that these 
limits—both epistemological and existential—are obvious to anyone who has studied history and 
human affairs in earnest: “[L]et anyone who has examined the current of human affairs, and how 
intricate, perplexed, unfathomable, even when seen into with our own eyes, are their 
thousandfold blending movements, say whether the true representing of it is easy or 
impossible.”39  
For Carlyle, such a true representation is impossible. And the reason that this should be 
obvious is evident from what we know (or cannot know) of ourselves, since biography is the 
basic stuff of history.  
Social life is the aggregate of all the individual men’s lives who constitute society; 
History is the essence of innumerable Biographies. But if one Biography, nay, our own 
Biography, study and recapitulate as we may, remains in so may points unintelligible to 
us; how much more must these million, the very facts of which, to say nothing of the 
purport of them, we know not, and cannot know!40  
 
We know little more than the “facts” of our own lives, to begin to grasp the significance of 
which requires strenuous and interminable self-examination on one’s own part. Of other people’s 
lives we hardly have the facts; and the life of a society or historical community is so much more 
impenetrable owing to layers of biographical obscurity and complexity. If Carlyle uses the “great 
man” as a shortcut to history, then, it is with full awareness of the limits of this enterprise, which 
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is based, in turn, on the limits of self-awareness, for human consciousness is the ultimate 
mystery. Hence, a Carlylean hero is a symbol or a hieroglyph, an “incarnate sign.” But Carlyle’s 
deepest interest is in man as an incarnate sign.  
Most of Carlyle’s heroes are dead—whatever life they may be said to have is extant in 
the memory and imagination of living human beings. That this is a relationship of exemplary 
authority is beyond doubt. This relationship is not a simple case of command-and-obedience, any 
more than cult-ism, however. In fact, it is difficult to think of any living contemporary of 
Carlyle’s before whom he would have recommended that the masses fall prostrate in the 
caricaturist’s rendition of “hero-worship.” From the small set of potentially heroic 
contemporaries, Carlyle prefers figures like Robert Peel over the Duke of Wellington, Mirabeau 
over Robespierre. Hitler would have seemed to him a quack; for Carlyle’s aesthetic turn was 
motivated by a perception of the dangers of art to politics, not faith in the artist-as-savior.  
It is typical to explain Carlyle’s suspicion of “art” and of all things merely aesthetic as a 
remnant of his Calvinist upbringing. While there may be a measure of truth here, unfortunately 
there is nothing instructive or philosophically interesting in this explanation which is in fact more 
deterministic than Carlyle’s purported “Calvinism.” A similar criticism of hero-worship, 
mistakes Carlyle’s hypothesis for an ideology or a recommendation. But for Carlyle, hero-
worship is natural, it is an “everlasting adamant” of social order precisely because it needs no 
recommendation. In the conduct of one’s life it is natural to choose moral exemplars. What 
Searle has called the “relational reality” of authority is a fact of social life whether one chooses 
to acknowledge it or not.  
The author of a recent monograph on Heroes levels the most typical critique of Carlyle: 
“An exaggerated veneration for an exceptional individual poses an insidious temptation. It 
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allows worshippers to abnegate responsibility, looking to the great man for salvation or 
fulfillment that they should more properly be working to accomplish for themselves.”41  
Either this writer has not read Carlyle (who happens to concur: “all but foolish men 
know…that the only solid, though a slow reformation, is what each begins and perfects on 
himself”42), or she disagrees with the more fundamental proposition that authority is real and 
ineradicable and involves an hierarchical relationship between persons. While she does not 
breach the question of authority in these terms, the writer addresses the question of personal 
authority in another connection: “Carlyle approvingly called [hero-worship] ‘the germ…of all 
religion hitherto known,’ but to make a fellow human the object of religious devotion is unwise. 
Hero-worshippers…are frequently disappointed in, and lay themselves open to abuse by, the 
heroes of their choice.”43  
This brings us a little closer to the heart of the matter. What is to be made of Carlyle’s 
(re)turn to personal authority in our age of reason, science, law and determinism? Far from 
noticing the divinity in others, modernity questions the very existence of others and regards 
divinity as the highest delusion of one’s self. Why would Carlyle put himself out for the abuse of 
the naïve hero-worshipper in this age of criticism, whose highest show of intellectual devotion 
consists in a reluctant willingness to recognize that the self is all-too-human, and a sincere 
disappointment that man cannot achieve his dream of becoming God?  
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Titanism 
The simple answer is that Carlyle’s historical perspective is “backward-looking,” not “forward-
looking” and a candid look behind us, at historical evidence, reveals that men do not believe in 
abstractions. What other sort of divinity are men supposed to have worshipped but one 
sensuously manifest? What is the likelihood that man could have begun with such a sublime 
apprehension of transcendent divine reality? It is a high achievement to be able to worship God 
without the meditation of sensuous appearances (including “ideas”), and historically, this has 
been the achievement not of rationalism, but rather of mysticism. Moreover, even the mystic 
does not begin with mysticism, but has to move up the ladder of appearances before having 
anything resembling mystical experience. Basically hero-worship is a variation of the premise 
that worship proceeds by appearances—eidola, idols—and more specifically, appearances of 
“the most godlike form of a man.” 
But there is more. Not merely backward-looking, Carlyle craves simultaneity—he, too, 
wants to grasp the relation of past and present; therefore, he is unwilling to ignore myth, or the 
symbolic or figurative aspect of human self-interpretation. The age of science does not put an 
end the age of myth: this is the hard core of Carlyle’s opposition to Hegel, Darwin, Mill and the 
rest of the “progress-of-the-species” camp. Modernity is not an age of disenchantment, but of 
self-enchantment.44  
Myth, symbol, is an enduring aspect of human thought expressing man’s desire to know 
the whole (that, ultimately, he cannot know). Science, analysis, merely chops up this reality into 
parts. At the epistemological limits, human reason can grasp fully neither the whole, nor the 
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parts. Scientific analysis is incapable of grounding the belief in progress; in fact, it is the belief in 
progress that validates a scientific “worldview” which in turn produces the dogmas of necessary 
historical-evolutionary advancement. Turning its back on the past, the idea of “progress” merely 
transfers the reality of the whole into a mystified future, even as it satisfies the present believer 
with the illusion of immanent knowledge of the whole: one has only to believe that progress is 
fate. Progress is future worship; as such, it is the mirror-image of ancestor worship, and a 
reversion to primitive belief. Progress is the religion of titanic humanity.  
Evidently this is the situation to which Carlyle alludes when he remarks that modern man 
has become Titanic “in a deeper than metaphorical sense.”45 Borne on the extraordinary 
achievements of modern natural science in augmenting man’s power over physical nature, the 
ghastly spectacle to which Carlyle bears witness is the penetration of the inner life by the alien 
force of mechanism. The power of science to subdue external nature gives rise to the faith that 
man’s moral nature can be mastered in the same way. All this requires is to turn man’s soul 
inside-out, to make the invisible visible and of course to ignore whatever cannot be 
systematized.46 In other words, as Carlyle laments, the only publicly acceptable path to the inside 
of man is by way of his outer body. “The truth is, men have lost their belief in the Invisible, and 
believe, and hope, and work, only in the Visible.”47  
What is at stake here is the incompatibility between the mechanical dictates of ideology 
and the morality of virtue: “The infinite, absolute character of Virtue has passed into a finite, 
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conditional one…a calculation of the profitable…. Our true Deity is Mechanism…. We are 
Giants in physical power: in a deeper than metaphorical sense we are Titans, that strive, by 
heaping mountain upon mountain, to conquer heaven also.”48  
Carlyle’s alternative to the mute Babel of modern mechanism does not entail the rejection 
of science, technology or analytical thinking. His is no vulgar irrationalism. However, what 
Carlyle clearly rejects is the totalizing claim that analytical reason is the only legitimate way of 
thinking and knowing. The “irrationalism” that Carlyle recommends is not so much the worship 
of heroes, but the religion of wonder:  
An intellectual dapperling of these times boast chiefly of his irresistible perspicacity, his 
‘dwelling in the daylight of truth,’ and so forth; which, on examination, turns out to be a 
dwelling in the rush-light of ‘closet logic,’ and a deep unconsciousness that there is any 
other light to dwell in or any other objects to survey with it. Wonder, indeed, is on all 
hands, dying out: it is the sign of uncultivation to wonder.49 
 
A latter-day defender of the “philosophy of wonder,” Christopher Lasch, situates Carlyle 
in a tradition of thinkers that begins with Jonathan Edwards and ends with William James. Lasch 
reiterates this tradition’s critique of skepticism: 
Scientific rationalism gives a ‘shallow’ and ‘superficial’ account of man’s spiritual life. It 
cannot explain religious belief even when it tries to argue in support of religion instead of 
arguing against it. A rationalistic God is no more convincing than a universe with no God 
at all.50 
 
This presumptuous skeptical attitude merely disconnects the calculative from the chthonic in 
human reality. Accordingly, Carlyle casts himself on the side of the uncultivated, the 
“irrational.” But he does this while remaining a man of culture. As a man of culture, Carlyle 
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tries, like Rousseau, to bring the Lockean camera-obscura of consciousness out of the realm of 
closet-logic and to awaken the reader to the mystery of conscious existence.  
In On Heroes, we find Carlyle deploying the familiar camera-obscura metaphor in at 
least three different ways: following Locke, it is a figure for intentional consciousness. Secondly, 
the camera-obscura is a figure for the human sensorium. Finally the camera-obscura figures 
tradition, which is Carlyle’s (Burke-derived) version of historicism: “What an enormous camera-
obscura Magnifier is Tradition! How a thing grows in the human Memory, in the human 
Imagination, when love, worship, and all that lies in the human Heart is there to encourage it.”51 
We need to clarify that Carlyle’s turn to tradition, memory, and the moral imagination is 
not a turning-back on modernity. As Ruth ApRoberts observes:  
One of Carlyle’s challenges was to come to terms with Hume… Carlyle acclaims [Hume] 
for seeing that…we must at last develop a science of religion. But Hume’s values are all 
wrong. Hume ‘regards [Religion] as a disease, we again as Health; so far there is a 
difference; but in our first principle we are at one.’52   
 
From Carlyle’s perspective, it is not that the Humean discovery that science is a mere habit of 
mind is false. However, what Hume reveals to Carlyle is that even science partakes of the 
imagination.  
Science, myth, literature: all are modes of meaning, clothes—“habits”—woven together 
and worn by the imagination. In turn, all of these are comprehended by the “great thaumaturgic 
art of Thought!”  
Thaumaturgic I name it; for hitherto all Miracles have been wrought thereby, and 
henceforth innumerable will be wrought; whereof we, even in these days witness some. 
Of the Poet’s and Prophet’s inspired Message, and how it makes and unmakes whole 
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worlds, I shall forbear mention: but cannot the dullest hear Steam-engines clanking 
around him? Has he not seen the Scottish Brassmith’s IDEA (and this but a mechanical 
one) traveling on fire-wings round the Cape, and across two Oceans; and stronger than 
any Enchanter’s Familiar, on all hands unweariedly fetching and carrying: at home, not 
only weaving Cloth; but rapidly enough overturning the whole system of Society; and for 
Feudalism and Preservation of the Game, preparing us, by indirect but sure methods, for 
Industrialism and the Government of the Wisest. Truly a Thinking Man is the worst 
enemy the Prince of Darkness can have; every time such a one announces himself, I 
doubt not, there runs a shudder through the Nether Empire; and new Emissaries are 
trained, with new tactics, to, if possible, entrap him, and hoodwink and handcuff him.53 
 
The higher intellectual ground claimed by enlightenment science is not truly “higher,” 
unless it can comprehend what is lower. Since self-enchanted skepticism cannot comprehend the 
near-universal fact of religious belief (the kind of belief that does not ask for the “evidences”), its 
claim to a higher knowledge is flawed, fatally. This attitude of mental complacency reveals 
popular skepticism for what it is: another form of enthusiasm.  
But, again, Carlyle’s philosophy of wonder is not hostile to natural science. The 
Teufelsdrockhian passage above indicates clearly enough how Carlyle intentionally plays with 
the distinction between myth and science. Popular skepticism is all talk, cant, incantation—at 
best, all speculation, armchair analysis—and no action. By contrast Carlyle’s heroism is a mute 
ethics, an ethics of exempla not formulae: it aims to give expression to virtue, the aim of which is 
itself infinite, in the only language available, the language of moral action. 
 Why did Carlyle find it necessary to write those forty volumes in praise of silence? An 
important part of the answer, that often critics fail to appreciate, lay in Carlyle’s attention to the 
vicissitudes of language. In particular, Carlyle’s insights into the complex phenomenal 
relationship between the voice and the text deserve to be recognized as a key contribution to 
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Anglo-American thought, as well as a governing theme of his work. Both Carlyle’s and 
Emerson’s writings are shot through with awareness of the action-character of thought, speech 
and writing. Thought, a divine gift and sole apparent object of Carlyle’s reverence, is a silent 
virtue. Thought cannot be translated into public action until it erupts into speech. Speech is a 
kind of writing already, a king of doing or making; for, speech is “shaped, spoken thought.” On 
the one hand, this means that there is an inherent fallibility in the human word: the human word 
is a tool like other tools and consequently we should not be surprised when words sometimes 
“break,” failing to serve their constituted purpose as vessels of thought and meaning. On the 
other hand, there is no human culture without language—no spirit, but only brute bodies.  
With writing, especially, come the blessings of civilization. Unlike Rousseau, Carlyle 
neither praises nor recommends the primitive or uncivilized life of the so-called noble savage. 
Carlyle’s savage is Montaigne’s cannibal. For Carlyle, writing is especially miraculous; without 
writing, only a tribal existence is possible. But, unlike Hegel, Carlyle does not fall prey to the 
illusion that the meaning of history can be captured fully in a text. History, like life, is made of 
time. Time is persistent activity that does not come to an end—or another beginning—with a 
mere text. Carlyle’s renovation of the voice reminds the reader of the action-character of moral 
life and brings to the fore the personal reality of communication between authors and readers. 
But this is a doubly-mediated form of communication. At the same time, then, Carlyle keeps in 
view the peculiarities that come along with communication by way of print. 
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Chapter Four: The Democratization of Heroism 
 
How does the problem of the heroic individual relate to the seemingly distant questions of 
democratic theory? To begin to understand this relationship it will be necessary to examine more 
fully the political philosophy of Rousseau. Rousseau was the first thinker to combine the 
“mechanical” perspective of social contract theory with the emerging “organic” themes of 
individual and social self-determination. In this chapter, I focus specifically on Rousseau’s 
renovation of the great legislator and the civil religion as the primary manifestation of these 
organic themes in Rousseau’s political philosophy. My interpretation here leads to two broad, 
and related, conclusions. The first is that Rousseau’s legislator figures the rehabilitation of 
personal (or in Weber’s terms, charismatic) authority in the new guise of the hero as author. The 
second is that Rousseau’s ambivalence towards heroism in general, combined with his 
rehabilitation of heroic authority in the figure of the legislator, in particular, has the effect of 
suppressing the heroic voice and identifying the legislator with the text of the law, in this case, 
with the science of politics and the dogmas of the civil religion. The effect of this is evident in 
Rousseau’s portrayal of citizens as mere carbon-copies of the legislator’s character.  
In short, Rousseau’s great legislator appears as the exclusive author of the character of 
citizenship. While this author-text relationship is impressive in theory, it is untenable in practice. 
Since Rousseau, however, democratic political philosophy has continued to be vexed by 
Rousseau’s dilemma of how best to relate the exceptionalism of the legislator with the rule of 
citizenship. In the next few paragraphs we shall consider the contemporary relevance of this 
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dilemma. Following this, the bulk of this chapter returns to Rousseau’s attempt to democratize 
heroic authority. 
 
The Democratization of Heroism  
The democratization of heroism poses a problem. The hero is a species of the “exceptional” 
person; whereas contemporary democracy thinks of itself as the regime of ultimate equality. 
Democracy—ideal democracy—cannot tolerate exceptional or superlative personalities. Without 
denying the compelling vision of justice that democracy represents, we must admit, then, that on 
its own terms democratic morality cannot accommodate the radical inequality implied by our 
intuitive sense of the hero as one who excels his fellows in virtue, who thereby is entitled to a 
more exalted status than common people. If we take this basic intuition seriously, we must 
further acknowledge that despite the real moral progress heralded by proponents of democracy, 
the urge for democratic equality contains in itself the potential for at least one injustice: it 
privileges mediocrity. This injustice is implicit in the democrats’ denial of merit, or desert; its 
epitome is democracy’s intolerance of heroes. 
 It goes almost without saying that democracies must be vigilant in defense of individual 
liberties and in opposition to potential tyrannies. Certainly the customary disapprobation of 
vulgar hero-worship in liberal-democratic culture is a salutary normative bulwark against 
possible oppression. At first glance, then, the suggestion that we ought to be concerned about 
democracy’s potential injustice to the “exception” may seem extravagant, even dangerous. 
Moreover, the commonsensical critic will observe that if we put theoretical abstractions aside, it 
is clear that people today do attribute excellence to certain individuals and even allow these 
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individuals a rather lofty—maybe too lofty—status on account of it. “Perhaps there is no more 
gross example of this than the phenomenon of ‘celebrity-worship,’” someone might say, “and far 
from being an inducement to defend the principle of heroism, this celebrity-worship exposes the 
baseless superstition that underlies all sorts of hero-worship and only suggests that the 
demolition of arbitrary inequality has yet to be completed.” The point is compelling. It would be 
hard to find a sensitive person who disagrees about the lamentable state of a society in which the 
typical referents of the term “hero” are entertainers or athletes, and where for lack of another 
common authority many people have come to expect political wisdom from the former, or to 
demand moral excellence from the latter. The perceptive social observer knows better than to 
look for such qualities in these quarters. But of course most such observers lack the bully pulpit 
of celebrity. Moreover, social critics tend to mute each other’s voices by the force of their own 
internecine disagreements. 
 Not that the vociferations of social critics, on the one hand; or, the silencing of 
disagreement on the other, should be expected to resolve the problems associated with the 
democratization of heroism. These problems are too deeply rooted in our philosophy to be 
reached by criticism alone. They are bound up in the basic assumptions that make criticism in the 
modern sense possible; namely, the belief in the possibility of an impartial “critical” perspective 
from which the detached individual observer may evaluate the world “objectively.” This belief, 
speaking as it does in the language of modern natural science, turns out to be a profoundly 
democratic belief—“democratic” in the leveling sense we just portrayed—and so it begs our 
question. The reason for this is that the dialects of natural science, “objectivity,” “philosophical 
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critique” and so on, are all variants of the modern dialect of method. And method is the greatest 
leveler.  
 Descartes, the first convert to the vita methodica, understood well that method is the 
proper enemy of genius. His philosophical project was not to annihilate, but to correct “genius” 
by subordinating it to a clear and distinct method. Today the desirability of such a methodology 
is a given, but for Descartes it implied a personally meaningful decision. As Wolin has observed, 
the vita methodica implied “a profound personal choice, perhaps the closest functional 
equivalent to a conversionary experience that the modern mind can achieve. At the very least, it 
was intended as a form of re-education, as the title of one of Descartes’ works, Regulae ad 
directionem ingenii, implied.”1 
 By now methodology has become hegemonic as the optic through which we view the 
human things. Indeed, methodology is so dominant that it has provoked a counter-conversion 
against method, and in favor of what can only be called genius. But this putatively postmodern 
“genius” also is a leveling notion—a genius open to all. The affect of this conversion is manifest 
in the popularity of a so-called relativism, the meaning of which is, for the obvious reasons, all-
too-ambivalent. Is relativism an empirical notion, implying that each person creates one’s own 
world as a matter of fact? Or alternatively, is it a moral or normative demand that each person 
ought to have the right to create one’s own reality? To confront these difficult questions is to 
begin to understand why Descartes was so attracted to method in the first place.  
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The problem with genius, recognized by Descartes, is that it is far too particular; and 
therefore variable, and unpredictable. As the notions of civilizational “genius” and the individual 
“genius” suggest, genius is too particular to be scientific in the modern sense. A thinker who, 
like Descartes, aims to establish a regime of universally commensurable, “clear and distinct” 
ideas, must forsake genius at the very least because of this irreducible particularity. The whole 
aim of method is to correct the bias, prejudice and inherent weaknesses of human genius. 
Method is “universal,” then, both in the sense of its scientific objectivity, and in the sense that it 
is accessible to everyone. You do not have to be anybody in particular in order to understand or 
use a scientific method. Genius, by contrast, implicates a particular tradition—or at least a 
personal talent—that may be difficult to understand from an “objective” vantage point. The price 
one pays for the vita methodica, then, is the suppression of particularity along with whatever 
resources particular cultures might carry. For this price one purchases a more general means of 
communication, but it is a communication limited to the externalities and incapable of expressing 
internal, particular realities. 
 A new sort of critic, the defender of tradition, emerges in reaction to the hegemonic view 
that the vita methodica is the only legitimate expression of the life of the mind. It is no 
coincidence that, often, defenders of tradition see the disjoint between democratic theory and 
practice that subtends the problem of merit, and accordingly of heroism. Edmund Burke’s 
defense of prejudice and Alexis deTocqueville’s fear of a “democratic despotism” based on 
systematic equality are early cases of this sort of insight. A more recent defender of tradition, 
Alasdair McIntyre locates a basic shortcoming of democratic theory in its inability to cope with 
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the problem of “desert.” In a comparison of John Rawls and Robert Nozick, the two antipodes of 
contemporary democratic theory, McIntrye2 evinces one key point of conformity:  
 
Neither of them make any reference to desert in their account of justice, nor could they 
consistently do so…. [F]or both Nozick and Rawls, a society is composed of individuals, 
each with his or her own interest, who then have to come together and formulate common 
rules of life. In Nozick’s case, there is the additional negative constraint of a set of basic 
rights. In Rawls’s case the only constraints are those that a prudent rationality would 
impose. Individuals are thus in both accounts primary and society secondary, and the 
identification of individual interests is prior to, and independent of, the construction of 
any moral or social bonds between them. 
The dereliction of desert makes sense within the horizon of social contract theory, because 
contract theory aims to demonstrate how legitimate political authority could arise from the 
consent of free and equal rational individuals. Instead of basing political legitimacy on tradition, 
history or religion, the contractarian is bound to employ the scientifically-inspired method of 
constructing a hypothetically legitimate regime based on a carefully defined “axiomatic” notion 
of the pre-social individual. What an axiomatic individual can be expected to accept is 
“legitimate.” Unsurprisingly, these sorts of theories have the virtue of being applicable to any 
political regime, but not to any regime in particular. For the abstract nature of these premises 
cannot but produce abstract conclusions. 
 McIntyre’s critique would be unremarkable if it was restricted to this expose of radical 
individualism in democratic theory. The charge of radical individualism is commonplace among 
opponents of the contract view. But to this McIntyre appends the observation that, in political 
practice, people make claims of desert all the time. Indeed, such claims often take the place of 
the theoretical claims made by Nozick and Rawls. Commonplace political discussions trade in 
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terms of merit and desert, regardless of whether one adopts the Nozickean or Rawlsian view of 
distributive justice. To use McIntyre’s illustration: Party “A,” representative of the former view, 
feels that massive redistribution (i.e. high taxes) threatens his ability to achieve personal goals. 
But he has earned these resources through hard work. Therefore “A aspires to ground the notion 
of justice in some account of what and how a given person is entitled to in virtue of what he has 
acquired and earned.” On the other hand, party “B” represents the Rawlsian view. “He is, if 
anything, even more impressed with the inability of the poor and deprived to do very much about 
their own condition as a result of inequalities in the distribution of power.” He tends to regard 
such inequalities as rather arbitrary, and in need of justification. Therefore “B holds that 
principles of just distribution set limits to legitimate acquisition and entitlement.” This conflict, 
typical of today’s debates, is usually dealt with in terms of “weighing” the claims of the 
opposing parties. But McIntyre argues that “these two types of claim are 
indeed...incommensurable, and the metaphor of ‘weighing’ moral claims is not just inappropriate 
but misleading.” The reason for this is that “our pluralist culture possesses no method of 
weighing, no rational criterion for deciding between claims based on legitimate entitlement 
against claims based on need.”3 Parties A and B, respectively, invoke two incommensurable 
standards of desert: 
 
What A complains of on his own behalf is not merely that he is entitled to what he has 
earned, but that he deserves it in virtue of his life of hard work; what B complains of on 
behalf of the poor and deprived is that their poverty or deprivation is undeserved and 
therefore unwarranted. And it seems clear that in the case of the real-life counterparts of 
A and B it is the reference to desert which makes them feel strongly that what they are 
complaining about is injustice, rather than some other kind of wrong or harm. 
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McIntyre’s argument parallels that of other critics in so far as it relies on the sense of a 
fundamental disconnect between political theory and practice. But rather than finding fault with 
the “real-life counterparts” of parties A and B, McIntyre assigns the flaw to modern political 
theory, with its entrenched bias towards individualism. “The notion of desert is at home only in 
the context of a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for 
man and of the good of that community and where individuals identify their primary interest 
with reference to those goods.”4 Desert does not and cannot have any place in a political theory 
that relies strictly on methodological individualism, and this includes all contract theories. 
Individualism rules out the appeal to tradition, and more generally to history, on which the 
notion of desert relies.  
 For McIntyre a solution to this theoretical impasse would involve not throwing out the 
notion of desert. Instead, we have to acknowledge that modern theory is destined to fail at 
achieving a new moral consensus. Any solution, he concludes, would then seem to involve some 
kind of return to tradition. But this return is complicated because individualism also stands for a 
social reality, and it cannot just be abandoned. The reality is that, from the perspective of the 
modern state, the traditionalist is now a dissenter. “Modern systematic politics, whether liberal, 
conservative, radical or socialist, simply has to be rejected from a standpoint that owes genuine 
allegiance to the tradition of the virtues; for modern systematic politics expresses in its 
institutional forms a systematic rejection of that tradition.”5 To whatever extent this is possible, 
individualism is our tradition; or, put alternatively, it is our anti-tradition.  
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The question we are pursuing is not exactly whether some people deserve more (or less) 
than others. But the problem of desert is instructive because it shows how modern democratic 
theory can fail to account for even our most basic intuitive notions about justice. If the reader 
needs to see the connection between this example and the problem of heroism, let McIntyre’s 
own remarks suffice. For, after he dispenses with the question of desert, he goes on to talk about 
the most characteristic presence of the heroic in politics—patriotism: 
 
Patriotism cannot be what it once was because we lack in the fullest sense a patria. The 
point that I am making must not be confused with the commonplace liberal rejection of 
patriotism…. [M]y present point is not that patriotism is good or bad as a sentiment, but 
that the practice of patriotism as a virtue is in advanced societies no longer possible in the 
way that it once was. In any society where government does not express or represent the 
moral community of the citizens, but is instead a set of institutional arrangements for 
imposing a bureaucratized unity on a society which lacks genuine moral consensus, the 
nature of political obligation becomes systematically unclear.6 
 Now let us try to spell out how all of this relates to our problem, the democratization of 
heroism. First, we have to clarify our terms. “Democracy” here means modern democracy, or the 
regime made up of freely consenting individuals. Only within this specific modern horizon can 
the democratization of heroism become a problem. The reason for this is that “heroism” is 
emphatically a traditional notion. Most recently Joseph Campbell7 has shown that although the 
figure of the hero is universal (in the sense that all mythologies contain hero-characters, whose 
journeys exhibit a remarkably similar form) the function of the hero is particular to a community. 
The archetypal consummation of the heroic journey is the hero’s return to the community, 
bearing the gift of a “new truth” for his people. Despite the obscurity of what Campbell means 
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by a “new truth,” it is clear that even his rather formal account of heroism would lose all sense if 
the connection between hero and community was severed. Yet this is precisely what the 
“democratization of heroism” implies. Heroism and democracy are potentially as 
incommensurable as tradition and individualism. With this established we can state the problem, 
or paradox of democratic heroism in terms of a question that shall guide our research: Is heroic 
individualism possible? 
 
Rousseau and the Heroic Legislator 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was perhaps the first political thinker to recognize and try to solve this 
problem. If we wish to understand what modern patriotism means, or can mean, then we must 
begin with Rousseau. Rousseau’s critique of social contract theory is one of the first great 
attempts to synthesize the ancients and the moderns. His unique contribution “lies in his attempt 
to combine a view of human nature derived from moderns like Hobbes and Locke with a view of 
history derived from Plato and Aristotle.”8 Like the moderns, Rousseau views human nature 
primarily in terms of individual self-preservation. Conversely, the ancients understood human 
beings primarily as social creatures. For example, Aristotle acknowledges the possibility of a 
person without a polis, but summarily declines to consider such an isolated “individual.” He only 
remarks that the apolis man is either a god or a beast. By choosing the form of a “social 
contract,” Rousseau announces his sympathy with modern individualism. Yet he replaces the 
“aggressive or rational egoism of Hobbes and Locke with the more passive and instinctive self-
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preservation of isolated animals.” On the other hand, Rousseau sides with the ancients in his 
view of history, interpreting history in rather pessimistic terms. From his early critiques, in the 
Discourses, of the corrupting effects of civilization, to his mature attempt, in the Social Contract, 
to demonstrate how the corrupt relations of modern society might be legitimized, Rousseau 
displays an ancient “skepticism towards radical historical progress” while nevertheless upholding 
a quasi-Platonic idealism as a radical standard “that show[s] how to construct a legitimate and 
free government, at least in some instances.” 
 Interpretation of Rousseau’s political thought is notoriously difficult. One reason for this 
lay in his synthesis of the modern view of human nature and the ancient view of history. Another 
reason seems to be that none of Rousseau’s views can be understood in strictly ancient or 
modern terms, but require the reader constantly to participate in Rousseau’s imaginative effort of 
synthesis. What is remarkable about Rousseau’s “modern” view of human nature, for example, is 
that he deploys it in the Social Contract to construct an ideal of political community that much 
more closely resembles the ancient polis than the modern state. Many critics have observed this 
tendency; Hannah Arendt diagnosed it as Rousseau’s polis envy. 
 Another remarkable transformation of an idea that has received less attention concerns 
Rousseau’s view of the legislator, as well as his view of the hero. There is much to suggest that 
Rousseau saw a close connection between the figures of the hero and the legislator. “The 
legislator is the most exceptional example of heroic virtue discussed in [Rousseau’s early] 
Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero.”9  
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In the Social Contract and Geneva Manuscript, the figure of the hero returns in the guise 
of the great Legislator. Rousseau’s legislator “is an extraordinary man in the State in all respects. 
If he should be so because of his genius, he is no less so by his function. It is not magistracy, it is 
not sovereignty. This function, which constitutes the republic, does not enter into its 
constitution.”10  
 The great legislator’s “function” is to persuade selfish men to abide by the common good. 
Since this function “constitutes the republic” the legislator is constrained to fulfill it without 
recourse to coercive force or constitutional authority (coercion does not create citizens, and a 
constitution is yet lacking). It is easy to see, then, why Rousseau refers to the legislator as “an 
extraordinary man...in all respects,” for he takes upon himself the burden of “an undertaking 
beyond human force and, to execute it, an authority that amounts to nothing.”11 What sets the 
great legislator apart from other men? What sorts of qualities are required to fulfill this audacious 
task? In the Hero Rousseau refers to a virtue that he calls “strength of soul,” but as we have seen 
he also mentions the lawgiver’s “genius.” The legislator must also have knowledge of the 
“science of the legislator,” or the “maxims of politics.” 
 Rousseau’s appreciation for the heroic-lawgiving virtue epitomizes the ancient side of his 
political thought. Earlier moderns had not addressed the ancient question of the “lawgiver” and it 
almost seems like a non sequitur in a discussion of the “social contract.” On the level of theory 
Rousseau basically agrees with the contract theorists, defining political legitimacy in modern 
terms as an idealization of popular sovereignty. But he is quick to admit that, in practice, most 
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people lack the ability to discern and apply abstract principles of political science. Here enters 
the special function of the legislator, who adapts the universal maxims of politics to a particular 
people. This explains why, in the Social Contract, the legislative 
 
‘genius’ discovering the laws best suited for a particular community is personified as an 
individual...[who] is somehow above the level of ordinary men…. Because a successful 
policy cannot be based on popular understanding of the ‘science of the legislator,’ the 
patriotic opinions needed to support good laws are transformed into dogmas—the ‘civil 
religion’ that converts selfish individuals into virtuous citizens.12 
 The Legislator, the maxims of politics, and the civil religion form a coherent complex of 
ideas that enable Rousseau to rebuild ancient republicanism on modern premises. While the 
theory of the “general will” begins from modern premises, his political practice begins from 
ancient premises. Rousseau the republican believes in the importance of tradition, and the 
timeworn idea of civic virtue. But just as Rousseau the democrat conjures an ancient polis from 
modern premises, his treatment of the ancient Legislator leads to a strikingly modern conclusion. 
Since Rousseau views the heroic legislator with all the suspicion demanded by the modern view 
of human nature, he is unable to conceive of a disinterested heroism: “Let us not conceal 
anything; public felicity is far less the end of the Hero’s actions than it is a means to reach the 
one he sets for himself, and that end is almost always his personal glory.”13 This conclusion does 
not alter Rousseau’s conviction that “of all the qualities of soul...heroism is the one with which it 
is most important to Peoples that those who govern them be adorned.”14 However, it does lead to 
a strict distinction between the hero and the “Wise Man.”  
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The Wise Man possesses all the virtues but is not a public benefactor, while the Hero 
“compensates for the virtues he lacks by the brilliance of those he possesses.”15 This is a critical 
distinction: 
 
Indeed, the care of his own felicity is the Wise Man’s entire occupation and that is 
doubtless a large enough one for an ordinary man. The views of the true Hero extend 
further. The happiness of men is his object, and it is to this sublime labor that he devotes 
the great soul he received from Heaven. The Philosophers, I admit, claim to teach men 
the art of being happy, and as if they were expecting to form nations of Wise Men, they 
preach to peoples a chimerical felicity which they do not have themselves and of which 
the people never acquire an idea or taste. Socrates saw and deplored the misfortunes of 
his fatherland; but it fell to Thrasybulus to end them. And Plato, after having wasted his 
eloquence, his honor, and his time at a Tyrant’s court, was forced to abandon to someone 
else the glory of freeing Syracuse from the yoke of tyranny. The Philosopher can give the 
Universe some salutary instructions, but his lessons will correct neither the nobles who 
scorn them or the People which does not hear them at all. Men are not governed in that 
way by abstract views; one makes them happy only by constraining them to be so, and 
one must make them experience happiness in order to make them love it. Those are the 
occupation and talents of the Hero.16 
This early treatment of the hero is worth quoting at length because it bears a striking resemblance 
to Rousseau’s account of the legislator in the Social Contract. The peculiar function of the great 
legislator is the same as that of the hero: to make the people happy “only by constraining them to 
be so” If the legislator is to perform this feat without the aid of coercion or the yet-unmade law, 
then he must of course have a superior share of wisdom. But this does not eradicate the 
distinction between the hero and the philosopher. For the distinguishing quality of the 
philosopher is prudence, or the care of his own self; whereas the lawgiver-hero has the audacity 
to “undertake the founding of a people...transforming each individual, who by himself is a 
perfect and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole...altering man’s constitution in order to 
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strengthen it; [and] substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical independent 
existence we have all received from nature.”17 Rousseau has no illusions regarding what we call 
the “audacity” of the legislator, for properly speaking the effective transformation of human 
nature that makes equal and “partial” citizens out of “perfect and solitary” individuals is a divine 
act. “Gods would be needed to give laws to men.”18 
 Rousseau does not mention the egotism of the legislator in the relevant passages of the 
Social Contract. However since he expressed this view in the Hero, we may take Rousseau’s 
later silence on this point as evidence that his view has not changed. Moreover, the relevant 
passages of the Social Contract plainly indicate that the legislator is not a god, but merely 
attributes his own wisdom to the gods in order “to win over by divine authority those who cannot 
be moved by human prudence.”19 The hero-legislator, then, is emphatically a modern 
“individual.” He is an egotist like all other men; his nature is that of “perfect and solitary whole.” 
Indeed, the legislator is a standing threat to the constituted republic because in the wake of the 
founding he alone persists in his whole individuality.  
 As we have seen, the common good is but the hero’s means to the egotistic end of 
immortal glory (rivaled only by the gods). This heroic immortality project sums up the natural 
telos of every human being. “So it is that the World has often been overburdened with Heroes, 
but nations will never have enough citizens.” For every man, as a man, craves the undying fame 
                                                 
17
 Social Contract, II.vii (Collected Writings 4:155). 
 
18
 Ibid. (Collected Writings 4:154). 
 
19
 Ibid. (Collected Writings 4:156). 
  116 
of heroism; but as citizens, men must learn to satisfy this desire through the less natural (and 
consequently more difficult) virtues of obedience.20  
 The important result of this investigation is that the Rousseauean hero unequivocally is a 
heroic individual. Our paradigmatic example is the great legislator: It is precisely in consequence 
of the legislator’s heroism that he can never be a citizen. The citizen by contrast can never be a 
hero. Citizenship is but an imitation of the hero since heroism implies the natural egotism of 
man, thereby corrupting the sense of a common good on which citizenship depends. That there 
really is a common good is what Rousseau is attempting to prove with his political science. But 
as we have seen he identifies this science with the person of the legislator. In this sense 
Rousseau’s revival of the legislator represents a significant departure from ancient political 
thought. The ancients attempted to domesticate the hero by criticizing traditional heroes from the 
perspective of the regime; Rousseau inscribes the person of the hero upon the regime. Rousseau 
may share with the ancients the aim of producing citizens, but his method rather opposes the 
ancients. Presupposing that the hero cannot be domesticated, Rousseau chooses to situate the 
hero in a transcendent and unitary relation to the regime of citizenship, the Rousseauean hero is a 
sort of deus ex machina. 
 To understand Rousseau’s modernity on this point, we must consider the sources that 
underlie his belief that the hero cannot be domesticated. Briefly, they are to be found in the 
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originators of modern political science, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli. Two general 
considerations support this view. The first is drawn from the character of Rousseau’s life-project 
of criticizing the Enlightenment. For Rousseau “Enlightenment” means the popularization of 
science, and more specifically the thesis that the diffusion of scientific knowledge necessarily 
leads to progress. His lifelong opposition to this prejudice of the philosophes is a constant theme 
from his very first published Discourse.21 At first glance Rousseau’s critique of science seems to 
amount to a rejection of Hobbes and Machiavelli, but the reality is quite opposite: It is the truth 
of modern science that makes it so dangerous. Not science itself, but the popularization of 
science is what Rousseau fears. This point can be validated by a second consideration drawn 
from our discussion of the heroic legislator. The legislator must be kept at arm’s length from the 
constituted republic because he is the very personification of the science of politics. And since 
Rousseau thinks of the community as a nation or patria (that is, a closed or particular 
association), the diffusion of strictly scientific knowledge can only be negative in its effect on the 
public. Science will either be too abstract for the common people to understand, or will lead to a 
widespread skepticism that undermines the dogmas of the civil religion. For the civil religion 
expresses the maxims of politics in such a way that the people can understand and believe them. 
Common men are not naturally disposed to doubt the civil religion.22 The systematic doubt 
introduced by science, therefore, can only lead to a malignant confusion that will vitiate 
citizenship, leading not to progress but decline. 
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 As Leo Strauss observes,23 “Rousseau who warns the common men of the dangers of 
science is so far from considering himself a common man that he boldly compares himself to 
Prometheus who brings the light of science, or the love of science, to the few for whom alone it 
is destined.” Evidence abounds to suggest that Rousseau accepts modern science on principle 
and that his particular objection to science is that of a political philosopher who is concerned 
with the effects of philosophy or science on politics as well as the reciprocal effect of 
popularization on philosophy or science itself. Accordingly, one way to understand Rousseau’s 
revival of ancient republicanism is as an attempt to protect modern science from society, and 
vice-versa. If this is true then it makes sense to look for the foundation of Rousseau’s view of 
heroism in the philosophy of Machiavelli and Hobbes. 
 
The Modern Origins 
The “Question of Machiavelli,” as Isaiah Berlin phrased it, has bedeviled political philosophers 
since the sixteenth century. Whether it will ever be resolved is a mystery, so the best way to get 
at the impact of Machiavelli may be to state the question instead of attempting to answer it. The 
“question” concerns the so-called “Reason of State”: Is there a peculiar logic (and perhaps a 
morality) of political action that stands alone without reference to the logic of personal action, or 
of the government of a household, or of the Church, et cetera? Does political action have 
reference to an aim that transcends politics itself; or is politics a self-referential activity? 
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Classical political philosophy tends toward the first answer, modern political philosophy the 
second.  
 The ancients routinely analyzed the regime with reference to some teleological aim. 
Plato’s Republic is the most famous example of this approach, since it examines politics with an 
eye to its highest aim, which is the idea of Justice or Right (dike). But this is only one variant of 
the teleological approach. Since most existing governments are not “ideal,” Aristotle suggested 
at least four different approaches to the question of the “best” regime. First, we can consider the 
best regime “simply.” This is the method of the Republic. Second, we can ask which regime is 
the best “on a presupposition.” This approach presumably takes into account the character of the 
particular regime in question. Third, we can ask with regime is best under the circumstances 
given. Finally, we can inquire as to what regime is best “in most cases.” This combines the 
theoretical tendency of the Republic with a practical recognition of the limits of human nature. In 
every case, however, politics makes no sense as an end in itself; politics must be understood with 
reference to overriding aims, if it is to be understood properly. Machiavelli was the first 
philosopher to openly call this view into question. It is not clear whether politics has any end for 
Machiavelli, save the acquisition and maintenance of a territorial state; or whether the prince has 
any aim, save his own glory.  
 Michel Foucault has proposed that, regardless of the true interpretation of Machiavelli’s 
political philosophy, the  
 
politics of The Prince...from which people sought to distance themselves, was 
characterized by one principle: for Machiavelli, it was alleged, the prince stood in a 
relation of singularity and externality, and thus of transcendence, to his principality. The 
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prince acquires his principality by inheritance or conquest, but in any case he does not 
form part of it, he remains external to it.24 
As Foucault observes, the “synthetic” relation Machiavelli imposes between the prince and his 
principality denies implicitly that there is anything “fundamental, natural, essential [or] juridical” 
about the art of ruling.25 Properly speaking, Machiavelli’s science of politics is nothing but an 
instrumental science of how to acquire one’s estate, and secure it against rivals, both from 
without and from within. The result of Machiavelli’s political theory, which identifies this dismal 
wisdom exclusively with the person of the prince, is a scientific despotism. The Prince is a 
textbook in absolutism, a primer in the science of management. 
Obviously Rousseau’s praise of The Prince as “a book for republicans” represents a 
minority view. For Rousseau, Machiavelli’s Prince is a satire on absolutism. If anything, 
Machiavelli himself is the prince who teaches his readers republicanism, albeit indirectly. 
Nevertheless, Rousseau’s legislator, like the prince, stands in a relation of singularity and 
externality with respect to the regime. In particular, Rousseau’s legislator figures the prince as 
the author of the regime. 
 Criticism of Machiavelli’s science of politics, from many perspectives, continues to be a 
main occupation of political thinkers. Foucault argues that one wellspring of criticism that 
emerged in the sixteenth century pits the “art of government” against the “science of politics.” 
The art-of-government tradition emphasizes the diverse, particular and differentiated aims of 
civil association(s) over and against the singular, transcendent, and self-referential “science” of 
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the Prince. Most importantly, this tradition rejects the impersonal relation between the 
Machiavellian prince and his estate or territory, preferring a conception of government that 
relates the prince to his people.  
 
The art of government, as becomes apparent in this literature, is essentially concerned 
with answering the question of how to introduce economy—that is to say, the correct way 
of managing individuals, goods, and wealth within the family (which a good father is 
expected to do in relation to his wife, children, and servants) and of making the family 
fortunes prosper—how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father toward his 
family into the management of the state. 
Thus, the basic problem involved in the art-of-government tradition is “the introduction 
of economy into political practice.”26 The difficulty of this problem may not be obvious today, 
since the word “economy” by now has come to designate a field of social reality amenable to 
scientific study. However this was not the case in the sixteenth century. At that time the 
dominant (if not the only) meaning of “economy” was roughly the same as that attached to it by 
the ancients: Economy was a practical art related to managing a household, not a theoretical 
science pertaining to the wealth of nations. So the pedagogical approach of art-of-government 
tradition was more Aristotelian than Machiavellian. Whereas Machiavelli takes a top-down 
approach to the science of politics, regarding personal ethics as a roadblock to the prince’s ability 
to use cruelty well; the art-of-government takes a bottom-up approach, regarding ethics (the 
study of character) and economics (the art of household management) as the proper foundation 
for the study of rulership. The only problem with this classical Aristotelian approach is that the 
object of modern political science is not the polis, but the territorial state. The art-of-government 
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tradition, therefore, introduces the new problem of political economy into modern political 
science.  
 Foucault points out that Rousseau thought this problem was still unresolved in the 
eighteenth century. In his article on “Political Economy”27 Rousseau  
 
says...roughly...that the word ‘economy’ can only be properly used to signify the wise 
government of the family for the common welfare of all...the problem, writes Rousseau, 
is how to introduce it, mutatis mutandis...into the general running of the state. To govern 
a state will mean, therefore...to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which 
means exercising toward its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a 
form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his 
household and his goods. 
From this perspective, it makes sense to interpret Rousseau’s political theory as an 
attempt to project the paternal and filial aspect of household “economy” onto the modern 
territorial state. It is obvious that this project requires converting the territorial state into a 
national and territorial state, a modern patria. “Nation” of course is derived from the Latin natio 
(to be born), and signifies just this filial aspect of Rousseau’s republican project. One way to see 
the difference between ancient and modern politics, then, is in terms of the relation between the 
cultural entity called “nation” and the territorial entity called “state.” This distinction would 
make little sense to the ancients: It was Machiavelli’s philosophy that generated the rigid concept 
of the state as a territorial parcel of property owned by the prince. Rousseau found a certain 
virtue in ancient political philosophy’s lack of a distinction between the territorial “sovereignty” 
of the prince and the economic welfare of the “people.” In this he remains true to form as an 
opponent of science and the Enlightenment. Yet his return to ancient republicanism is not a 
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return to ancient philosophy; although he rejects the popularization of modern science Rousseau 
does not deny its rectitude. It is on the foundation of modern, not ancient political science that 
Rousseau sets up his republican edifice. For the sake of the people, he circumscribes the 
knowledge of science within the sphere of the legislator. 
 Already we can see a resemblance between the Machiavellian prince and Rousseau’s 
legislator, in so far as they both occupy a singular and external position of authority with respect 
to the state.28 One might even say that Rousseau considers the basic question of rulership to have 
been answered by Machiavelli’s science of politics. The only remaining aspects of political 
science, then, are ethics and economics. But Rousseau inherits more than Machiavelli’s science; 
in the form of social contract theory, he inherits a tradition of modern political philosophy that 
has already begun to deal with the problem of ethics in an attempt to coordinate the science of 
politics with the art of government. The classic example of this is the philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes. 
 
[The] art of government tried, so to speak, to reconcile itself with the theory of 
sovereignty by attempting to derive the ruling principles of an art of government from a 
renewed version of the theory of sovereignty…. Contract theory enables the founding 
contract, the mutual pledge of ruler and subjects, to function as a sort of theoretical 
matrix for deriving the general principles of an art of government. But although contract 
theory, with its reflection on the relationship between ruler and subjects, played a very 
important role in theories of public law, in practice, as is evidenced by the case of 
Thomas Hobbes (even though what Hobbes was aiming to discover was the ruling 
principles of an art of government), it remained at the stage of the formulation of general 
principles of public law.29 
                                                 
28
 There is one crucial difference between the legislator and the prince: the former, it seems, cannot use 
coercion whereas the latter certainly can. This obviously is a crucial point of moral and political practice. However, 
the theoretical question at hand concerns authority, not power. 
 
29
 Ibid., p. 240. 
  124 
The great achievement of Hobbes’s philosophy is that it accounts for the relation between the 
Machiavellian executive and his subjects in terms of the hypothetical consent of free and equal 
individuals. The costs, or drawbacks of this approach are first, that by dealing in the abstract and 
theoretical terms of a science of sovereignty, it cannot really penetrate to the level of particulars 
that would make a true art of government possible; secondly, the only way that Hobbes can 
justify in terms of free and equal individuals the radical domestic inequality implied by 
sovereignty, is to make every individual a potential prince. In other words, Hobbes scientifically 
defends the Machiavellian executive by rendering the selfish egoism of the prince as a 
fundamental characteristic of human nature. Human beings are equal because we are all about as 
capable of murdering one another. The coercive state is legitimate because the only alternative is 
to live in fear of a violent death. 
 
Historical Heroism: Vico and Rousseau on Hobbes 
By substituting the summum malum for the summum bonum as the systematic reference-point of 
political theory, Hobbes completes the revolution in political science. Even Machiavellian 
politics can be rationalized in terms of a positive aim: civilizational greatness, or glory. But the 
Leviathan aims to put down “the proud.” Hobbes’s state has no positive aim, pagan or Christian; 
it aims only to avoid disaster by subduing the political passion. Why would Hobbes so degrade 
the aims of politics? One reason may be that he had seen enough of heroism.  
 As Vico well observed, historical heroism is rather more severe than romantic heroism. 
Historical heroism builds cities, protects allies, fights invaders from without and cultivates 
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strenuous virtues within. Vico held that eventually every nation experiences a “heroic age” in its 
history that exhibits these civilization-building characteristics. Heroic ages do not philosophize. 
Heroic ages by definition are not cultivated or reflective ages. In the classical world, heroism 
would be more closely associated with the Romans then the Greeks; in modern times, English 
society with its common-law institutions and latter-day conflict of the orders is representative of 
heroism for Vico. Heroism speaks a rough but unequivocal language. The historical hero “lives 
by agreements and laws, but interprets them so rigidly that he is often unjust; he defends his 
family and property, but with a religious zeal bordering on open violence. The hero is only 
midway between man and beast, and not, as the Greeks anachronistically believed, between men 
and the gods.”30  
 If we take Vico’s characterization of the “heroic” and add that Hobbes witnessed an 
England destroyed by religious violence, it becomes quite plausible to interpret Hobbes’s 
political philosophy as a critique of heroism. But, understood in this way, the force of Hobbes’s 
critique would not lie in negating the “heroic” in man. It would rely rather on the exposure of 
man’s heroic nature as his vainglorious nature, and the suggestion that it should be 
systematically suppressed by the state. 
 Vico might have approved of Hobbes’s dire characterization of the heroic element in 
human nature.31 What Vico could not abide was Hobbes’s abstract method of explaining 
civilization by recourse a hypothetical agreement between self-interested individuals in an 
imaginary state of nature. Despite the atrocities of historical heroism, the heroic age represents a 
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crucial step between mere nature and civilized society. Moreover, even in the heroic age human 
beings are naturally social, not individualistic. Hobbes’s expose of the heroic is too abstract. It 
fails to acknowledge the social value of heroism, not to speak of its historical importance. 
 Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes takes a slightly different direction. Rousseau maintains 
that Hobbes’s mistake was to read the self-serving rationalism of modern “civilized” man back 
into the state of nature. Rousseau claims to the contrary, that “the state of reflection is a state 
contrary to nature and that the man who meditates is a depraved animal.”32 However, for 
Rousseau this critique of Hobbes does not entail a rejection of Hobbesian individualism. 
Rousseau agrees with Hobbes that man in the state of nature is asocial, and acts on the basic 
instinct of self-preservation. Only Rousseau distinguishes the innocent amor-de-soi of the noble 
savage from the vain and avaricious amor-propre of civilized man. Hobbes attributes to the 
savage a level of self-consciousness that would be impossible in a state of nature lacking 
language. For language is the basis of civilization as well as rational reflection. That pre-social 
man lacked language is sufficient proof for Rousseau that he was also innocent of pride: 
 
For the same reason for which natural man lacks, pride, he also lacks understanding or 
reason and therewith freedom. Reason is coterminous with language, and language 
presupposes society: being presocial, natural man is prerational…. Rousseau draws a 
necessary conclusion from Hobbes’s premises which Hobbes had not drawn. To have 
reason means to have general ideas. But general ideas...are not the products of a natural 
unconscious process; they presuppose definitions; they owe their being to definition. 
Hence they presuppose language. Since language is not natural, reason is not natural.”33 
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Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes is a critique of the whole social contract tradition. 
Contract thinkers had always premised their accounts of the genesis of society on the abstract 
definition of pre-social man as a “rational animal.” But if Rousseau is right (about Hobbes), then 
natural man cannot yet be a rational animal. Furthermore, if the “nation” is to be the object of the 
art of government, then political philosophy must understand societies in their particularity. But 
we have seen that Hobbes’s approach cannot go beyond the level of “general principles.” The 
question regarding the formation of society thus demands a “physical” or anthropological 
treatment, not a theoretical one. Rousseau moves in this direction when he conceives of the 
natural man as a dumb yet compassionate, self-interested animal. This dumb innocence is what 
Rousseau means by man’s natural “goodness.”  
 Strictly speaking, Hobbes argued that natural man was neither “good” nor “evil.” The 
core of Hobbes’s moral theory is that moral evaluations are only possible within the State, as 
products of conventional agreements backed up by the sovereign. “The desires, and other 
passions of men, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those 
passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor 
can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.”34 Ultimately there 
is only one right of nature, namely self-preservation. From this right Hobbes derives the 
fundamental law of nature, “to seek peace, and follow it.”35 Peace or collective security, 
therefore, is the true end of politics. This nullifies the appeal of idealistic political goals. The 
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very purpose of Hobbes’s politics is to foreclose on the classical appeal to ideal greatness; 
furthermore, since there is no good or bad in nature there can be no appeal to natural greatness. 
 
The Critique of Heroism 
It may help to elaborate on the theme of Hobbes’s philosophy as a critique of heroism. Hobbes 
did not critique heroism without purpose. He had a definite intent: to create a genuine political 
science, modeled on the natural sciences. Ancient political philosophy, whatever its merits, lacks 
the mathematical rigor of modern natural science. Hence, it cannot legitimately claim the status 
of a “science” in the modern sense. Due to its prodigious practical success in our day, modern 
natural science has a tendency to impose itself as the model of all science, indeed of all knowing. 
To be sure, any attempt at “constitutional engineering” presupposes a mathematical science of 
politics similar to modern physics, the science that makes mechanical engineering possible. 
Hobbes aspired to create just this type of science and he knew these requirements well. In short, 
they are the subordination of practice to theory and the pursuit of stability rather than grandeur. 
 Now, if the historical hero really is the unsophisticated and parochial creature that Vico 
describes, or even if he is something akin to the “noble savage,” one can see easily the tension 
that will arise between the hero and the sovereign state. Heroes tend to have intense and myopic 
visions of their own purposes, which if pursued with comparable intensity, could put the regime 
at risk.36 The pursuit of security demands this systematic repression of heroic ambition; and this 
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requires the theoretical reduction of heroism to mere ambition. Scientifically speaking, there are 
no great men; there are only more or less ambitious men.37 Hobbes’s scientific reduction of all 
human motivation to passion (or intelligent passion; “interest”) signals a great departure from 
ancient political philosophy. The ancients made an important character distinction between the 
“tyrant” and the “king.” The tyrant is motivated by passion alone, putting his calculating mind at 
its service; whereas the king subordinates his passions to reason, in pursuit of the good. (The 
pedagogy of the art-of-government tradition follows the ancients in this, requiring the potential 
king to learn ethics before politics.) However from the perspective of Hobbesian political science 
this distinction is functionally irrelevant.  
 For Hobbes, the single highest occasion for rivalry between men is the pursuit of glory. 
The objects of “glory” Hobbes defines as “trifles, a word, a smile, a different opinion, and [the 
liquidation of] any sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their 
kindred, their profession or their name.”38 Glory is a good reputation. In the final analysis, then, 
the aims of quarrelsome men must be self-serving. Hobbes here foreshadows Rousseau’s 
principle that “public felicity is far less the end of the Hero’s actions than it is a means to reach 
the one he sets for himself.” 
 This modern attitude of suspicion towards the great man pales in comparison to the 
admiration of heroic valor in antiquity. For that matter, it runs against the grain of Medieval 
Chivalry, as well as the Reformation ethic. In these traditions, suspicion towards the hero is 
tempered by the conviction that authentic heroes are selfless servants of a greater good. These 
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traditions are not naive. Rather, the Western tradition as a whole has always recognized the 
tension between the hero and the regime.39 For examples of this one has only to consider 
Achilles and Agamemnon; Antigone and Creon; Aeneas and Turnus; Lancelot and Arthur; 
monastic reformers and the Church; and Luther against it. So, tensions can always arise between 
constituted authority and a heroic cause. Sometimes this tension can be resolved, sometimes it 
cannot. Indeed, many of our traditional narratives leave us guessing as to which party—the hero 
or the regime—is “right.” This is one of the great themes of tragedy, at least. 
 The evasion of tragedy is a basic theme of political philosophy. The attempt to avoid 
tragedy is especially pronounced in modern political philosophy since its main objectives are 
security and stability. Philosophical idealism can be an invitation to tragedy; therefore the 
moderns reject it altogether. For, if the goal of politics is to secure a state from all possible ruin, 
then it is better to establish political philosophy on a theory of human nature as it “is,” not as it 
“ought to be.” Machiavelli sets this agenda when he proclaims that his philosophy is the first “to 
go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it. And many have 
imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in truth; for it 
is so far from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for what 
should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation.”40 Machiavelli’s “realistic” view of 
human nature translates into Hobbes’s empirical or “scientific” philosophy. Hobbes universalizes 
Machiavelli’s view of human nature to contrive law-like generalizations about politics that could 
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be applied in political practice as geometry is applied to architecture. With such a tool in hand, 
one might be able to construct an unshakeable political order. That order is the modern state. 
 Rousseau was one of the first thinkers to react powerfully against the cold and 
mechanical edifice of modern political philosophy. His revolutionary criticism of modern politics 
coalesces with his censure of the Enlightenment. In the interest of democracy, Rousseau 
contends that science and freedom are incompatible. This may sound strange since our modern 
ears are used to hearing “science” uttered in the same breath as “freedom” and “progress.” Yet 
Rousseau’s objection to enlightenment “is not unintelligible.” After all modern political science 
is a science of power conceived with one object in mind: namely, the concentration of power at 
the level of the state. “That enlightenment is a pillar of absolute monarchy was admitted by the 
two men who are still popularly considered the greatest defenders of despotism in modern times, 
Machiavelli and Hobbes.”41 Machiavelli insists that the prince must concentrate all power in his 
person, uno solo. The arguments and examples he offers in this connection are too infamous to 
bear repeating. Suffice it to say that Machiavelli’s science of legislation relies on fear and not 
love, since the prince has control over the former but not the latter. Like other contract theorists, 
Hobbes sees political legitimacy as a product of the consent of individual subjects. But since 
Hobbes defines human nature in terms of rational self interest, and rational self interest in terms 
of the fear of murder, he concludes that anyone but a fool would consent to despotic government.
 Rousseau views the formation of society as a transformation into human nature, an 
education (educere: “to draw out”) from our original savage state into “humanity” properly 
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speaking. As the following quote indicates,42 the great legislator plays the central role in this 
process: he educates men to humanity by making them into citizens: 
 
He must, in short, take away man’s own forces in order to give him forces that are 
foreign to him and that he cannot make use of without the help of others. The more these 
natural forces are dead and destroyed, and the acquired ones great and lasting, the more 
the institution as well is solid and perfect. So that if each Citizen is nothing, and can do 
nothing, except with all the others...it may be said that legislation has reached its highest 
possible point of perfection. 
 The great legislator, the science of politics and the civil religion, form a coherent 
complex of ideas that are meant to account for this educative function of politics. Rousseau 
learned about the educative function of politics from the ancients. But he believes in Hobbes’s 
theory of human nature. For this reason, Rousseau’s assigns a most extraordinary task to the 
legislator: The legislator must destroy men in their original independence, and build them up 
again as interdependent citizens. Rousseau acknowledges the difficulty of this task, in the 
subjunctive, when he remarks that “Gods would be needed to give laws to men.” Nevertheless, 
this superhuman office belongs to the human legislator. The task would be less difficult, perhaps, 
if most men understood the language of science. But they do not. It would also be easier if the 
legislator could use fear to coerce men into citizenship. But Rousseau knows that the only true 
way to civic virtue is through love. “And according to the definition I have given of virtue,43 love 
of the fatherland necessarily leads to it, since we willingly want what is wanted by those we 
love.”44 The way to virtue would not seem to be science, then. Science attests to the necessity of 
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virtue, but it is too difficult for most men to understand and too remote to seize their hearts.45 
Nor can virtue come from coercion or fear: 
 
This is what has always forced the fathers of nations to have recourse to the intervention 
of heaven and to honor the gods with their own wisdom; so that the peoples, subjected to 
the laws of the State as to those of nature, and recognizing the same power in the 
formation of man and of the city, might obey with freedom and bear with docility the 
yoke of public felicity.46 
This accounts for Rousseau’s revival of civil religion. A civil religion is the only institution 
capable of expressing political wisdom in a commonly accessible form, and of compelling men 
to obey it by persuasion instead of force. In addition, the civil religion has the added benefit of 
constraining the most obstreperous men by fear of divine punishment. 
 One of Rousseau’s grievances against Machiavelli and Hobbes is that the former 
substitutes the fear of the prince, and the latter the fear of bodily death, for the fear of God.47 
Rousseau accepts the science of Machiavelli and Hobbes, but he also recognizes the limits of this 
science: It can account for sovereignty, but not society; the state, but not the nation. Rousseau 
could see that a modern “art of government” would have to append an account of civil society to 
that of the sovereign territorial state. Only then could it rule a genuine “People,” animated by the 
sort of providential care that makes good household management possible. In other words the 
state would have to become a fatherland, a democratic republic, for political economy to be 
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possible. Rousseau’s politics follow from these concerns. He wanted to graft a nation onto the 
state, make equal citizens out of unequal men, supply fear with love, and improve on collective 
security with collective welfare. The abstract idea of the “general will,” and the heroic legislator, 
compose Rousseau’s unique contributions to this project. 
 
Conclusion: The Problem of the Hero 
Strauss has remarked that “all the serious difficulties with which the understanding of 
Rousseau’s teaching remains beset...can be traced to the fact that he tried to preserve the classical 
idea of philosophy on the basis of modern science.”48 It seems no less true that our problem—the 
democratization of heroism—can be traced to this fact. We have examined Rousseau’s 
philosophy as an attempt to reproduce ancient republicanism on a modern basis. Specifically, we 
took an interest in the role of the great legislator in Rousseau’s modern patria. We have already 
glossed some of the difficulties with this relationship. It boils down to this: the modern view of 
human nature makes it impossible for Rousseau to view the hero without suspicion. The gloomy 
suggestion that, ultimately, the hero is an egotistical glory-seeker becomes downright perplexing 
in light of Rousseau’s elevation of the legislator to an unparalleled position of moral authority. 
One is tempted to say of the legislator what Rousseau said of Oliver Cromwell: “public opinion 
is still unsure whether the murderer of Charles Stuart is not one of the greatest men who ever 
lived even with all his heinous crimes.”49  
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 But there is evidence that Rousseau was aware of the tension between the age-old figure 
of the hero and his modern legislator. We have proceeded on the assumption that there is a basic 
similarity between Rousseau’s notion of the legislator in the Social Contract and in his early 
discourse on the Hero. Yet Rousseau never submitted the Hero. In fact he regarded the piece as 
“very bad,” and when he finally published it, it carried this disclaimer: “It is easy to do less bad 
on the subject, but not to do well, for there is never a good answer to make to frivolous 
questions.”50 Why does Rousseau regard the question of heroic virtue as “frivolous”? Is it 
because heroes are at least half-vicious, while the wise man is the true example of virtue? Or is it 
because there is no human virtue until the heroic-legislator brings an ethical world into being, as 
the account of the legislator would suggest? If the former is true, then why does Rousseau refer 
to Socrates as a hero? If the latter is true, then why is the question of heroic virtue “frivolous” 
rather than fundamental?  
This forces us to face up to the difference between the hero and the legislator. It seems 
hard to deny that the legislator is “heroic.” And Kelly is right to observe that “the legislator is the 
most exceptional example of heroic virtue discussed in the Discourse on the Virtue Most 
Necessary for a Hero.”51 However, in the Social Contract Rousseau never identifies the 
legislator with the hero.  
 The importance of the legislator is obvious. If the question of heroic virtue is frivolous, 
that of the legislator clearly is not. The chapter on the great legislator stands apart so 
conspicuously from the egalitarian tendency of the Social Contract that it demands the reader’s 
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attention. How can the unimportance of the hero be reconciled with the monumental importance 
Rousseau assigns to the legislator? Let us venture a preliminary answer: The reason is that the 
legislator is the only “hero” that Rousseau can admit into his political system. And even the 
legislator cannot be admitted into the constituted republic but must stay just outside its walls. 
Owing to his patrimony in the Machiavellian prince, Rousseau conceives of the workaday leader 
as a mere functionary, while his great legislator is the sole author of the moral personality of the 
state—uno solo. “The latter is the mechanic who invents the machine; the former is only the 
workman who puts it together and starts it running.”52 
 The ambiguity between heroism and Machiavellian ambition is a product of Rousseau’s 
modern premises. Initially, modern political philosophy substitutes narrow self-interest for the 
moral good of the whole as its basic point of reference. This can be understood as a part of the 
broader modern enterprise of subjugating nature to human purposes: We have seen this at work 
in Machiavelli and Hobbes, both of whom reduce human nature to self-interest for the purpose of 
developing a “how-to” guide for the potential state-builder. But Rousseau’s return to a moral 
concept of human nature complicates this design. According to Rousseau, the natural man has a 
specific potentiality to “enter into” human being by virtue of becoming a citizen. In a sense, mere 
individuals can only become human beings in the context of a good society. Rousseau attempts 
to describe such a society in the Social Contract. His political science combines antique morality 
with a quasi-Hobbesian hypothetical contract, to baptize the “general will” as the infallible moral 
sovereign from which all legitimate obligations flow. 
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 Rousseau’s democratic republicanism points up the demand of radical equality within the 
state. “For the will of the individual tends naturally to privilege, the general will to equality.”53 It 
is clear from the Social Contract that the only rightful “sovereign” is the comprehensive 
assembly of citizens, jointly enacting the general will. The “government,” for Rousseau, is just a 
neutral instrument whose object is to administer the general will without being partial to one 
interest or another. “Power can be transmitted [to the government], but not will.” Within the 
constituted republic, the sovereign People alone can “legislate.” 
 In Hobbes’s philosophy power and authority (“might” and “right) are equated in such a 
way as to engender radical inequality between the omnipotent Sovereign (who is not a party to 
the social contract) and his subjects. The despotic king is indeed the sine qua non of Hobbes’s 
political order. By contrast, Rousseau’s republicanism is democratic and egalitarian in spirit.54 
The people must participate actively in the approval of laws, as their consent is the only true 
ground of obedience. “Once the Master appears upon the scene, the sovereign vanishes, and the 
body politic suffers destruction.”55 Rousseau criticizes Hobbes on this point; for, if Hobbes’s 
reckoning of human nature is correct, “then humanity is divided into herds of livestock, each 
with its ‘guardian’ who watches over his charges only that he may ultimately devour them.”56 
Rousseau specifically denies Hobbes’s implication that the political relation is essentially 
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amoral. “The reasoning of Caligula, of Hobbes, and of Grotius is fundamentally the same. Far 
earlier, Aristotle, too, had maintained that men are not by nature equal, but that some are born to 
be slaves, others to be masters.”57 This unequal power-relation between ruler and subjects must 
be made legitimate, Rousseau claims, for the sake of moral liberty. 
 Rousseau’s moral egalitarianism inspires a powerful reaction against all sorts of social 
inequality. But if Hobbes and Rousseau have a fundamental dispute here, as moderns they share 
an equally important agreement: namely, that the dichotomy between despotic kingship and the 
egalitarian “general will” exhausts the possibilities of modern politics. In short, an “aristocratic” 
political theory must be excluded on principle. This difficulty results from the fact that Hobbes’s 
and Rousseau’s common starting-point is radically individualistic. However deployed, the 
principle of radical individualism can support only two theoretical accounts of society. On the 
one hand, a despot can be given power and authority over all other individuals. This is Hobbes’s 
solution. On the other hand, one may take up Rousseau’s challenge and try to “‘find a form of 
association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common 
force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and 
remains as free as before.’ This is the fundamental problem which is solved by the social 
contract.”58 
 We have already touched on the relation of individualism and ambition. Machiavelli set 
the stage for this problem; and he also tried to solve it. In the Prince, Machiavelli suggests that 
the leader should form an alliance with the common people to put down the threat of other “great 
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men” (read: ambitious men) who would seek to steal the prince’s property. Hobbes’s 
hypothetical contract is but a systematic elaboration of this story, told from the perspective of the 
“people.” A prudent people would be foolish reject the protection of any king, when the 
alternative is an anarchical rivalry between “great men” into which all people would likely 
become unwillingly embroiled. Machiavelli and Hobbes conduct their analyses on the level of 
power. Rousseau’s turn to virtue downplays the aspect of power, but the suspicion of great men 
remains alive, and even receives new importance in the context of his moral interpretation of 
individualism. 
 The phenomena of heroism, therefore, present a genuine problem for modern democratic 
theory. The reason for this is that modern political philosophy lacks a reliable standard to 
distinguish heroism from mere ambition. Rousseau’s failure to finally incorporate the hero into 
his philosophy—or to be more precise, the fact that Rousseau can only incorporate the hero in 
the form of the legislator (Carlyle will say “king”), who is in a relation of perfect identity with 
the character of the state—serves to indicate that this is a substantial problem. Rousseau’s 
democratic-republican project can tolerate heroism in one form only, viz. the artificial heroism of 
citizenship. The legislator is the only “natural” hero, and this is precisely why he must stay at 
arms-length from the regime. For once the secret of the hero is revealed, the regime faces danger. 
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Chapter Five: The Hero as King 
 
To mend and remake all which we have, indeed, victorious Analysis. 
Honour to victorious Analysis; nevertheless, out of the Workshop and 
laboratory, what thing was victorious Analysis yet known to make? Detection of 
incoherences, mainly; destruction of the incoherent. From of old, Doubt was but 
half a magician; she evokes the spectres which she cannot quell. We shall have 
“endless vortices of froth-logic”; whereon first words, and then things, are 
whirled and swallowed. Remark, accordingly, as acknowledged grounds of 
Hope, at bottom mere precursors of Despair, this perpetual theorizing about 
Man, the Mind of Man, Philosophy of Government, Progress of the Species, and 
such like; the main thinking furniture of every head. Time, and so many 
Montesquieus, Mablys, spokesmen of Time, have discovered innumerable 
things: and now has not Jean-Jacques promulgated his new Evangel of a 
Contract Social; explaining the whole mystery of Government, and how it is 
contracted and bargained for,—to universal satisfaction?... 
And now if a whole Nation fall into that? In such case, I answer, infallibly 
they will return out of it! For life is no cunningly-devised deception or self-
deception: it is a great truth that thou art alive, that thou hast desires, necessities; 
neither can these subsist and satisfy themselves on delusions, but on fact. To 
fact, depend on it, we shall come back: to such a fact, blessed or cursed, as we 
have wisdom for. The lowest, least blessed fact one knows of, on which 
necessitious mortals have ever based themselves, seems to be the primitive one 
of Cannibalism: That I can devour Thee. What if such Primitive Fact were 
precisely the one we had (with our improved methods) to revert to, and begin 
anew from! 
 
Carlyle, The French Revolution, “Contract Social” 
 
The Legacy of Carlyle 
It is fitting to begin this discussion of Carlyle by observing how, knowingly or unknowingly, the 
past lives on in the present. Carlyle’s work itself is a fragment of our past whose voice still 
reverberates in the English-speaking mind, although to popular consciousness the man has been 
nearly forgotten. Direct contact with Carlyle’s work now is the province of a handful of scholars. 
And yet Carlyle’s ideas unwittingly furnish the mind of most literate people. One can get a sense 
of Carlyle’s legacy by reflecting on the awesome popularity of his neologisms: It was Carlyle 
who first described capitalism as the replacement of traditional social bonds with an impersonal 
“nexus of cash-payment”; he also saddled political economy with the appellation “dismal 
science.” More significantly, Carlyle was the first to employ the word “environment” in its 
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modern sense, as the totality of circumstances in which a being develops. It is safe to say that 
most people who employ such phrases and concepts today have at best a dim awareness of their 
extraction. 
 What survives of “Carlylese” today not only attests to Carlyle’s lasting impression on 
English thought and language, it also bespeaks the Sage of Chelsea’s Janus-faced legacy. The 
fate of Carlyle as an historical figure is quite opposite of that of Carlyle’s idioms. For example, 
our short list of Carlylisms suggests that Carlyle’s social gospel has left its stamp on the left, or 
at least on leftist rhetoric. But Carlyle is hardly a leftist; indeed, many chide him as a reactionary. 
In his eulogy of Carlyle, Emerson relates this curious phenomenon of Carlyle’s appeal to the left, 
which apparently had taken root during Carlyle’s lifetime: 
 
Young men, especially those holding liberal opinions, press to see him…. He treats them 
with contempt; they profess freedom and he stands for slavery; they praise republics and 
he likes the Russian Czar...they praise moral suasion, he goes for murder, money, capital 
punishment and other pretty abominations of English law…. They go for free institutions, 
for letting things alone and only giving opportunity and motive to every man; he for a 
stringent government, that shows people what they must do, and makes them do it. 
 
Emerson’s aim here is not to show that Carlyle is a “conservative,” but that Carlyle 
intentionally defies such categories, admiring independence of mind above all else. “[Carlyle] 
throws himself readily on the other side. If you urge free trade, he remembers that every laborer 
is a monopolist.” The purpose of Emerson’s caricature of Carlyle-the-reactionary is not, 
therefore, to associate the man with radical conservatism but to remind us of Carlyle’s radical 
individualism. “He never feared the face of man,” and this fearlessness was the ground of 
Carlyle’s prophetic authority. Upon this foundation Carlyle rebuked partisans of every stripe, 
aspiring himself to be a partisan of no cause, save the facts. “It is not so much that Carlyle cares 
for this or that dogma, as that he likes genuineness (the source of all strength) in his 
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companions.”1 As we shall see, Carlyle considered genuineness, or sincerity, to be the sine qua 
non of a clear moral vision. 
 Nevertheless, Carlyle’s moral vision is obscure to our twenty-first century eyes. No one 
doubts that Carlyle preached a certain type of morality, but its content is as protean as its author. 
Perhaps only this is certain: Carlyle’s preeminent practical concern is the re-establishment of 
authority. The revolutionary era, he thought, affirmed that the old well-springs of authority 
(namely tradition/the ancien regime and revelation/the Church) had become dry, and it 
confirmed the victory of science and democracy. Carlyle despaired that the ideology of laissez-
faire, which accompanied the triumph of science and democracy, would undermine all moral 
claims to authority. This despair was deep-felt in Carlyle, because he saw moral leadership as the 
one needful thing for a people. Without this the triumph of democracy is only a chimera of 
freedom. “The true liberty for a man,” he wrote, consists “in his finding out, or being forced to 
find out the right path, and to walk thereon. To learn, or to be taught, what work he actually was 
able for...to set about doing of the same! That is his true blessedness...if liberty be not that, I for 
one have small care about liberty.”2 
 Carlyle’s vision seemed obscure to many of his contemporaries, even to his disciples. 
Matthew Arnold called him a “moral desperado.” For better or worse Carlyle’s was always a 
voice crying in the desert, but his voice is so compelling that he lured a large following “into the 
desert,” where he is said to have left them.3 Carlyle rejected dogmatism, but he believed in the 
authority of wisdom. He taught that the substance of wisdom is not dogmatic but dynamic, even 
visionary. He believed in insight. For Carlyle, there was no higher goal of man or civilization 
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than to be ruled by wise and capable leaders. By nature such leaders always keep the good of the 
community in sight. Carlyle seemed to regard all forms of government as mere methods for 
selecting these “capable men.” His own “theory of government” can be reduced to the axiom that 
good leadership is the one needful thing for a people. 
 Carlyle insisted on the distinction between salus populi—the healthiness of the people—
for which all sincere leaders must provide, and vox populi—the voice of the people, or public 
opinion—which often speaks mistakenly. On account of his strict attentiveness to this 
distinction, Carlyle systematically mistrusts the ballot-box. Indeed, Carlyle sometimes appears to 
have violated his own anti-dogmatic principles, treating the latent antagonism between salus 
populi and vox populi as if it was a rigid truth. This disposition has greatly obscured Carlyle’s 
legacy as a political writer since, as it turns out, he was chronicling the early days of 
democracy’s still-unfinished advance through the world. Carlyle therefore appears to be on the 
wrong side of history, making him easy to pass over as a political thinker. At first sight Carlyle 
seems totally blind to the possibilities of democracy. But a closer look will show that there is a 
democratic side to Carlyle’s thought that shines through, for example, in his peculiar sort of 
individualism. Like Emerson and Nietzsche following him, Carlyle has a genuine interest in the 
good of the whole, but fears that under the rule of democratic procedure the voice of genuine 
leadership will be drowned out by the more clamorous vox populi. This would only produce the 
appearance of progress since, as Carlyle believes, the “people” are incapable of sustaining the 
coherent vision required for leadership—the whole is given a genuine voice by way of its natural 
leaders, not any electorate. To the extent that democratic peoples facilitate the emergence of 
natural leaders, Carlyle approves of democracy; to the extent that they accede to antiheroic, 
egoistic individualism, Carlyle abhors democracy. As an engaged political writer, then, Carlyle 
has two broad aims. The first is to offer a moral interpretation of democracy, to oppose the 
procedural interpretation. Naturally, such an interpretation addresses the individual, rather than 
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public opinion. Carlyle’s second aim is to teach the public to seek heroic leaders who inspire 
them to action, not to settle for those who countenance inaction and complacency. These two 
aims converge in the protean figure of the Carlylean hero, which allows Carlyle simultaneously 
to elevate the “great men” of history over other, “average” men, and to address each average 
individual as a hero, to awaken their potential for public action. 
 So as it turns out, Carlyle may be of more than antiquarian interest as a political thinker. 
There is even evidence that he thought of himself this way. Though an author and historian by 
profession (he had given up theology and mathematics before becoming an author), by mid-life, 
Carlyle would confess that he had a “political” nature.  Yet, his politics never quite conformed to 
the extant schools of thought; nor did he develop his own political vision, except perhaps the 
sibylline vision of a “world of heroes” that we consider here. Carlyle’s political legacy confirms 
the pattern of two-sidedness. On the one hand, Carlyle put the “Condition of England Question” 
atop the Victorian agenda, rebuked the rich to care for the poor and conceded that, for all its 
shortcomings, “the Gospel according to Jean-Jacques” was “a further step in the business” of 
liquidating a reckless aristocracy. Yet this same Carlyle heaped scorn upon the ballot-box, 
opposed the emancipation of black slaves (in a particularly nauseating dialect), and captained the 
defense of Governor Eyre. For all his evangelizing on behalf of “the People,” Carlyle referred to 
the run of Englishmen as “twenty-five millions, mostly fools.” Any interpretation of Carlyle’s 
politics must acknowledge these paradoxes as insurmountable obstacles, perhaps intentional, to 
singling out any ideological dogma in his work. 
Like his forerunner, Edmund Burke, Thomas Carlyle’s position as an authority on history 
and politics derives from his popularity as an interpreter of the French Revolution. When, in 
1837, Carlyle first published his epic history, the French Revolution was the most important 
political event in recent memory. Having transpired less than half a century before, its 
reverberations were still far from complete. In England, they would issue in the Chartist 
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uprisings that racked the country throughout the nineteenth century; Europe would face the 
Colonial and Continental uprisings of the middle nineteenth-century (esp. 1848); and the entire 
world witnessed countless national struggles for self-determination that continued into the 
twentieth century and show no sign of ceasing today. Arguably, the Revolution of 1789 remains 
the pivotal event in modern political history. We can find in the French case the general pattern 
of all subsequent (phyrric) “victories of Analysis,” including Communism. In any case, it would 
be hard to deny in earnest that the legacy of the French Revolution still affects modern politics. 
As such, is remains a living issue for us today.  
 As we have mentioned, Carlyle resembles Burke as an author. Like Burke, Carlyle essays 
both sides of the boundary between aesthetics and politics; poetry and religion; theology and 
economy; contemplation and action. But Carlyle is not as staunch a traditionalist as Burke (or 
Coleridge, his other predecessor). While Carlyle respects tradition, he epitomizes his generation 
by turning to “history,” to account for both continuity and change within traditions. Earlier 
thinkers advocated the return to tradition as a way to negate history. It had “appeared to Carlyle’s 
predecessors [Burke and Coleridge] that England and Europe had abandoned theocracy in favor 
of political economy, and they developed the analysis of political economy that represented this 
historical change not merely as a shift of authority but as the destruction of it.”4 On the basis of 
this view Burke put forth his preeminent criticism of the French Revolution: that it was merely 
an orgy of murderous desire played out under the banner of empty formalisms, its ideals being 
too airy, abstract, and remote to experience to guide real human conduct.  
 
On [the revolutionary] scheme of things, a king is but a man, a queen is but a woman, a 
woman is but an animal—and an animal not of the highest order…. Regicide, and 
parricide, and sacrilege, are but fictions of superstition, corrupting jurisprudence by 
destroying its simplicity. The murder of a king, or a queen, or a bishop, or a father, are 
only common homicide—and if the people are by any chance or in any way gainers by it, 
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a sort of homicide much the most pardonable, and into which we ought not to make too 
severe a scrutiny.5  
 
To Burke, the French Revolution confirms that the replacement of theology with the 
ledger-book authority of political economy spawns a cold, inhuman existence. Carlyle agrees, in 
large measure, but he can see no way out but forward. His historical perspective aims to 
appropriate the Revolution rather than avoiding it. Accordingly, he cannot put forth a direct 
return to tradition but has to reinterpret tradition imaginatively, to fit the new, democratic 
circumstances. 
   Throughout, Carlyle shares the desire of Burke and Coleridge to replace a calculating 
political economy with a faithful moral order. What is more, he regards this desire as proper, and 
common to all honest human beings. As he puts it, all men desire some form of theocracy. In 
“the Hero as Priest” he remarks of the theocracy of John Knox’s “devout imagination”: 
 
If we think his scheme of truth was too narrow, was not true, we may rejoice that he 
could not realise it; that it remained after two centuries of effort, unrealisable, and is a 
‘devout imagination’ still. But how shall we blame him for struggling to realise it? 
Theocracy, Government of God, is precisely the thing to be struggled for! All Prophets, 
zealous Priests, are there for that purpose…. Nay, is it not what all zealous men, whether 
called Priests, Prophets, or whatsoever else called, do essentially wish, and must wish? 
That right and truth, or God’s Law, reign supreme among men.6 
 
This is the sense in which Carlyle offers theology as a corrective to political economy. But at the 
heart of historical theology, for Carlyle, is not only tradition but a “devout imagination” that 
takes particular historic and biographical forms. Again, where Burke or Coleridge would return 
to tradition, Carlyle turns to history. This is confirmed by Carlyle’s view of religious belief. 
Carlyle construes belief in historical terms, as the variegated result of a natural human desire to 
reach out after what is truly good. For Carlyle what is truly good is the moral imagination, the 
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“devout imagination.” This moral drive is, so to speak, the empirical foundation of Carlyle’s 
historical alternative to the dismal science.7 Now and then, Carlyle expresses himself in 
unmistakable language, as in this passage from the Latter Day Pamphlets: 
 
Not because Heaven existed, did men know Good from Evil; the “because,” I invite you 
to consider, lay quite the other way. It was because men, having hearts as well as 
stomachs, felt there, and knew through all their being, the difference between Good and 
Evil, that Heaven and Hell first came to exist. That is the sequence.8 
 
This “bottom-up” view of religion allows Carlyle to champion the needs of the soul over 
the needs of the stomach, while simultaneously rejecting traditionalism. “While [Carlyle] 
extended Burke’s and Coleridge’s critique of political economy, he did not share their belief that 
the religious and political institutions of the past could serve the present.”9 Carlyle’s disdain for 
the “game-preserving” Aristocracy, equal to his scorn for democracy, drips from all his social 
tracts. His religious views are more ambiguous perhaps, but whatever they are they are not 
orthodox:  
 
As a dissenter and a Scotsman from the artisan class, he regarded the Church of England 
and the aristocracy as corrupt and hopelessly outmoded…. [He] also shared the 
Enlightenment assumptions underlying the theory of the social contract. Whereas Burke 
and Coleridge sought a return from revolution to authority, Carlyle sought a return to 
authority through revolution.10 
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Carlyle: Ancient and Modern 
This estimation of Carlyle’s politics is correct, but only in part. The critic quoted above leaves us 
with a puzzle: How is it possible for the same Carlyle who sees in “theories of government” false 
hopes, “at bottom mere precursors of Despair,” nevertheless share “the Enlightenment 
assumptions underlying the theory of the social contract”?  
 Revolution is but one rope of Carlyle’s Gordian knot, the other rope, tradition, remains 
bound up in every particular revolution. Unlike later thinkers, Carlyle never conceives of 
revolution in a pure or abstract sense. Yet this critic senses an important difference between 
Carlyle’s views and those of his predecessors; a difference that appears in spades in Carlyle’s 
reading of the French Revolution. For example, Burke interprets the Revolution as a derailment 
from the collective wisdom embodied in tradition, a negation of the past. Alternatively, Carlyle 
sees it as an intelligible (if tragic, and even avoidable) episode in a still-unfolding European 
history. Where Burke disowns the French Revolution, Carlyle appropriates it. He names it, 
specifically, “the third and final act of Protestantism; the explosive and confused return of 
mankind to Reality and Fact, now that they were perishing of Semblance and Sham.”11  
 As “Contract Social” attests, the reality and fact to which Carlyle believes the revolution 
has returned mankind is not the “rights of man and citizen,” but the primitive fact of cannibalism. 
Carlyle concedes to the democratic movement the world-historical significance it claims for 
itself. He finds in it an overwhelmingly negative significance, however, despite that the 
revolutionaries aspired to positive or progressive aims. From the perspective of a political 
theorist, Carlyle’s evocation of cannibalism in The French Revolution seems like a poetic 
expression of the “war of all against all” laid bare by Hobbes at the origin of modern political 
science.  
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“The hero of The French Revolution—if it has a hero other than its author—is the 
demonic Paris mob.”12 It is plain that the hero-as-Paris-mob resembles far less the ideal heroes of 
fiction than the coarse historical heroes described in our discussion of Vico in the last chapter. 
From this historical perspective, the French Revolution appears as the final gasp of a heroic age 
and the beginning of a new, people’s era, in which  
 
the door to honors...is wide open by law to the greedy multitude which is in command, 
[and] in times of peace nothing remains but to struggle for power, not by law but by 
arms, and use the power to make laws with a view to the increase of wealth. 
 
This is how Vico describes the transition from heroic to popular ages, which he sees as 
part of the temporal destiny of all nations. In his New Science, Vico illustrates this point with the 
example of Rome: “Such were the agrarian laws of the Gracchi at Rome. The result is civil wars 
at home and unjust wars abroad at the same time.” From this he concludes that the age of 
“Roman heroism is confirmed by contrast for the entire period before the Gracchi.”13  
 To return to our main concern, the Vichian perspective sheds light on Carlyle’s 
perplexing attitude, of acceptance and rejection, toward democracy. Carlyle’s account of the 
French Revolution describes a comparable historical transition, “confirming by contrast” that the 
heroic age of Aristocracy, Chivalry, King and Church had ended in Europe, and the age of 
popular Democracy had begun. This explains how Carlyle can welcome democracy as a fact, 
while remaining distant from it as an ideal. Carlyle is modern enough to acknowledge the 
vicissitudes of history, but not enough to be resigned to them. His ancient side is reflected in the 
woe he expresses over the passing of the aristocratic ideal, along with his hope that a new order 
might someday emerge to replace the old. 
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 Let us examine more closely Carlyle’s view of democracy. Despite his incessant rants 
against democratic politics, Carlyle never suggested that democracy could be undone. In fact, he 
saw democracy as inexorable in history: “It may be admitted that Democracy, in all meanings of 
the word, is in full career; irresistible by any...Son of Adam, as times go. ‘Liberty’ is a thing men 
are determined to have.”14  
 Carlyle suggests that Democracy is produced by a yearning for liberty in human nature. 
Although he disagrees with the popular definition of “liberty,” Carlyle never denies the might of 
this natural yearning. As a result, he does not entirely dismiss the legitimacy of democratic 
claims. Carlyle’s reprobation of democracy is no mere reactionary’s ranting. On the contrary, at 
his best Carlyle is masterful interrogator of the meaning of liberty who offers a sympathetic, if 
acerbic critique of democracy’s self-understanding. One can say that Carlyle, like Rousseau, is a 
democratic moralist. Like Rousseau, Carlyle aspires to replace the laissez-faire version of liberty 
with a more sociable sense of liberty. However, Carlyle rejects Rousseau’s solution, with its 
collectivist merger of liberty and equality in the “general will.” If Rousseau’s political morality 
is ultra-democratic, conceiving of liberty as the maximum of equality, Carlyle’s morality is 
trans-democratic, conceiving of liberty in terms of individually consenting leaders and followers; 
and emphasizing the individual will to act, as well as to obey. If Rousseau’s vision of liberty is 
summed up by the general will, Carlyle’s alternative is a “World of Heroes.” But Carlyle’s and 
Rousseau’s differing views are products of the same project. Both thinkers aim to ennoble 
democracy by raising an edifice of moral idealism upon modern foundations of political realism.
 Carlyle’s moral interpretation of democracy can be further illuminated by his view of 
history. Carlyle characterizes history as a “divine BOOK OF REVELATIONS, whereof a Chapter is 
completed from epoch to epoch.”15 This meaning is not always obvious, however, but needs to 
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be divined. One might say that history, like other revelations, stands in need of interpretation. 
Moreover, history is not a linear story of progress. From the start Carlyle insists on certain 
principles of historical interpretation that, interestingly, resemble our present-day view of history 
more than they conform to the views of his peers. In “On History,” for example, Carlyle points 
out a difference between history as-it-occurs and history as-it-is-told that has become a key 
insight to many students of history today: “Narrative is linear, Action is solid. Alas for our 
‘chains’ or chainlets, of ‘causes and effects,’ which we so assiduously track through certain 
handbreadths of years and square miles, when the whole is a broad, deep Immensity, and each 
atom is ‘chained’ and complected with all!”16  
 This differentiation between the forms of history and of narrative exhorts the historian 
always to bear in mind the irreducible complexity of his subject, but also to abide by an idea of 
the whole, however imperfect his expression of it is bound to be. Carlyle realizes that to grasp 
the whole actually exceeds the capacity of finite human intelligence. In fact, he suggests that we 
are limited in two directions. On the one hand, Carlyle agrees with the ancients that the proper 
orientation towards the human things lay in the direction toward transcendent meaning. In this 
sense, the elusive “whole” stands for an idea that transcends the sum of its parts. Carlyle also 
agrees with the ancients in regarding philosophy as the pursuit of this whole under the condition 
of Socratic doubt, which is the recognition that actual knowledge of the whole must be deferred 
into eternity.  
The ancients did not regard immanent history as an ordered whole in the way modern 
science intends it. History for them is the very opposite of science or philosophy. Explaining the 
difference between the poet and the historian, Aristotle remarks “that the one describes the thing 
that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more 
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philosophic and of graver import than history,” Aristotle concludes, “since its statements are of 
the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars.”17  
On the other hand, Carlyle sympathizes with the moderns in acknowledging another, 
immanent whole, in the sum of causal relations between material objects. Modern science is how 
we know this “descendental” whole. According to many of Carlyle’s contemporaries (and many 
today), science improves on philosophy by offering to man the chance for absolute knowledge in 
the form of causal laws governing the relations between things. While Carlyle never denies in 
principle the existence of the immanently ordered whole intended by modern science, he 
steadfastly doubts our ability to know it. Carlyle follows Thomas Reid here, constraining science 
according to the principle of “nescience.” Nescience stipulates that the inherent weakness of 
human judgment warps the interpretation of sensory evidence, upon which science is based.18 
Significantly, nescience does not imply that the senses are fallible in themselves, nor does it deny 
the “objectivity” of sensory data. It only puts science in its epistemological place, within the total 
compass of human nature. “Science is a drop; nescience is the ocean in which that drop is 
whelmed.”19 
 Carlyle’s conditioned consent to modern science allows him to cast history in a different 
light; namely, as “philosophy teaching by experience.” Carlyle grants that the chronicle of 
separate events is one type of history, but besides this he places another type of history, one that 
aims to express a universal meaning. Despite the limitations just surveyed, Carlyle maintains that 
the historian who strives for this comprehensive expression is superior to one who settles for a 
dry account of the facts. The one is superior to the other as an artist is to an artisan. “For [in 
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history], as in all other provinces, there are Artists and Artisans; men who labour mechanically in 
a department, without eye for the Whole, not feeling that there is a Whole; and men who inform 
and ennoble the humblest department with an Idea of the Whole, and habitually know that only 
in the Whole is the Partial to be truly discerned.”20 
 By holding up another sort of historian—the one unable to avert his gaze from the 
Whole—as an “Artist,” Carlyle suggests that in some sense history ought to be made poetic to 
convey a human meaning.21 Carlyle does not imply that the historian-as-artist actually imposes 
significance on history (in the sense of creating it ex nihilo), but rather affirms that the historian-
artist is constrained by the characteristic limits of human nature; that he, too, dwells “between 
two eternities, and warring against Oblivion...would fain unite himself in clear conscious 
relation, as in dim unconscious relation he is already united, with the whole Future, and the 
whole Past.”22  
 There is a reflection of truth in history, to be sure. “History is a real Prophetic 
Manuscript”; but for all its surfeit of meaning, history “can be fully interpreted by no man.”23 In 
truth the historian-artist merely attempts to render the singular aspect of history into some 
meaningful relation to the Whole, having more or less success. Accordingly, the sincere 
historian-artist will own that his comprehension of the Whole, though of consequence, is dim and 
incomplete. Artistic or speculative history is really an essay in temporal possibility (as Aristotle 
said of poetry, it describes “a kind of thing that might be”), as opposed to a prosaic chronicle of 
past events, on the one hand; or a reckoning of deterministic fate, on the other. Carlyle steers 
between these two excesses, realizing that artisan-history, although certain, is humanly 
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meaningless; while scientific or deterministic history promises a plenitude of meaning that it 
cannot deliver. Carlyle’s unique blend of ancient and modern perspectives explains why, 
although he obviously pursued speculative history, there is little evidence that he took the 
deterministic philosophy of history seriously. In the main, speculative philosophy of history and 
determinism go hand in hand. But Carlyle only complains of historical determinism as artisan-
history taken to a speculative excess. The charge that historical determinism is prosaic history in 
the extreme comes out, for example, in Carlyle’s indictment of “cause-and-effect speculators, 
with whom no wonder would remain wonderful, but all things in Heaven and Earth must be 
computed and ‘accounted for’; and even the Unknown, the infinite in man’s Life, had under the 
words enthusiasm, superstition, spirit of the age and so forth, obtained, as it were, an algebraical 
symbol and given value.” In 1830, Carlyle expressed his belief that this type of history was 
“verging towards extinction.”24 Of course he turned out to be wrong on this point, but this shows 
that he understands his own project as something beyond the pale of nineteenth-century 
philosophy of history, something meant to replace it. 
 
The Meaning of Democracy 
Our next step is to assess Carlyle’s historical interpretation of democracy. According to Carlyle 
democracy is not an historical tabula rasa. Democratic culture does not entail a complete, 
conscious renunciation of tradition. Nor is democracy a historically contingent development, 
although it is dependent upon earlier events. Democracy can and must be understood as part of a 
larger history, which is meaningful as a whole. Broadly, this view of democracy is not 
uncommon. But mainstream nineteenth-century philosophy of history takes democracy and 
science to be the final stage of man’s historical development. This still-popular view is mainly 
associated with Hegel and the so-called “end of history” thesis. As the term “trans-democratic” 
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implies, Carlyle spurns the “end of history” thesis. Instead of exalting democracy as the end of 
history (or dismissing it, as a derailment from tradition), Carlyle incorporates democracy into 
history as a sort of transition between the decaying ethical structures of the past, and some 
undreamed-of future moral order. Following the romantic tendency, Carlyle discredits the claim 
that democracy, science and enlightenment portend a future of unlimited progress for mankind 
by shaking off the superstitious chains of tradition. As we have seen, Carlyle interprets the 
enlightenment rather as the destructive march of “victorious Analysis,” a force unable in itself to 
build anything. He also sees a certain value, or at least inevitability, in the “superstitious.” 
Indeed, Carlyle the social prophet performs the prophetic function by exposing the idols of 
democracy (e.g. procedural reform, extension of suffrage) as mere forms, urging us to behold the 
substance of democracy, often to question whether it has substance at all. 
 Carlyle frequently styles democracy as the political body—the corpus of common beliefs 
and practices—grown-up around the soul of “victorious analysis.” To put it densely, democracy 
is the ideo-practical social structure attendant on a “logic-chopping,” unbelieving, social state. It 
is the precise opposite of hero-worship and the heroic. Consider the following radical view, 
which Carlyle vents through his famous alter ego, Diogenes Teufelsdrockh25: 
 
Democracy...means despair of finding any Heroes to govern you, and contented putting-
up with the want of them,—alas, thou...seest well how close it is of kin to Atheism, and 
other sad Isms: he who discovers no God whatever, how shall he discover Heroes, the 
visible Temples of God?26 
 
In his more respectable persona, “the editor,” Carlyle concedes only partial truth to this 
grim view of democracy as the substantive absence of belief. The editor observes that indeed, 
“‘the liberty of not being oppressed by your fellow man’ is...indispensable, [though] one of the 
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most insignificant fractional parts of Human Liberty.”27 Through the editor Carlyle 
acknowledges what is good about the progress of liberty through democracy. This dialectical 
give-and-take between Radical and Editor builds up towards Carlyle’s distinctive view of 
democracy as historical transition. Democracy is an intermediate moment when “The Toiling 
Millions of Mankind, in most vital need and passionate instinctive desire of Guidance, shall cast 
away False Guidance; and hope for an hour, that no-guidance will suffice them: but it can be for 
an hour only.”28 
 The French Revolution, which Carlyle sees as the apotheosis of democracy, enacts 
through regicide the casting away of false guidance. But instead of delivering the salvation 
hoped for, it exposes humanity once more to the “lowest, least blessed fact one knows of...the 
primitive [fact] of Cannibalism.” This revelation is certainly of “descendental,” as opposed to 
transcendental, import. It is tragic to contemplate mankind reduced to this episode of modern 
cannibalism. Nevertheless, it is an historical reality and must not be lost for its pedagogic 
significance. Carlyle rehearses this point in his ‘Flame-Picture’ of the Reign of Terror. 
Recounting the story of a human tannery at Meudon, he remarks: “History looking back over 
Cannibalism...will perhaps find no terrestrial Cannibalism of a sort, on the whole, so 
detestable.”29 In twenty-first century hindsight, this remark makes Carlyle look like a naive 
optimist. 
 From Carlyle’s perspective, the utter depravity of revolutionary things was grounds for 
an unusual sort of optimism. Like many of his radical contemporaries, Carlyle interpreted the 
revolutionary period as the beginning of a new epoch in history. Unlike his contemporaries, 
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Carlyle found the substance of this new beginning not in the democratic movement itself, or its 
principles, but in its remarkable power of destruction. Democracy had not set up new tablets of 
law; but it soundly annihilated the old. On the level of ideas democracy is the apotheosis of 
skepticism, atheism, “victorious Analysis.” On the practical level, it signals the Old World’s 
final surrender of responsibility: the “leaving of all to ‘Cash’...quietly shutting up the God’s 
Temple, and gradually opening wide...the Mammon’s Temple, with ‘Laissez-faire, and Every 
man for himself.”30 Carlyle sensed that society had descended to rock-bottom. Hence, as 
conventional wisdom goes, the only direction to go is back up. Carlyle’s faith, therefore, does 
not rest in democracy itself, but what it might lead to. Democracy for Carlyle is a transitional 
regime—a barren soil, but a soil that, with the right kind of cultivation, might yet bear fruit. 
 The implication of Carlyle’s view is that, properly speaking, democracy is no society at 
all. At best democracy is a society of the shipwrecked; at worst, a tremulous agreement among 
cannibals. Although such an agreement just barely provides the foundation on which 
“necessitious mortals” may base their lives, it is surely the lowest conceivable state of things. It 
is a potential anarchy, in which the “rind of habit” that separates civilized man from the 
cannibal-savage is at its thinnest, and most transparent; when the thought becomes most 
thinkable that “man’s civilization [is] only a wrappage, through which the savage nature of him 
can still burst.” 
 
Carlyle and Rousseau 
Although both Carlyle and Rousseau envision mankind through the lenses of nature and history, 
rather than theology and tradition, they see contrary images. Rousseau’s imaginary history, laid 
out in the Discourses, reveals that the natural man is a “noble savage,” a selfish but benevolent 
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individual who becomes corrupt only when private property and the luxuries of civilization force 
him into competition with others. By contrast, Carlyle’s poetic interpretation of actual history 
exposes something like the “savage nobility” of man. The decadence of the aristocracy proves 
how well corruption can subsist under the appearance of nobility, while the barbarism of the 
sansculottes proves equally the barbarity of those who would seize power in the new order.  
From Carlyle’s perspective the French Revolution has its proper consummation not in the 
Republic, but in Napoleon. It reveals not the virtue of negative liberty, but the iron necessity of 
leadership. To Carlyle, who seems to approve of the political economy of laissez-faire, the 
morality of laissez-faire is hostile to human nature. It was the morality of laissez-faire that 
suborned the indolence of the aristocracy, institutionalized chaos and made revolution inevitable. 
For all its disorderliness, even despite itself, the revolution prefigures the restitution of order 
under Napoleon. “Thus too all human things, maddest French Sansculottisms, do and must work 
towards Order... [Man’s] very life means that; Disorder is dissolution, death. No chaos but it 
seeks a centre to revolve round. While man is man, some Cromwell or Napoleon is the necessary 
finish of a Sansculottism.”31 
 Carlyle infers from this observation that the King—the “capable man” who can institute 
order among men—is the original and summary form of the hero. Paradoxically, the emergence 
of the heroic king from the ashes of rebellion recalls the primitive beginnings of heroism. With 
the arrival of Cromwells and Napoleons “the old ages are brought back to us; the manner in 
which Kings were made, and Kingship itself first took rise, [are] again exhibited.”32 
 Chris Vanden Bossche interprets Carlyle’s belief in the identity between hero and king as 
a turning point in his search for a new form of authority. In all of his major writings Carlyle 
displays a preoccupation with the problem of the rise and fall of authority. But the manner in 
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which he treats this theme varies throughout his career. It is said that the “early” Carlyle, of 
Sartor Resartus, the French Revolution, and Chartism, hoped to reestablish authority on a new, 
literary, foundation. During this part of his career, “Carlyle continued to seek a literary form 
through which he could envision and represent the recuperation of authority.”33 However, 
Carlyle abandoned the hope of rehabilitating authority through literature near the end of his 
preparation of Heroes and Hero-Worship. This manifests in his decision to conclude the lectures 
with a demonstration of the hero as “king,” rather than the hero as “man of letters,” as originally 
planned.  
 
With On Heroes and Hero-Worship, Carlyle shifted the locus of authority from the realm 
of literature to the realm of politics, a shift manifested in a last-minute change in the 
order of the lectures. He initially planned to end the series with a lecture on Burns, 
but…he altered his plan and decided to conclude with a lecture on Cromwell and 
Napoleon (CL, 12:103, 115, 128). In addition to demonstrating the importance he would 
give to the hero as king, this change indicates that, as Carlyle himself admitted, the 
lectures were “not so much historic as didactic” (CL 12:94). We must read them not as a 
history of authority, but as a history of Carlyle’s own attempt to envision a new form of 
authority.34 
 
Vanden Bossche conforms to the habit of many interpreters of Carlyle,35 who downplay 
the importance of his post-Heroes writings36 on account of the alleged shift from literature to 
politics. Understandably, such interpreters are troubled by the appearance that from Heroes 
onward Carlyle the socially-conscious aesthete loses ground to Carlyle the political ideologue 
and panegyrist of nation-builders. In light of subsequent history, the “political” Carlyle seems 
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eerily to prefigure twentieth-century fascism. “Admired, even revered, by his contemporaries as 
a preacher of righteousness, Carlyle now emerges as a prophet with a sinister message…. His 
views on social and political problems, divested of their moral appeal by the march of time, are 
revealed to be those of a fascist in their essential implications.”37 
 Instead of dismissing Carlyle altogether, or trying to reconcile the early work with his 
less palatable later work, these interpreters attempt to rescue Carlyle by partitioning him into two 
distinct phases, and letting the first eclipse the second. While this approach has obvious appeal, it 
poses several serious problems. The first is that Carlyle did not construe his own work in this 
way. It may be presumptuous of a scholar to impose a pattern of development on an author, 
which the author himself would not acknowledge. Secondly, while this tactic presupposes a 
psychological or biographical explanation for Carlyle’s turn to politics,38 it seems just as 
reasonable to interpret the shift from literature to politics as a reply to historical events, even to 
events in the history of ideas. Recall that, in the eighteen-thirties, not only Carlyle but most of his 
audience would have found the question of Napoleon’s and Cromwell’s heroism more pressing 
than that of Johnson, Burns or even Rousseau. On the level of ideas, let us also consider the 
possibility that some deeper historical connection exists between figures like Rousseau and 
Napoleon, that Rousseau in some way prefigures Napoleon. It seems clear that Carlyle saw such 
a connection, whether his interpreters do or not. If this is the case, then there is for Carlyle an 
intelligible coherence between the man of letters and the king, between the literary and the 
political, the demands of the voice and the regime of the text, and so on. In general, this is of a 
piece with Carlyle’s avowed belief that “at bottom the Great Man, as he comes from the hand of 
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Nature, is ever the same kind of thing...that only by the world’s reception of [Great Men], and 
the shapes they assume, are they so immeasurably diverse.” 
In the remainder of this chapter we shall explore an alternative thesis, that Carlyle’s 
identification of the hero and the king is not the result of a decision he made while preparing 
Heroes, but a discovery about the immanent logic of modern democratic culture. In the last 
chapter we uncovered preliminary evidence for this argument: The identity between hero and 
king was revealed as a necessary, if problematic, implication of Rousseau’s modern 
republicanism. Our thesis here is that Carlyle, despite his outspoken criticism of Rousseau, 
basically offers a friendly amendment to Rousseau’s political vision. In other words, even though 
Carlyle finds Rousseau’s account of the hero-legislator tragically incomplete in the details, he is 
for the most part in agreement with the premises of Rousseau’s political philosophy. We have 
found support for this partial agreement already in the differences between Carlyle’s and Burke’s 
disposition towards the French Revolution. While Burke attributes no legitimacy to the 
Revolution, Carlyle at least finds a negative justification in that it exposed the intractable 
illegitimacy of the old order. Of course, Carlyle regards this as a meager foundation on which to 
rebuild society. Yet he accepts it as a starting point, since he is convinced that the only other 
alternative, the attempt to resurrect a dead society, is worse. Carlyle sees no escape from history. 
But, for Carlyle, history will not consummate itself in skepticism or naive historicism.  Rather, 
history will proceed beyond intellectual doubt and political revolt, towards a new and more sure 
moral order, that Carlyle prefigures as a “world of heroes.”  
 Carlyle bases his prognosis on a fundamental reflection on the importance of what he 
calls hero-worship. In hero-worship, Carlyle sees the one “everlasting hope...for the management 
of the world,” that will remain “[should] all traditions arrangements, creeds, societies that men 
ever instituted [sink] away”39 It cannot be emphasized too much that Carlyle does not endorse 
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the worship of heroic personalities. Rather, he hopes that, by encouraging readers to reflect on 
the phenomena of heroism they might come alive to the reality of the devout imagination. 
Carlyle’s re-discovery of hero worship as “the tap-root of all religion” is meant as a first step 
toward rehabilitating belief on a new and true foundation. He consistently holds “belief,” rather 
than doubt, disbelief or skepticism, to be the sine qua non of a healthy soul, and also of a healthy 
society. But Carlyle is one of the first thinkers to confront an unequivocally modern world, 
whose skeptical underpinnings confront the intellect with the quintessential challenge of modern 
political thought, namely, how to rescue a common moral foundation without recourse to 
“foundationalism.” The hero-theory represents Carlyle’s attempt to resolve this peculiar 
dilemma. 
 Carlyle and Rousseau concur in diagnosing skepticism as the malady of modern society. 
Both thinkers are particularly concerned about the negative social consequences that might 
ensue—had already resulted, perhaps—from the diffusion of the skepticism characteristic of 
modern philosophy and science to every level of society. Recall that Rousseau’s social project is 
to neutralize the corrosive tendencies of enlightenment rationalism. Earlier we saw that the two 
major components of this side of Rousseau’s political philosophy are the great legislator and the 
civil religion. Like Rousseau, Carlyle regards religious belief as the organ of moral homonoia. 
However, while Rousseau anchors belief to the dogmas of his civil religion, Carlyle seeks a more 
flexible and natural ground of belief through reflection on the in the phenomena of heroism. For 
Carlyle, then, the recovery of heroism is the one thing needed for the recovery of society. In 
particular, the cultivation of heroic intellects, and of a receptive attitude toward heroic voices, is 
Carlyle’s prophylaxis against the spiritual viruses loosed by the “Pandora’s box” of eighteenth-
century skepticism.  
 
Skepticism means not intellectual Doubt alone, but moral Doubt; all sorts of infidelity, 
insincerity, spiritual paralysis. Perhaps, in few centuries that one could specify since the 
world began, was a life of Heroism more difficult for a man. That was not an age of 
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Faith,— an age of Heroes! The very possibility of heroism had been, as it were, formally 
abnegated in the minds of all.40 
 
 Like many other critics, Carlyle holds that Rousseau’s theory of government is deficient, 
despite Rousseau’s noble effort to restore a crucial and neglected aspect of political philosophy. 
That Rousseau’s endeavor to revive republicanism was “a step forward” is a point Carlyle 
readily acknowledged, however. In addition to qualified praise of “the evangelist” in the French 
Revolution, Carlyle includes Rousseau among his heroes as men-of-letters. But in both works, 
Carlyle’s attitude towards Rousseau is best described as ambivalent. “He is not what I call a 
strong man,” observes Carlyle in Heroes, “[he is] at best, intense rather than strong. He had not 
‘the talent of Silence,’ an invaluable talent; which few...men of any sort in these times, excel 
in!”41 
 Carlyle’s labeling Rousseau as “intense rather than strong” is somewhat mysterious in 
this context, since in Heroes Carlyle also says that “strength” is a quality necessary for heroism. 
One might even say that, like Rousseau, Carlyle regards “strength” as the quintessential heroic 
virtue. The often-misunderstood Carlylean dictum, “might is right” (read also: “right is might”) 
neatly expresses his belief in the identity of the good and the strong, or capable. That “all Power 
is Moral” is for Carlyle the most sublime of human insights although he admits that “man first 
puts himself in relation with Nature and her Powers, wonders and worships over those,” and only 
later comes to recognize the preeminence of moral nature over physical nature.42 Odin—“the 
hero as Divinity”—is revered chiefly for his physical strength. But Christianity deepens insight 
into our moral nature by making suffering, not conquest, redemptive. The triumph of moral over 
physical nature minimizes the importance of physical strength, and under the new insight 
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heroism is defined by the more stringent criterion of moral strength. Accordingly, heroic human 
beings no longer appear as divinities but as prophets, poets, priests and so on. After Odin, 
Carlyle reveres his heroes mainly for deepening and broadening man’s spiritual topography. At 
least this holds true until the modern revolutionary era in which, Carlyle suggests, “the old ages 
are brought back to us; the manner in which Kings were made, and Kingship itself first took rise, 
[are] again exhibited.”43  
 That such a return should be possible, even necessary, must be seen as the result of the 
state of moral decadence that Carlyle associates with skepticism, in which he finds Rousseau still 
ensnared. Carlyle identifies the key symptom of this modern decadence as overweening self-
consciousness—an attribute that Rousseau possessed in droves. The tragic flaw of Rousseau-as-
hero is this vanity, which Carlyle diagnoses as the product of his  
 
Egoism; which is indeed the source and summary of all faults and miseries whatsoever. 
He had not perfected himself into victory over mere Desire; a mean Hunger, in many 
sorts, was still the motive principle of him. I am afraid he was a very vain man; hungry 
for the praises of men... How the whole nature of the man is poisoned; noting but 
suspicion, self-isolation, fierce moody ways! He could not live with anybody.”44 
 
Carlyle thus linked Rousseau’s philosophical shortcomings with his personal disposition. The 
objections to this sort of critique are of course well known. Nevertheless, it may be fair to regard 
with suspicion the political philosophy of a man who, like Rousseau, “could not live with 
anybody.” 
 Perhaps Carlyle had Rousseau somewhere in mind when he observed in his journal: 
 
The difference between Socrates and Jesus Christ! The great Conscious; the 
immeasurably great Unconscious. The one cunningly manufactured; the other created, 
living, and life-giving. The epitome this of a grand and fundamental diversity among 
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men. Did any truly great man ever go through the world without offence—all rounded in 
so that the current moral system cold find no fault in him? Most likely, never.45 
 
 It is unclear whether Carlyle sees Rousseau’s personality as the product of his 
philosophy, or the other way around, but overall the conclusion is unmistakable: “His Books, 
like himself, are what I call unhealthy.” On the other hand, perhaps Rousseau has done the best 
he can, given his disordered environment. “In Rousseau we are called to look...at the fearful 
amount of evil which, under such disorganization, may accompany the good…. [He] had grown 
to feel deeply that the world was not his friend nor the world’s law. It was expedient, if any way 
possible, that such a man should not have been set in flat hostility against the world.”46 
 On Carlyle’s view, Rousseau’s shortcomings are mostly explained by his high degree of 
self-consciousness. Ironically, this puts Carlyle in the position of passing a Rousseauean 
judgment upon Rousseau; for it was Rousseau who conceived of the distinction between amor-
de-soi, which is a natural, healthy and unconscious sort of self-love, and amor propre, which is 
an unnatural, diseased state of self-consciousness, where one is possessed by the desire to have 
an excess of goods (both material and immaterial) with respect to one’s fellows. With following 
anecdote, Carlyle clearly indicts Rousseau of amor propre:  
  
A man of some rank from the country, who visited [Rousseau] often, and used to sit with 
him, expressing all reverence and affection for him, comes one day, finds Jean Jacques 
full of the sourest unintelligible humor. “Monsieur,” said Jean-Jacques, with flaming 
eyes, “I know why you come here. You come to see what a poor life I lead; how little is 
in my poor pot that is boiling there. Well look into the pot! There is half a pound of meat, 
one carrot and three onions; that is all: go and tell the whole world that, if you like, 
Monsieur!”—  
 
“A man of this sort,” Carlyle concludes, “was far gone.”47 
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 That Rousseau feels so agitated by his relative poverty, not to speak of his lack of honors, 
so rightfully deserved, is for Carlyle evidence of the weakness of Rousseau’s intense personality. 
This is not to deny Rousseau’s brilliance. Indeed, Carlyle marvels at Rousseau’s 
accomplishment. “Out of the element of that withered mocking Philosophism...there has arisen in 
this man the ineradicable feeling and knowledge that this Life of ours is true; not a Skepticism, 
Theorem, or Persiflage, but a Fact, an awful Reality. Nature had made that revelation to him; had 
ordered him to speak it out.”48  
 The gospel according to Jean-Jacques, a revelation out of nature, was beginning to 
externalize itself in revolutions and new regimes. Rousseau’s philosophy unleashed something 
bigger than himself, in which Carlyle found himself implicated. Carlyle’s Rousseau is a sort of 
latter-day Socrates. “He could be cooped into garrets, laughed at as a maniac, left to starve like a 
wild beast in his cage;—but he could not be hindered from setting the world on fire.” Rousseau’s 
radical philosophy penetrated the depths, revealing the sources of modern civilization’s 
discontent. But the way France disparaged Rousseau is dwarfed by the atrocity of how 
Sansculottism dispensed with France. The comparison stops here since Rousseau, unlike 
Socrates, was allowed by France to live, and the forces unleashed by Rousseau, unlike those of 
Socrates, preferred coercion to persuasion. “Difficult to say what the governors of the world 
could do with [Rousseau]! What he could do with them is unhappily clear enough,—guillotine a 
great many of them!”49 
 In this light it appears that Carlyle stresses hero-worship in order to rectify the 
shortcomings of Rousseau’s political philosophy in the particular area of leadership. Heroes can 
be viewed as a modern political liturgy that takes its cue from Rousseau’s renewed speculation 
on the legislator and the civil religion, but intensifies these aspects while diminishing Rousseau’s 
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egoistic and mechanistic tendencies. Carlyle’s identification of the hero and the king is a 
personification of the attempt to reconcile civil society and the state, a fundamentally 
Rousseauean project. Key to this enterprise is Carlyle’s effort to undermine the belief that 
egoism, or pride, erects a wall separating the intentions of great men from those who follow 
them. The Carlylean hero aims not to attain glory in the eyes of his fellows but to communicate 
with them by virtue of a common vision of nature—specifically of human nature, as 
fundamentally resistant to disorder and falseness—that issues in cooperative effort on behalf of 
human order. 
 
The Hero as Legislator 
There are, then, two general aspects of Carlyle’s revision of Rousseau. The first pertains to 
leadership, and follows the lines just sketched. The second concerns the relationship between 
leaders and followers. This relationship receives little or no attention in Rousseau’s theory but 
becomes central to Carlyle, who wants to cast “hero-worship” as a form of participation in the 
“heroic”. It is only by demonstrating such a relationship that Carlyle can sustain his vision of a 
world of heroes, while holding to the obvious fact of human inequality. The success or failure of 
the hero-theory greatly depends on how convincingly Carlyle can portray the disciple as a hero 
in his own right. Carlyle does this by relying on a background notion of the “heroic” as 
something transcendent of both hero and hero-worshipper. Within the circumference of the 
heroic, a sort of equality attains on account of subordination to a common project.  
 One can get an impression of the difference between Rousseau’s and Carlyle’s sense of 
the hero by comparing two of their references to Mohammad, founder of Islam. In the section of 
the Social Contract that deals with the great legislator, Rousseau makes oblique reference to 
Mohammad as one of many political founders. Here Rousseau is arguing that the “sublime 
reason,” possessed by the great legislator, is the source of his abiding authority: 
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It is this sublime reason, which rises above the grasp of common men, whose decisions 
the legislator places in the mouth of the immortals in order to win by divine authority 
those who cannot be moved by human prudence. But it is not every man who can make 
the Gods speak or be believed when he declares himself their interpreter. The Legislator’s 
great soul is the true miracle that should prove his mission. Any man can engrave stone 
tablets, buy an oracle, or pretend to have a secret relationship with some divinity; train a 
bird to talk in his ear, or find other crude ways to impress the people. One who knows 
only that much might even assemble, by chance, a crowd of madmen, but he will never 
found an empire, and his extravagant work will soon die along with him. False tricks can 
form a fleeting bond; wisdom alone can make it durable.50 
 
We must presume that Mohammad, who famously claimed to have received his revelation from 
the angel Gabriel come down in the form of a pigeon, is one of the Legislators to whom 
Rousseau refers in this passage. Accordingly, Rousseau claims that Mohammad “train[ed] a bird 
to talk in his ear” and in this “crude way” he won over “by divine authority those who [would 
not] be moved by human prudence.” The implication is that Mohammad contrived this pigeon, in 
the light of his “sublime reason,” as a means to achieve this end. Mohammad’s “sublime reason” 
is the real source of his “great soul,” not the revelation he allegedly received from a talking 
pigeon. Rousseau does not insinuate that Mohammad’s soul is any less great for having 
“impress[ed] the people” with a “false trick.” That is not the point here. Rather, Rousseau is 
hinting that reason, and not revelation, is the authority behind Mohammad’s greatness as a 
legislator.51  
 Now let us consider Carlyle’s treatment of Mohammad’s pigeon. For Carlyle, like 
Rousseau, the essence of greatness is sincerity or genuineness; but one might add that, for 
Carlyle, it is sublime insight and not sublime reason that marks a great soul. Sincere insight is the 
kernel of heroism. For example, Carlyle sees in Mohammad’s scripture “a merit quite other than 
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the literary one. If a book come from the heart, it will contrive to reach other hearts; all art and 
authorcraft are of small amount to that. One would say the primary character of the Koran is this 
of its genuineness, of its being a bona-fide book.” The merit of Mohammad as a Legislator, then, 
is that he proclaims the moral law in good faith. Mohammad’s authority emanates from the 
sincerity of his belief, not the sublimity of his knowledge.52 Carlyle explains: 
 
I do not assert Mohammad’s continual sincerity: who is continually sincere? But I 
confess I can make nothing of the critic, in these times, who would accuse him of deceit 
prepense; of conscious deceit generally, or perhaps at all;—still more, of living in a mere 
element of conscious deceit, and writing this Koran as a forger and juggler would have 
done! Every candid eye, I think, will read the Koran far otherwise than so. It is the 
confused ferment of a great rude human soul; rude, untutored, that cannot even read; but 
fervent, earnest, struggling vehemently to utter itself in words.53 
 
Carlyle singles out the suspicious attitude towards Mohammad’s pigeon as a symptom of 
enlightenment smugness. “The lies, which well-meaning zeal has heaped round this man, are 
disgraceful to ourselves only. When Pococke inquired of Grotius, Where the proof was of that 
story of the pigeon, trained to pick peas from Mahomet’s ear...? Grotius answered that there was 
no proof! It is really time to dismiss all that.”54  
 Carlyle dismisses “that story” as an instance of what he calls the “Fanatic-Hypocrite” 
theory. He attributes this theory to David Hume.55 “Hume and a multitude following him” 
originally applied the theory to the case of Oliver Cromwell: “Cromwell was sincere at first; a 
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sincere ‘Fanatic’ at first, but gradually became a ‘Hypocrite’ as things opened round him. 
This…is Hume’s theory of it; extensively applied since,—to Mahomet and many others.” 
 Carlyle raises two objections to the Fanatic-Hypocrite theory; one rooted in his theory of 
heroic character, the other in his theory of belief. First, Carlyle finds the Fanatic-Hypocrite 
theory incompatible with heroic character. “Think of it seriously, you will find something in it; 
not much, not all, very far from all. Sincere hero-hearts do not sink in this miserable manner.” 
Heroes are seers and doers, capable men. A genuine hero, therefore, cannot be a hypocrite, or 
“play-actor.” Heroism by definition is the opposite of feigning.56 
 Secondly, Carlyle observes that no evidence exists either for or against the Fanatic-
Hypocrite theory. Grotius had “no proof,” he simply believed the story of Mohammad having 
trained a pigeon to pick peas from his ear. By pointing out that this is a matter of belief and not 
of demonstration, Carlyle hints that the Fanatic-Hypocrite theory tells us more about those who 
believe it than those for whom it is meant to account. It is significant that Carlyle never tries to 
prove the opposite theory, that Mohammad actually received a revelation from the angel Gabriel 
come down as a pigeon. In his mind, this is quite another issue. Indeed, in On Heroes, Carlyle 
describes the Koran mildly as the “ferment of [one] great rude human soul.” Further remarks 
confirm that Carlyle does not mean to claim that Mohammad actually received a revelation of 
divine law that would be binding on all humanity. “We have chosen Mahomet not as the most 
eminent Prophet,” he explains, “but as the one we are freest to speak of. He is by no means the 
truest of Prophets; but I do esteem him a true one. Farther...I mean to say all the good of him I 
justly can,” he continues, since “there is no danger of our becoming, any of us, Mahometans.”57 
 While Carlyle’s idea of the nature of Christian revelation is hopelessly obscure, he clearly 
regards Islam as a derivative of Christianity. Islam is “a confused form of Christianity; had 
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Christianity not been, neither had it been,” hence, Carlyle concludes, “the soul of Islam...is 
properly the soul of Christianity.”58 This helps to explain why Carlyle sees no danger of 
converting Christians into Muslims by simply giving a congenial account of Mohammad. 
Following Goethe, Carlyle believes the heart of both Christianity and Islam is dutiful submission 
to moral law. “That we must submit to God. That our whole strength lies resigned in submission 
to Him, whatsoever he do to us…. ‘If this be Islam,’ says Goethe, ‘do we not all live in Islam?’ 
Yes, all of us that have any moral life; we all live so.”59 
 To Carlyle, this moral attitude of submission is the essence of all true and healthy belief. 
What originates in transcendent admiration of superlative physical strength, for example in Odin-
worship, culminates in the adoration of superlative moral strength, epitomized by Christianity 
and reflected in Islam. Finally there emerges an antithetical, unhealthy, type of belief, summed 
up by skepticism. Skepticism, in a manner of speaking, is the opposite of belief. But Carlyle 
wants to maintain that, in an equally important sense, skepticism is a sort of corrosive faith. 
Carlyle presupposes that the need for faith cannot be overcome, though all of its objects become 
suspect. So the skeptic, too, must be a type of believer, only one with a mean and distrustful soul, 
who over time becomes incapable of trusting—of “living with”—any other soul. Skepticism 
becomes a debilitating type of faith, to the psyche and even to the intellect, since it undermines 
every criterion of relevance. “[Man] cannot know...unless he can worship in some way. His 
knowledge is a pedantry, and dead thistle, otherwise.”60 
 The presence of skepticism must be accepted as given in even the healthiest culture. In 
fact, Carlyle identifies the unheroic attitude of the skeptic as an element of even the healthiest 
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soul. Moreover, Carlyle characterizes the “valet-soul,” “fatal charlatan-element,” or “vulpine 
intellect, [in terms of] its knowingness, its alertness and expertness in ‘detecting hypocrites.’”61  
Only the dominance of the valet-type is given away by the popularity of invidious stories like 
that of Mohammad’s pigeon.  
The significance Carlyle finds in such “Fanatic-Hypocrite” stories lay not in their merit, 
but their testimony of spiritual decay. Carlyle indicts the skeptical eighteenth century, in which 
he partially includes Rousseau, as answerable for this decay. However, Carlyle’s interests do not 
lie in the direction of exacting retribution, but correcting the disease. With Heroes he hopes to 
stall, even reverse, the decay by reinforcing a bond of community between leaders and their 
followers based on a shared sense of submission to the moral good and a “devout imagination.” 
 One can see a similar effort unfolding in Rousseau’s evocation of the great legislator as a 
figure who commands authority without “either force or reasoning,” win over the people 
“without violence and persuade without convincing.” Precisely in this discussion, Rousseau 
observes that to perform his task the legislator “must...have recourse to another order of 
authority” than force or reason—namely, religion.62 Yet Rousseau conceives of religion-by-
design, making Carlyle’s naturalistic concept of heroic authority appear in stark opposition. 
Rousseau’s legislator is nothing if not a master artificer, quite different from Carlyle’s 
occasionally rude, “untutored” heroes. For Carlyle, the hero’s sincerity of expression more than 
compensates for artlessness. 
 Carlyle’s focus on the expressive and communicative event resonates throughout Heroes. 
The hero gives to people their bearings in the universe. Around this achievement grow entire 
traditions, even civilizations. Odin, in particular, is not just a titan but also a “Thinker, [a] 
spiritual Hero.” Carlyle describes Odin as a “Teacher and Captain of soul and body…. By him 
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[the people] know now what they have to do here, what to look for hereafter. Existence has 
become articulate, melodious by him; he first has made Life alive!”63 
Carlyle’s hero and Rousseau’s legislator thus occupy the position of a “center of gravity” 
in a human tradition. But Rousseau’s legislator seems self-consciously to design an order, while 
the Carlylean hero unpremeditatedly articulates a view of the world inscribed already “in all 
minds...as in sympathetic ink.” Carlyle’s hero is a discoverer rather than a designer. The hero 
discovers symbols that give outer expression to the latent sense of inner significance that makes 
a “people” possible.  
 
Odin’s Runes are a significant feature of him…. It is the greatest invention man has ever 
made, this of marking down the unseen thought that is in him by written characters. It is a 
kind of second speech, almost as miraculous as the first. You remember the astonishment 
and incredulity of Atahulapa the Peruvian King; how he made the Spanish Soldier who 
was guarding him scratch Dios on his thumb-nail, that he might try the next soldier with 
it, to ascertain whether such a miracle was possible. If Odin brought Letters among his 
people, he might work magic enough!64  
  
Human letters are only “almost as miraculous” as original speech because, being mortal 
contrivances, they lack the faultlessness of original (divine?) communication. They only work 
their miracles if they convey the proper names of things, otherwise they can obfuscate, 
dissemble, and suborn falsehood, as the story of Atahulapa and the absent author of “Dios” 
suggests. The miracle of letters, then—and of legislation—requires the coalescence of inner 
belief and outward forms and practices. Once belief is clothed in proper forms and practices, a 
people have attained healthiness. They are neither devout yet savage and inarticulate, on the one 
hand; nor sophisticated yet skeptical and unbelieving, on the other. Indeed, these two extremes 
mark the two different phases of disorder, the one, before belief has concrete forms; and the 
other when the rote rigidity of practice conceals an atrophy of inner meaning. The hero, in the 
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most specific sense, is he who first discovers a concrete expression of belief. The “heroic” 
typifies this coalescence of belief and practice. Within the broader scope of the heroic, enters a 
second definition of the hero as any individual who asseverates, or restores the link between 
belief and practice, once established. In this sense, anyone is heroic who participates actively in a 
living tradition. 
 
Conclusion 
Carlyle’s On Heroes offers a countervailing account of authority that agrees with Rousseau in 
general, but departs from him in many particulars, as if the hero and the legislator are two 
branches stemming off of the same philosophical trunk. Let us briefly recapitulate some of the 
differences. First, Carlyle and Rousseau converge in their tendency to equate the hero and the 
king as paradigmatic authority-figures. However, Rousseau finally contains the hero (as the 
legislator) within the compass of his republican theory, while Carlyle, it seems, would quit the 
law for a true king. Second, Carlyle and Rousseau agree that religion or worship is the distinctive 
organ of the type of authority in question. But where Rousseau’s civil religion aims at 
citizenship, or imitation of a great man, Carlyle’s aims for honor, loyalty, “transcendent 
admiration of a great man.” Third, what differentiates the hero from the run of ordinary men, for 
both Carlyle and Rousseau, is their capacity to “legislate” in a literal sense.65 However, 
Rousseau’s legislator and Carlyle’s hero differ in a couple of ways. First, Rousseau relies for the 
most part on the model of the ancient lawgiver who raises new tables of law, in the manner of the 
ancient stele. Also, the Rousseauean legislator derives authority from the science of politics, 
from sublime rationality and theoretical knowledge. By contrast, Carlyle leans on the model of 
the biblical prophet. The prophet turns out to be as much of an iconoclast as a legislator, 
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breaking the old tables of law in order to fulfill them.66 Also, Carlyle’s heroes derive their 
authority from passionate engagement and practical intuition. The hero does not need to possess 
science, but must have the courage and ingenuity to put nescience under foot.  
         Carlyle finds another heroic archetype in the antique Norse “sovereigns...who got the title 
Wood-cutter; Forest-felling Kings…. [For] true valour, different enough from ferocity, is the 
basis of all [heroism]. A more legitimate kind of valour that; showing itself against the untamed 
Forests and dark brute Powers of Nature, to conquer Nature for us.”67 As the original heroes 
enable us to tame literal forests, subsequent heroes thrash through the tangled forests of the mind 
and spirit. Finally the modern hero-kings emerge, to reestablish order in a social world given 
over to chaos as a result of skeptical negligence regarding human affairs. Carlyle’s highest hope 
is that such men will perform the ordering work necessary for genuine human advancement to 
occur. 
         In many respects, Carlyle and Rousseau share similar influences and aims. Yet they offer 
two alternative views of the moral relation between leaders and followers within the broad 
context of democratic morality. That Carlyle and Rousseau have both been branded “proto-
fascists” does not disprove their commitment to a certain “democratic” vision of morality, indeed 
it only confirms that they were both moralists at heart. “Proto-fascism” is a charge that can be 
leveled against any thinker who questions the rule of lenience in the conduct of human life, and 
who would strive for a morally coherent alternative instead. Rather than rebuking these thinkers, 
it may be possible to temper their excesses by comparing their visions to one another with an eye 
to their strengths and weaknesses. We can learn from the struggles of these authors without 
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denying their obvious shortcomings. To ignore them, however, reflects our own failure of 
sympathy.  
  177 
Chapter Six: “The Godlike in Human Affairs” 
 
Hero-Worship 
Thomas Carlyle delivered his famous lectures On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in 
History in the summer of 1840. The series stood as the culmination of Carlyle’s four years as a 
professional lecturer. In the three preceding years he had given courses on German Literature, 
the History of Literature and Modern Revolutions. Carlyle’s lecture courses, all delivered in 
London, met with growing popularity every year; and by the time of On Heroes Carlyle had 
established a reputation in London literary society. Although he had already published two of his 
greatest works, Sartor Resartus and The French Revolution, lecturing was the first career that 
brought Carlyle the public success with the English that he had desired for some time. London 
notables eagerly awaited the opportunity to hear the Sage’s utterances that summer. 
 On Heroes is the last lecture series that Carlyle would deliver. It is the only one he would 
print as a book. An anxious lecturer, Carlyle spent six entire months following the delivery of On 
Heroes renovating the lectures for publication. In many ways the course is an amalgamation and 
summary of themes Carlyle pursued during the early years of his career as an author. On Heroes 
aspires to a panoramic vision of man and society; presents an imaginative synthesis of history, 
poetry and society; and sustains a focus on Carlyle’s most abiding concern: religion. It is well 
known that the nineteenth century saw a wave of doubt regarding the permanence of accepted 
moral truths, propelled by the rapid transformations wrought by the scientific, industrial and 
democratic revolutions. Accordingly the nineteenth-century intellect was forced to face the 
challenge of understanding truth in historical terms. Over the course of Heroes, Carlyle unveils a 
view of universal history as an interminable process of change that, nonetheless, constantly 
manifests one animating principle— reverence for the highest potential of humanity: 
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For, as I take it, Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this 
world, is as bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here. They were the 
leaders of men, these great ones; the modellers, patterns, and in a wide sense, creators, of 
whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things we see 
standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical 
realisation and embodiment, of thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world: 
the soul of the whole world’s history, it may justly be considered, were the history of 
these.1 
 
The lectures On Heroes, then, attempt to demonstrate the underlying persistence of hero-worship 
beneath all of the ephemeral revolutions in beliefs, habits, customs and institutions that ripple the 
surface of human history. But On Heroes offers more than just a perspective on history. For 
Carlyle also sees in the endurance of hero-worship the only hope for an inconstant present. What 
were the defining characteristics of Carlyle’s putatively anti-heroic time? Against what 
tendencies does he assert the heroic as the proper antidote? 
 Carlyle’s era–the nineteenth-century world of Reform Bills, Factory Acts, Chartist 
uprisings, laissez faire enthusiasms, utopian programs, workhouses and poorhouses–saw political 
bedlam and disorder throughout England and on the Continent. In Enlightenment skepticism 
Carlyle identifies the heart of all this disorder, the primary cause of a revolt against moral 
greatness, legitimate authority, loyalty and obedience, on the part of mass and elite alike. As 
Walter Houghton has observed, the nineteenth century saw itself clearly as a time of transition 
from a feudal past to an inalterably more democratic and capitalist future:  
 
[T]he past which [the early Victorians] had outgrown was not the Romantic period and 
not even the eighteenth century. It was the Middle Ages. They recognized, of course, that 
there were differences between themselves and their immediate predecessors, but from 
their perspective it was the medieval tradition from which they had irrevocably broken–
Christian orthodoxy under the rule of the church and civil government under the rule of 
king and nobility; the social structure of fixed classes, each with its recognized rights and 
duties; and the economic organization of village agriculture and town guilds. That was 
‘the old European system of dominant ideas and facts’ which Arnold saw dissolving on 
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the nineteenth century. But the process had begun much earlier, starting with the 
Renaissance and the Reformation, gaining momentum, quietly but steadily, through the 
next two centuries of philosophic rationalism and expanding business, until it finally 
broke into the open when the French Revolution of 1789 proclaimed the democratic 
Rights of Man and the atheistical worship of the Goddess of Reason.2 
 
The great authors of the early Victorian period, such as Carlyle and Mill, were acutely aware of 
the period of transition through which they were living. “Carlyle and Mill were not reflecting the 
general outlook in the England of 1830. They were attempting–and successfully–to form it.”3 
The aftermath of the French Revolution was not one of liberation only; but the rapid changes, 
and apparent destruction, of the ancestral order underlay a sense of malaise about the future of 
society. Carlyle and Mill  
 
were trying to revive the idea of progress which had lost its hold on the generation of the 
twenties, and by doing so, to check the impotent dismay which the revolutionary changes 
of the period produced in many minds. In itself, Carlyle insists, there is “nothing terrible, 
nothing supernatural” about change; it is the normal condition of life, from day to day, 
age to age. And though often painful, it is a wholly beneficent process. Change is 
progress, and the age is one of transition to a greater age–that is the underlying message 
of “Signs of the Times” (1829), “Characteristics” (1831) and Sartor Resartus (1833).4  
 
 Carlyle viewed the early industrial period as a time of decision as well as transition. To 
him, the burning question is whether modern commercial and democratic culture can absorb or 
re-appropriate the best qualities of the medieval society it had replaced. Carlyle’s idealization of 
the twelfth century, in a work like Past and Present, is paradigmatic of this early Victorian self-
understanding: The Abbot Sampson, a just and wise leader, idealizes the virtues of a bygone 
order; while, in light of the reality of changing times, Carlyle directs an appeal for moral 
leadership to the new “captains of industry” (whom he also chastises for their selfishness and 
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greedy behavior). Similarly, in The French Revolution Carlyle counterposes echoes of Homeric 
and Biblical song against an unswerving recognition of the power of print as the catalyst of a 
new, silent, scripture of universal humanity. For Carlyle, the democratic culture that reaches its 
apotheosis in the French Revolution, with its “atheistical worship of the Goddess of Reason” is 
inseparable from the culture of print, unimaginable without the intercession of inexpensive 
printed matter through which new habits of privacy were cultivated and new systems of justice 
devised. But even in this private, paper age–of pamphlets, treatises, journals and annals, 
constitutional theories, philosophical systems, heightening visions of the progress-of-the-species 
amidst a diminishing sense of the voice–even now, Carlyle observes, reformers admire their 
leaders; and in this fact he sees one glimmer of hope for the voice of authority. “In times of 
unbelief, which soon have to become times of revolution, much down-rushing, sorrowful decay a 
ruin is visible to everybody. For myself in these days, I seem to see in this indestructibility of 
Hero-worship the everlasting adamant lower than which the confused wreck of revolutionary 
things cannot fall.”5 
  Often Carlyle’s teachings, the so-called “doctrine” of hero-worship, and the “great man 
theory” of history basically have been criticized for manifesting a naive form of authoritarianism. 
Yet any astute reader of Carlyle’s texts will recognize quickly that this criticism is naive. For it 
should be clear already that Carlyle does not advocate authoritarianism blindly, as a mere 
reaction against the anarchy he perceives: “Hero-worship” is neither a “policy” to be enforced by 
coercive techniques; nor is it an artificial panacea for the natural social decay whose symptoms 
are Chartist uprisings and French Revolutions. Rather–like all true worship in Carlyle’s view–it 
is a natural and voluntary attitude based on a just tie of loyalty between the hero and his 
followers. This tie of loyalty has deep roots in the hero’s insight into moral reality; and the hero 
is authoritative because his example expresses this insight most adequately. A Carlylean hero 
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figures ideal kingship. For, “man never yields himself wholly to brute Force, but always to moral 
Greatness.”6 Finally, the essential aspect that unites all Carlylean heroes, from Odin to Napoleon, 
is the sincere insight of the hero-as-thinker: “What he says, all men were not far from saying, 
were longing to say. The thoughts of all start up, as from painful enchanted sleep, round his 
Thought; answering to it, Yes, even so!” This relationship seems to holds even when the hero’s 
message is anti-heroic, as the example of Voltaire illustrates. Carlyle sees the link between the 
enormous influence of skeptical philosophes like Voltaire and the modern tendency to deny “as it 
were...the existence of great men; [to deny] the desireableness of great men. Show our critics a 
great man, a Luther for example, they begin to what they call ‘account’ for him; not to worship 
him, but to take the dimensions of him, —and bring him out to be a little kind of man!”7 
According to the fashion of a materialistic and skeptical age, such critics explain away the great 
man as a mere “creature of the Time.” Instead of seeing him as an example of human excellence 
and a pattern of moral conduct worth consulting, they ascribe his active greatness to dumb 
mechanical causes. 
  The modern skeptic believes that events make men, and that human agency has little to 
do with history. Carlyle’s view is nearly the opposite: history bears witnesses to a struggle of 
human freedom against natural necessity. “As Carlyle reads history [in Heroes,] he finds that the 
‘marrow’ of it is the heroism of the ‘mortals superior in power, courage, or understanding.’”8 He 
detects in the non-voluntaristic, amoral, outlook of materialism, the cardinal intellectual fault of 
his age, as well as the motive principle behind the dilatory conduct of game-preserving 
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aristocrats that had already given occasion to the destruction of the ancien regime in France, and 
portended the same for England. 
 Herein is the great paradox of Carlyle’s perspective–a paradox that Carlyle recognized, 
and in which we may also see the clearest mark of its complexity: 
 
The unbelieving French believe in their Voltaire; and burst-out round him into very 
curious Hero-worship, in that last act of his life when they ‘stifle him under roses.’...  No 
people ever were so little prone to admire as those French of Voltaire. Persiflage was the 
character of their whole mind; adoration had nowhere a place in it. Yet see!... They feel 
withal that, if persiflage be the great thing, there never was such a persifleur. He is the 
realised ideal of every one of them; the thing they are all wanting to be; of all Frenchmen 
the most French. He is properly their god,—such god as they are fit for.9 
 
This commentary on the French and their Voltaire evinces the subtlety of Carlyle’s sweeping 
idea of the heroic. It also restates Carlyle’s view that the hero is not an authoritarian dictator of 
belief, but rather reflects and refines tendencies that already prevail among the mass of “hero-
worshipers.” I note this early in this chapter for the same reason that Carlyle notes it at the 
beginning of his lectures: If we wish to avoid simple misunderstandings of Carlyle’s intention, 
we have to bear in mind that the principle of the “heroic”—for Carlyle, the very marrow of 
human history— encompasses a complex relationship between two separate yet related aspects 
of heroism and hero-worship, or, of authority and audience. These aspects are intertwined in the 
phenomenon of the “heroic” itself. Despite that heroism ultimately relies on transcendent insight, 
wisdom, the hero in action is constrained necessarily by the prejudices of his own type, as well 
the endemic defects of human nature. On the other side, hero-worshipers may adopt such limited, 
and patently false, beliefs as, for example, that the man Odin really is a god, or that Voltaire is a 
figure worthy of abject obedience. But even in these most limited forms, all worship springs 
from an unbounded sense of admiration that is also endemic in human nature: “Worship is 
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transcendent wonder.”10 For the pragmatic Carlyle, historical hero-worship–the evident 
phenomena of “transcendent admiration of [Great Men]”–is “the deepest root of all [historical 
forms of worship]; the tap-root from which in a great degree all the rest were nourished a 
grown.”11 Therefore, even in its most nescient forms, men will opt for hero-worship over no 
worship at all. The practically unconscionable alternative is both spiritual and literal chaos: 
 
Society is founded on Hero-worship. All dignities of rank, on which human association 
rests, are what we may call a Heroarchy (Government of Heroes),—or a Hierarchy, for it 
is ‘sacred’ enough withal! Duke means Dux, Leader; King is Kon-ning, Kan-ning, Man 
that knows or cans. Society everywhere is some representation, not insupportably 
inaccurate, of a graduated Worship of Heroes;—reverence and obedience done to men 
really great and wise. Not insupportably inaccurate, I say! They are all as bank-notes, 
these social dignitaries, all representing gold; —and several of them, alas, always are 
forged notes. We can do with some forged false notes; with a good many even; but not 
with all, or the most of them forged! No: there have to come revolutions then; cries of 
Democracy, Liberty, and Equality, and I know not what.12 
 
 
Heroes and Valets 
We can identify from Carlyle’s impressionistic view of heroism two important indices of 
historical-cultural health, in Carlyle’s perspective. First, there is a difference between genuine 
heroes and “shams” or “quacks.” The prevalence of sincere heroism obviously is a sign of social 
health, while the prevalence of disingenuous quackery points to disease and decay. Carlyle ever 
is hostile to shams, and believes intensely in the duty to resist them at any risk. Secondly, some 
degree of mutual participation in, and understanding of, the hero’s moral insight is an 
indispensable prerequisite of genuine worship; in ideal terms, the hero merely gives voice to a 
moral dialect that the many understand though as yet they cannot express it. Moral heroism 
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articulates the universal voice of moral duty in a particular and “not insupportably inaccurate” 
form.  
 This second, transitive, quality of hero-worship underlay a distinction between the 
healthy soul that is capable of reverence, and the critic, or valet-soul. Carlyle remarks 
disapprovingly of the aphorism that “no man is a hero to his valet.” Or, to the extent that it is 
true, Carlyle retorts that “it is not the Hero’s blame, but the Valet’s: that his soul, namely, is a 
mean valet-soul... The Valet does not know a hero when he sees him! Alas, no: it requires a kind 
of Hero to do that; —and one of the world’s wants…is for the most part want of such.”13 A 
sincere, heroic soul is required to recognize true heroism. In a healthy situation, what the hero 
and hero-worshiper share is participation not in a cult of personal “identity,” but a common 
understanding of transcendent moral duty. 
 With respect to this second register of health; Carlyle’s appraisal of his own historical 
situation is relatively grim. In his view, the nineteenth century was a skeptical, unbelieving 
century that had lost its faith in transcendent goodness, turned its intellectual attention to 
materialist metaphysics, and its practical attention to the arts of avarice. Carlyle, too, experienced 
a “descendental” phase of doubt and insecurity regarding the truth of moral order. His 
conversion from this “everlasting no” to the “everlasting yea”–the affirmation of moral 
dutifulness over material happiness–became a paradigmatic conversion story for the Victorian 
age. 
 As we have seen, Carlyle puts a good deal of faith and hope in his principle that hero-
worship is “the everlasting adamant lower than which this confused wreck of revolutionary 
things cannot fall.” But he knows well that the forces of skepticism and unbelief have not yet 
spent themselves entirely, nor can they be overcome totally. What hope he has for the authentic 
improvement of society, he puts off into the far future. Moreover, Carlyle has almost no faith in 
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the possibility of social regeneration as a result of mechanical or evolutionary mechanisms. For 
the most part Carlyle is a critic of the modern idea of progress; it fails precisely to the extent that 
it reflects a sense of physical rather than moral advance. He recognizes the ascendancy of 
political and economic liberalism as inevitable, and not necessarily undesirable, historical 
developments; but they herald more chaos and social unrest in the immediate future, not less. In 
Carlyle’s view this results because the forces that propel such developments are largely 
technological and physical, manifesting nothing on the moral plane except for a tendency, based 
on confusion, to reject all authority; and foreshadowing no inherent principle of moral progress.  
 
Not a Hero only is needed, but a world fit for him; a world not of Valets; —the Hero 
comes almost in vain otherwise!... Yes, it is far from us: but it must come; thank God, it 
is visibly coming. Till it do come, what have we? Ballot-boxes, suffrages, French 
Revolutions…. Why, the insincere, unbelieving world is the natural property of the 
Quack, and of the Father of quacks and quackeries! Misery, confusion, unveracity are 
alone possible there. By ballot-boxes we alter the figure of our Quack; but the substance 
of him continues. The Valet-World has to be governed by the Sham-Hero, by the King 
merely dressed in King gear.14 
 
A passage like the one above should be evidence enough to dispel the popular view of Carlyle as 
a purveyor of personality cultism. For Carlyle, merely political revolution–however necessary it 
may be–is not sufficient to render society healthy. What is needed is a moral revolution. But 
such a revolution is much harder to effect as it cannot be accomplished by force, but by 
persuasion, education. Moreover, no society-at-large can experience moral revolution. Moral 
education is a mystery; it requires the willing participation of the individual soul. It seems, then, 
that Carlyle’s deferral of hope may be justified. That he maintains such a hope is certain, 
however. The lectures on heroism, whatever their shortcomings, stand along with the rest of his 
literary work as positive evidence of Carlyle’s hope for the future.  
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 In the remainder of this chapter, I shall attempt to explain more adequately Carlyle’s 
heroic individualism and how it conforms to his views of history and religion. An important 
concept here is Carlyle’s notion of “unconsciousness.” Before embarking on a more detailed 
examination of this aspect of Carlyle’s philosophy I shall offer a brief exposition of his position 
in the popular discourse of his age. After establishing the boundaries of common opinion, I will 
continue on a deeper investigation of Carlyle’s philosophical foundations. I hope to show that 
despite his virulent opposition to political democracy, Carlyle is a sort of radical individualist 
and, in this sense, is a democrat. Carlyle reveres the idea of democracy, even as he despairs at its 
actuality. 
 
The Question of Action 
Carlyle did not unleash his fiercest attacks on democracy until several years after the delivery of 
Heroes. But by the late 1830s he had already established the basis of his critical stance toward 
democracy. In “Signs of the Times” (1829), a seminal statement of Carlyle’s social thought, 
Carlyle chimed in on the much-debated “spirit of the age” question. In that essay he enunciates 
several judgments that recur throughout his later work. At the outset, Carlyle proclaims that the 
“grand business” of the age, “undoubtedly, is, not to see what lies dimly at a distance, but to do 
what lies clearly at hand.”15 The nineteenth century, he argues, should be an age of action rather 
than analysis. By “action,” Carlyle does not mean simple activism, however. Action refers not to 
coercive or revolutionary violence, nor does it refer to political virtuosity in a specialized sense. 
Rather, for Carlyle, “action” lays the foundation of habit. To act is to establish or reestablish 
one’s own regime of habits, one’s character. Action in this sense is by nature personal, and not 
social. Moreover, action understood in this sense, as moral domestication, is among the least 
esoteric of Carlyle’s ideas. 
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 Carlyle never ceases to reiterate this call for personal action; and in general he always 
prefers action to speculation. There are at least two major reasons for this. On the one hand, 
Carlyle sees a link between modern analytical speculation and the conditions of decaying faith, 
conditions he believes to be an inheritance of the skeptical eighteenth century that he hopes to 
overcome. The source of this decay was a too-complete adherence to the Enlightenment view of 
the universe. In “Signs of the Times” Carlyle captures this view under the figure of 
“Mechanism.”  
 According to Carlyle, the mechanical philosophy puts man at a distance from himself by 
turning his attention from the interior and invisible world of the soul’s motivations, towards the 
outer world of objects, “interests,” and the power to manipulate external nature. Carlyle 
characterizes our epoch as an “Age of Machinery, in every outward and inward sense of that 
word; the age which, with its whole, undivided might, forwards, teaches, and practices the great 
art of adapting means to ends.” By now this critique of modern instrumentalism may be familiar, 
but Carlyle was announcing something new. Ours is “not an Heroical, Devotional, Philosophical, 
or Moral Age,” he concludes, but one of calculation and contrivance: “for the simplest 
operation...some cunning abbreviated process is in readiness.”16  
 Of course machinery, industry and technology have worked wonders for the betterment 
of modern mankind. Carlyle, a beneficiary of such events as the dawn of industrialism and the 
birth of the railway, does not fail to notice this fact. However, he observes with dismay that the 
principle of Mechanism seeping into every aspect of modern life, including those in which it may 
not belong. “Not the external and physical alone is now managed by machinery, but the internal 
and spiritual also.”17 Our perspective on things-in-general is becoming mechanized: education, 
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religion, literature, politics; all turned into contrivances for commodious living, but standing in 
the way of life itself. 
  
Men are grown mechanical in head and in heart, as well as in hand. They have lost faith 
in individual endeavour, and in natural force, of any kind. Not for internal perfection, but 
for external combinations and arrangements, for institutions, constitutions,—for 
Mechanism of one sort or another, do they hope and struggle. Their whole efforts, 
attachments, opinions...are of a mechanical character.18 
 
All of this, Carlyle sees as the outcome of metaphysical materialism, the creed of the 
Enlightenment rationalist. In “Signs,” he points to Locke, and also Hume, as primary symptoms. 
Yet he sees in the contemporary generation of Common Sense philosophers–“the school of 
Reid”–signals of possible renewal. For, these men had seen through to the ultimate inadequacy 
of materialism. However, they were unable to correct Hume conclusively. “[T]hey let loose 
Instinct, as an undiscriminating ban-dog, to guard them against these conclusions;—they tugged 
lustily at the logical chain by which Hume was so coldly towing them and the world into 
bottomless abysses of Atheism and Fatalism. But the chain somehow snapped between them; and 
the issue has been that nobody now cares about either.”19 For Carlyle, then, the world rests at a 
“Centre of Indifference.” That there are fatal flaws in the dominant Mechanical outlook was no 
longer deniable, yet at the same time thinking men were unready, or unable, to make the choices 
necessary to correct it. 
 In another sense Carlyle believes that the masses had already acted to expose the 
bankruptcy of the dominant order of things. The French Revolution was the grand event that 
symbolized this overturning of a dead social and intellectual order, an order that paraded about in 
the raiment of aristocratic nobility but really operated on the vulgar principle of self-interest. 
According to Carlyle, the Revolution manifests the “Dynamic” principle in human nature. A 
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counterpoint to the finite and mechanical, man’s dynamic nature manifests “the primary, 
unmodified forces and energies in man, the mysterious springs of Love, and Fear, and Wonder, 
of Enthusiasm, Poetry, Religion, all which have a truly vital and infinite character.” In past ages, 
this aspect of man’s nature has been the main concern of political and moral philosophy, 
especially. “A wide difference is manifest in our age. For the wise men, who now appear as 
Political Philosophers, deal exclusively with the Mechanical province” (for political philosophers 
read: political economists.)20 Carlyle divines that the political revolutions are nature’s way of 
warning against the ultimate inadequacy a finite, mechanical, treatment of human things. Human 
souls may appear in finite bodies, but our inner being is infinite and dynamic. The French 
Revolution manifests an up-swelling of dynamic energy that reveals the old forms to be false 
once and for all. But this liberation from false belief is not enough; for a healthy man is not only 
free from falsehood but also free to acknowledge and perform his moral duty: 
 
The thinking minds of all nations call for change. There is a deep-lying struggle in the 
whole fabric of society; a boundless grinding collision of the New with the Old. The 
French Revolution...was not the parent of this mighty movement, but its offspring... 
France was the scene of their fiercest explosion; but the final issue was not unfolded in 
that country…. Political freedom is hitherto the object of these efforts; but they will not 
and cannot stop there. It is towards a higher freedom than mere freedom from oppression 
by his fellow-mortal that man dimly aims. Of this higher, heavenly freedom, which is 
‘man’s reasonable service,’ all his noble institutions...are but the body, and more and 
more approximated emblem.21 
 
Thus, despite Carlyle’s initial remark that the business of the age is “not to see what lies dimly at 
a distance, but to do what lies clearly at hand,” this passage shows with remarkable clarity that 
Carlyle’s diagnosis of contemporary society emanates from a view of history in which events 
like the French Revolution have a meaningful place in a larger historical scheme based on the 
analysis of human nature. We will inquire more deeply into the details of this philosophy of 
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history later on. For now, let it suffice to mention that Carlyle’s analysis of the age does not rely 
on his philosophy of history alone. A second principle, the principle of unconsciousness (or, 
“anti-self-consciousness,” as John Stuart Mill called it) bespeaks a non-historicist foundation for 
his critique of mechanical culture, reflecting Carlyle’s view of human nature. 
 
Anti Self-Consciousness 
Carlyle elaborates his principle of unconsciousness in the (1831) essay “Characteristics.” 
According to Carlyle unconsciousness is a sign of health in both the physical and psychological 
realms. “The healthy know not of their health, but only the sick: this is the Physician’s 
Aphorism; and applicable in a far wider sense than he gives it.”22 On the basis of this first 
principle, Carlyle proceeds in “Characteristics” to sketch out a theory of “moral, intellectual, 
political, poetical...therapeutics.” Just as Nietzsche later would do, Carlyle sets himself up as a 
“physician of culture.” And anticipating Nietzsche, Carlyle diagnoses the present state of society 
as diseased and corrupted. To put it simply the source of the malaise is unbridled analysis, 
attorney-logic, as Carlyle is fond of calling it, or “closet-logic.” As the word implies, analysis is 
the power of the human mind to interrogate and to decompose complex wholes into simpler 
components. Carlyle recognizes the analytical tendency as the dominant tendency of the age, but 
he insists on its shortcomings. “The beginning of Inquiry is Disease: all science, if we consider it 
well, as it must have originated in the feeling of something being wrong, so it is and continues to 
be but Division, Dismemberment, and partial healing of the wrong.”23  
 Effectively, analysis is solvent of belief and inimical to intuition. For Carlyle, intuition 
and belief rely on an unmediated sense of the whole. In defense of intuition, Carlyle ruthlessly 
disapproves of the popular philosophical “systems,” so regnant in his time and in ours. The 
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healthy, believing man does not need a “system,” Carlyle implies. Systematic moral philosophy, 
in particular, is too self-conscious. This point is both historical and philosophical in its bearing: 
Historically, heroic civilizations need no such systems. “Unity, agreement,” in a word, health, “is 
always silent, or soft-voiced; it is only discord that loudly proclaims itself.”24 In terms of 
philosophical anthropology, Carlyle argues that human beings do not believe in systems but in 
symbols; the system is to belief as allegory is to symbol. Without the latter, the former would 
have no hold on the human affections. 
 Carlyle finds modern democratic rhetoric wanting because it relies so often upon 
precisely this kind of contrived moral philosophy, as if morality were merely an allegory for self-
interest. It is not that Carlyle is hostile to individualism, however. On the contrary, he recognizes 
the dignity and worth of persons. Few thinkers have defended this belief more eloquently than 
Carlyle does in his more tenderhearted moods. Still fewer have given the individual so high a 
place in the scheme of religious belief.  
 In On Heroes Carlyle refers the reader to “St. Chrysostom’s celebrated saying in 
reference to the Shekinah, or Ark of Testimony, visible Revelation of God, among the Hebrews; 
‘The true Shekinah is Man!’” Farther down on the same page Carlyle cites Novalis: “‘There is 
but one Temple in the Universe...and that is the Body of Man.’” Carlyle reiterates this belief in 
his own words, “We are the miracle of miracles, —the great inscrutable mystery of God.”25 It is 
hard to believe that this is the same Thomas Carlyle who courted, and finally achieved political 
infamy for himself by issuing increasingly vitriolic denunciations of the democratic and 
humanitarian–“progress-of-the-species”– movements, defending in rather obnoxious terms the 
institution of racial slavery and, according to some, idolizing authoritarian dictators.26  
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 As we said, Carlyle’s most scandalous political writings were not published until several 
years after Heroes, but this critical stance toward democracy’s excess is evident in his earlier 
work. In “Characteristics,” for example, we find a typical statement of Carlyle’s position. The 
underlying problem, as we have said, is self-consciousness. “Never since the beginning of time 
was there, that we hear or read of, so intensely self-conscious a society. Our whole relations to 
the Universe and our fellow-man have become an inquiry, a Doubt.” Rationalism has torn 
asunder the whole fabric of tradition. Under these novel circumstances, the only methods society 
can produce to cure its woes are artificial, mechanical, panaceas. Carlyle fears that, at best, such 
“cures” are capable merely of forestalling the inevitable process of degeneration.  
 
The whole Life of Society must now be carried on by drugs: doctor after doctor appears 
with his nostrum, of Cooperative Societies, Universal Suffrage, Cottage-and-Cow 
Systems, Repression of Population, Vote by Ballot. To such height has the dyspepsia of 
Society reached; as indeed the constant grinding internal pain, or from time to time the 
mad spasmodic throes, of all Society do otherwise too mournfully indicate.27 
 
The visible symptoms of this social disease are easy enough to observe. They are the woes of 
modern industrial society with which we are still familiar: alienation, avarice, labor troubles, 
criticism of property, and criticism of poverty. “Sad to look upon: in the highest stage of 
civilisation, nine-tenths of mankind have to struggle in the lowest battle of savage or even animal 
man, the battle against Famine.”28  
 But the roots of the problem lay not in these rapidly changing material conditions. 
Despite the undeniable significance of rapid socioeconomic change, such physical troubles are 
the reverberations of a deeper spiritual disorder. “Nothing [any longer] acts from within 
outwards in undivided healthy force; everything lies impotent, lamed, its force turned inwards, 
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and painfully ‘listens to itself.’”29 Men have forgotten God, and societies are trying to do without 
Him. Moreover, what religion remains is not, according to Carlyle, “healthy religion, vital, 
unconscious of itself; that shines forth spontaneously in doing of the Work, or even in preaching 
of the Word…. Instead of heroic martyr Conduct, and inspired and soul-inspiring eloquence, 
whereby religion itself were brought home to our living bosoms...we have ‘Discourses on the 
Evidences.’”30 Society is infected to its very core with the infirmity of doubt, disbelief, 
skepticism, materialism, fatalism, and calculation. The only genuine cure for this disease is 
spiritual regeneration; and one cannot effect this through ballot-boxes or clever feats of 
constitutional engineering. Men’s souls cannot be saved by mechanical means; and they certainly 
cannot be saved en masse. 
 In “Characteristics” Carlyle presents a quasi-Rousseauean vision of republican Rome as 
an example of the healthy society. More often, however, his tendency is to look back to medieval 
Europe for a model. Alternatively, in “The Hero as Divinity” Carlyle admires ancient Norse 
culture. He speaks with an intellectually qualified sympathy of those people, who were so simple 
as to take “the man Odin, speaking with a Hero’s voice and a heart, as with an impressiveness 
out of Heaven,” for a god. “[Odin’s] people, feeling a response to it in their own hearts, believed 
this message...thought it a message out of Heaven, and him a divinity for telling it them.” Hence, 
at bottom, Carlyle’s nostalgia results from his general appreciation of the positive qualities of 
naive religiosity. In the case of Odin, one simple instance of hero-worship constitutes the initial 
foundation of social order. As Emerson will say, institutions are the long shadow of one man. 
“Thus if the man Odin himself have vanished utterly, there is this huge Shadow of him which 
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still projects itself over the whole History of his People.”31 The ties of loyalty and obligation that 
bind a society, emanate from this original outpouring of admiration for the hero. “I have said, 
these people knew no limits to their admiration of [Odin]; they had as yet no scale to measure 
admiration by.”32 He taught them the necessary initial lesson:  
 
Valor is still value. The first duty for a man is still that of subduing Fear. We must get rid 
of Fear; we cannot act at all till then. A man’s acts are slavish, not true but specious; his 
very thoughts are false, he thinks too as a slave and a coward, till he have got Fear under 
his feet. Odin’s Creed, if we disentangle the real kernel of it, is true to this hour. A man 
shall and must be valiant; he must march forward, and quit himself like a man,–trusting 
imperturbably in the appointment and choice of the upper Powers; and, on the whole, not 
fear at all. Now and always, the completeness of his victory over Fear will determine how 
much of a man he is.33  
 
Carlyle ever sees one psychological alternative: the fear of God versus the fear of everything 
(and everybody) else.  
 The sense of loyalty and shared identity long outlives the hero in the forms of religion 
and tradition. Odin-worship, Carlyle observes, “seems to me the primary seed-grain of the Norse 
religion, from which all manner of mythologies, symbolic practices, speculations, allegories, 
songs and sagas would naturally grow.”34 Alternatively, folk-songs and sagas, speculations and 
allegories, songs represent later phases of hero worship. “Allegory and Poetic 
Delineation...cannot be religious faith; the faith itself must first be there, then Allegory enough 
will gather round it.” Carlyle turns to early Norse culture, rather than classical Greek culture, for 
the specific reason that it does not exhibit these more distant and sophisticated forms. “Superior 
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sincerity (far superior) consoles us for the total want of old Grecian grace. Sincerity, I think, is 
better then grace.”35  
 This sincere and simple comportment with reality,36 that Carlyle so esteems, is not a 
quality of Odin exclusively among other Norsemen. While it is true that Carlyle characterizes 
Odin as the “type Norseman” and their “first Thinker”–the first Norseman to discover the 
intelligible significance of the universe and articulate it in language–Odin personally does not 
create or substantiate this significance. Odin merely conceives symbols that evoke this 
significance for a people ready to understand it. Carlyle depicts the appearance of the hero as a 
small infusion of “real light shining in the center of that enormous camera-obscura image” of the 
untutored mind.37 He later qualifies the metaphor: “I called it that small light shining and shaping 
in the huge vortex of the Norse darkness. Yet the darkness itself was alive; consider that. It was 
the eager uninstructed Mind of the whole Norse People, longing only to become articulate, to go 
on articulating even further.”38 Carlyle sees the religious impulse in this intense and vital 
darkness. The life-tree figures the kernel of inner experience from which centuries of Northern 
European civilization would grow. Carlyle insists that it still exerts its influence, even in modern 
England. “No Homer sang [the] Norse sea-kings; but Agamemnon’s was a small audacity, and of 
small fruit in the world to some of them; —to Hrolf’s of Normandy, for instance! Hrolf, or Rollo, 
Duke of Normandy, the wild sea-king, has a share in governing England at this hour.”39 
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 For Carlyle, then, “unconsciousness” has a two-fold significance. On the one hand, 
unconsciousness is the register of spiritual health. An unconscious sense of the unity, the 
wholeness, and the consistency of things allows man to bypass metaphysical speculation and 
attend immediately to the duty nearest at hand. This unprepossessing sense of a connection with 
the moral whole attends the birth of culture. The essence of faith, unconscious belief halts not to 
demand evidence, logical or sensible, as a justification for action. Moreover, belief does not have 
to fly in the face of reason or the evidences. Heroism is active proof of this capacity of 
connatural nobleness. It is the ideal-type of moral health. However, Carlyle recognizes that this 
ideal is idyllic and in some ways savage, thus, he rules out the possibility of a complete return to 
unconsciousness. “Our being is made up of Light and Darkness, the Light resting on Darkness.” 
Accordingly the disease of futile metaphysics lay dormant in the mind at all times, human nature 
is constitutionally jeopardized by the “attempt of the mind to rise above the mind; to environ and 
shut in, or as we say, comprehend the mind. Hopeless struggle, for the wisest, as for the 
foolishest”40 The hopeless struggle of metaphysics is simultaneously a necessary corrective to 
the savage potential of naive enthusiasm. 
 On the other hand, unconsciousness is not just an idealization of reality: it is the 
pragmatic sine qua non of human action, and of social functionality. “Metaphysical speculation, 
as it begins in No or Nothingness, so it must needs end in Nothingness.” Since its power is 
exhausted within the realm of doubt speculation and inactivity, metaphysics cannot produce the 
certainty of conviction; rather, “in Action alone can we have certainty.”41 The converse of this 
formula also holds true: in certainty alone do we act, doubt cannot be resolved but by action. 
Reading the statement this way provides some insight as to the contemporary significance of 
Carlyle’s sweeping generalization that “society is founded on Hero-worship.” Society relies on a 
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hierarchical sense of the whole in order to function properly. These ties of obedience and loyalty 
that bind social superiors and inferiors are ultimately founded on belief. If all belief in the 
authority of the whole is shattered, then anarchic forces are loosed that may lead eventually to 
the annihilation of society. No amount of political economy or constitutional engineering can 
make up for this fact. Accordingly, no theory or ideology can provide for what Carlyle sees as an 
imminent need of modern society. It is in this context that we should read Carlyle’s unpopular 
(and satirical42) defense of divine right:  
 
I esteem the modern error, That all goes by self-interest and the checking and balancing 
of greedy knaveries, and that, in short there is nothing divine whatever in the association 
of men, a still more despicable error, natural as it is to an unbelieving century, than that 
of a divine right in people called kings. I say, Find me the true King...and he has a divine 
right over me. That we knew in some tolerable measure how to find him, and that all men 
were ready to acknowledge his divine right when found: this is precisely the healing 
which a sick world is everywhere...seeking after!43 
 
As the “great man” theorist, Carlyle takes it upon himself to defend the ideal of kingship, but not 
the institutions of monarchy. As the years go on and the tide of European revolution grows ever 
stronger, Carlyle’s denunciations of democracy, utilitarianism, humanitarianism and political 
economy become nastier and more frequent. However, by now it should be clear that his 
criticism is not the product of vulgar elitism, or merely a nostalgic reaction against modern 
circumstances.  
 In fact, Carlyle recognizes and approves of many of the insights of modern philosophy. 
Thinkers like Voltaire, Hume and Gibbon had convinced him that the old social forms were worn 
out. Carlyle saw their skeptical philosophy, along with its social fermentations, as part of a 
necessary, albeit infelicitous, phase of history. Though “the practical condition of man in these 
days is the saddest…. In no time was man’s life what he calls a happy one; in no time can it be 
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so.”44 The meaning of human life ever resides in man’s existential struggle with anxiety, 
uncertainty and want, both spiritual and material; yet by putting our effort to the scarce (or 
abundant) materials given to us, it is possible to withstand “the pressure of things outward” and 
make for ourselves a purposeful existence. Carlyle depicts this perennial struggle as nothing 
short of the battle between good and evil. “Evil, in the widest sense we can give it, is precisely 
the dark, disordered material out of which man’s Freewill has to create an edifice of order and 
Good. Ever must Pain urge us to Labour; and only in free Effort can any blessedness be 
imagined for us.”45 
 As Carlyle maintains, belief is key to overcoming evil and achieving the highest human 
good of “blessedness.” Faith enlivens the “inward force” of man, enabling him to withstand the 
outward pressures of earthly existence. “It is by Faith that man removes mountains...” Faith 
imparts to man “an inward Willingness; a world of Strength wherewith to confront a world of 
Difficulty.”46 What alarms Carlyle about his own epoch is its enthusiastic hostility towards faith. 
Modern philosophy gives rise to an apotheosis of doubt and disbelief. Forces of rationalism, 
scientism and mechanism bring about the forgetting of God and the sterilization of faith. One 
might see this as the unintended consequence of the modern attempt to quarantine faith, as one 
would a dangerous virus. Carlyle sees the initial phase of this movement as salutary. Institutions 
such as the papacy (which died in the Reformation) and monarchy (which died in the French 
Revolution) in fact had ceased to embody the ideals of spiritual and secular order. But the later 
phase of enthusiastic rationalism precipitates ill-begotten projects to reconstruct the social order 
that fail, with fatal consequences, to account for the basic facts of human nature: 
 
                                                 
44
 “Characteristics,” p. 90. 
 
45
 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
 
46
 Ibid., p. 91. 
  199 
Given a world of Knaves, to produce an Honesty from their united action? Were not 
experiments of this tried before all Europe, and found wanting, when, in that doomsday 
of France, the infinite gulf of human Passion shivered asunder the thin rinds of Habit; and 
burst forth all-devouring, as in seas of Nether Fire? Which cunningly-devised 
‘Constitution,’ constitutional, republican, democratic, sansculottic, could bind that raging 
chasm together?... It is not by mechanism, but by Religion; not by self-interest, but by 
Loyalty, that men are governed or governable. 
 Remarkable it is, truly, how everywhere the eternal fact begins again to be 
recognized, that there is a Godlike in human affairs...47 
 
Modern political philosophy–political economy–commits a grave error; it fails to account for the 
inward dynamics of human nature, in both its synthetic-heroic-constructive and analytic-
revolutionary-destructive manifestations. Beneath Carlyle’s objections to democracy lay the fear 
that such a distorted view of human nature might be incarnated in social institutions. Political 
economy is not defective in itself, but we should not mistake it for a complete theory of politics. 
 Democracy–ancient and modern–institutionalizes uncertainty. Carlyle sees modern 
democratic culture as fatally flawed, both theoretically and practically, to the extent that its 
foundations are merely skeptical and instrumentalist. At best, democracy in this laissez-faire 
sense is a transitory stage in the renovation of society. This is true because, in Carlyle’s 
judgment, what society really needs is a new sense of moral authority to replace the old, outworn 
forms. For Carlyle, this new sense of authority is more likely to emerge from the revolutionary 
ideal of careers open to talent than from a return to the old forms of hereditary aristocracy. 
 
Laissez-Faire 
Just as it institutionalizes the uncertain, democracy defers authority. To conditions that cry for 
leadership, it delivers laissez-faire. Over his literary career, Carlyle would spend a great deal of 
rhetorical effort trying to enlist one or another powerful class to take up the mantle of moral 
leadership that the landed classes abdicated. In his earlier years, he sees in the “captains of 
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industry” a possible aristocracy of talent that might abandon their exploitative policies and 
regulate social production in a more humane way.48 Later he turns to the Aristocracy–whom he 
had chided earlier as idle pedants–in the hope that he might provoke them to a newfound 
recognition of their traditional responsibilities. Orderly regimentation of industry and society is 
an increasingly prevalent Carlylean theme; this supports the conclusion that Carlyle is concerned 
less with the outward from of government, than that society is substantively well-governed. The 
end of good government requires the restoration of a social tie of loyalty between rulers and 
subjects in which the former accept a moral obligation to serve the latter’s well being and the 
latter manifests enough passive wisdom to submit to fit rulers. Democracy as a form of 
government, or “no-government,” cannot guarantee this relationship, but Carlyle does not fall 
victim to the illusion that any other form of government can guarantee this end. No number of 
ballots, no mass-movement, and no sophisticated account of political economy can guarantee 
success in a field where moral action and a moral vision are the things needed. 
 We must stress the point that Carlyle does not reject democracy as an ideal, nor is he an 
enemy of the “common man.” Carlyle’s qualified approval of the French Revolution shows that 
he accepts the practical inevitability of democracy, the “march of freedom.” Yet he fears deeply 
the prospect of governance by public opinion. Why? According to Carlyle, “[the] Universe itself 
is a Monarchy and Hierarchy.”49 Public opinion cannot constrain the eternal laws of justice, or 
the tendencies of human nature. “If popular suffrage is not the way of ascertaining what the Laws 
of the Universe are...then woe is to us if we do not take another method. Delolme on the British 
Constitution will not save us; deaf will the Parcae be to votes of the House, to leading articles, to 
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constitutional philosophies.”50 For Carlyle, the characteristic excess of democracy is too much 
talk and not enough action. Moreover, when democracies do take action, it is piecemeal and self-
interested rather than partaking of a comprehensive social vision. Carlyle is fond of citing the 
etymology of “Parliaments”: mere talking-chambers. 
 In his concern for workaday people, however, one may say decidedly that Carlyle is a 
democrat. Indeed, he considers himself to be more radical even than the Utilitarian philosophical 
radicals who represented the most “progressive” forces in British politics at the time.51 Whereas 
these thinkers advocate the greatest happiness for the greatest number; Carlyle stands for the 
infinite value of the person and of moral duty. As John MacCunn observes, “Carlyle is on many 
points in singular agreement with his democratic friend Mazzini. Like that apostle of the religion 
of democracy, he believes in the divinity of the individual man. ‘Through every living soul,’ so 
run his own words, ‘the glory of a present God still beams.’”52 Carlyle’s advocacy for the 
laboring classes, so impassioned in works like Chartism and Past and Present, is conspicuous 
evidence of where his sympathies lay in the great moral battles of the early industrial age. It was 
Carlyle who coined the pejoratives “cash nexus,” and the “dismal science,” that one continues to 
find in social criticism that is derisive of the morality of capitalism and of political economy. Yet 
Carlyle never places an unqualified faith in the creed that democratic political reform will effect 
the kinds of social reforms that justice demands. 
 For Carlyle, what is needed is not extension of the suffrage but reform of Downing 
Street, a new view of leadership. And the counterpart of good leadership, Carlyle insists, is 
morally justified obedience. Good follower-ship results neither from mass-enthusiasm, or even 
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enlightened self-interest; rather, healthy societies are composed of healthy souls. Good follower-
ship is leadership in the passive voice: it, too, requires a heroic soul. This is the substance of 
Carlyle’s radical democratic ideal: a whole world of heroes. “In all this wild revolutionary work, 
from Protestantism downwards, I see the blessedest result preparing itself: not abolition of Hero-
worship, but what I would call a whole World of Heroes... A world all sincere, a believing world: 
the like has been...will again be,—cannot help being. That were the right sort of Worshippers for 
Heroes.”53 
 Such a world may be democratic in form, but assuredly it is not “laissez-faire” in moral 
content. Carlyle, ever the protestant, maintains an attitude of unconcern about the particular 
institutions that mediate the individual’s relation to the eternal and divine; but he is concerned 
passionately that this relation should be healthy, sincere. He is a democrat in the sense of salus 
populi, of vox populi he is more suspicious. Democracy as a political panacea disturbs Carlyle 
because it threatens to wedge the idol of a Rousseauean “General Will” between the individual 
and the divine source of authority. “The truth here is exactly as Mazzini puts it... Carlyle believes 
in God...[and] in the worth of the individual man however humble and homely; what he...abhors 
and distrusts for evermore is the Collective Will. ‘God and the individual man—Mr. Carlyle sees 
no other object in the world.’”54 
 In light of Mazzini’s remark, we would do well to re-describe Carlyle’s radical 
democratic morality as a radically individualist morality. For it is in the idea of socially enforced 
“collective will” that Carlyle espies the side of democracy to which he is hostile, seeing it as a 
threat to the moral liberty of the individual: “Let the free, reasonable Will, which dwells in us, as 
in our Holy of Holies, be indeed free, and obeyed like a divinity, as is its right and its effort: the 
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perfect obedience will be the silent one.”55 This passage recalls the idyllic imagery of silent and 
unconscious moral virtue that, as we have seen, Carlyle takes as the ideal if not perfectly 
achievable condition of moral man. However, despite his radical Protestantism, Carlyle is aware 
that an unmediated relationship with the divine source of moral order is not possible: 
 
Is not all worship whatsoever a worship by Symbols, by eidola, or things seen? Whether 
seen, rendered visible as an image or picture to the bodily eye; or visible only to the 
inward eye, to the imagination, to the intellect: this makes a superficial, but no substantial 
difference. It is still a Thing Seen, significant of Godhead: an Idol. The most rigorous 
Puritan has his Confession of Faith, and intellectual Representation of Divine things, and 
worships thereby; thereby is worship first made possible for him. All creeds, liturgies, 
religious forms, conceptions that fitly invest religious feelings, are in this sense, eidola, 
things seen. All worship whatsoever must proceed by Symbols, by Idols:–we may say, all 
Idolatry is comparative, and the worst Idolatry is only more idolatrous.56 
 
Carlyle identifies the emerging secular ideologies of the nineteenth century as a sort of new 
Puritanism that has forgotten God and unwittingly made an idol of the text. This is evident, for 
example, in his satire of the new institution of the “literary lion” in the essay on Walter Scott. In 
Heroes, he applies this critique to the ideologies of progress: “Odinism was Valour; Christianism 
was Humility, a nobler kind of Valour…. And on the other hand, what a melancholy notion is 
that, which has to represent all men, in all countries and times except our own, as having spent 
their life in blind condemnable error...only that we might have the true ultimate knowledge!”57   
 Carlyle not only recognizes the ersatz-religious quality of secular ideology, he also 
identifies its particular character as a Pygmalion-like fetishization of the self, or of public 
opinion, or of the author, through the mirror of the text. Carlyle criticizes public opinion for its 
tendency to replace un-self-conscious virtue with the deliberate desire to achieve popularity with 
one’s fellows, to see oneself in print. But the collective will is a mere idol of collective prejudice. 
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Democracy lowers the barriers against the domination of public opinion, which begins to replace 
healthy morality. “In fact, what morality we have takes the shape of Ambition, of ‘Honour’; 
beyond money and money’s worth, our only rational blessedness is Popularity... Wonderful 
‘Force of Public Opinion’! We must act and walk in all points as it prescribes.”58 
 
Vox Populi Revisited 
 Carlyle’s critique of public opinion resembles both Plato’s and Rousseau’s. It involves 
two basic contentions. The first is that the cosmic law is not made by consent; “the Universe is a 
Monarchy and Hierarchy.” The second is that, ultimately, the pursuit of a “reputation” is a false 
means to obtaining the true ends of moral virtue. A comparison of Carlyle and Rousseau 
suggests possible departures from the Platonic tradition, however. Interestingly, these departures 
lead directly to the question of heroism, or heroic culture. We will treat this issue more 
thoroughly in other chapters. 
 In 1853 Carlyle affirmed his affinity with Plato in a letter to Emerson.59 And at the close 
of his life he still identifies with Plato “pouring his scorn on the Athenian democracy—‘the 
charming government, full of variety and disorder, dispensing equality alike to equals and 
unequals’—and hating that set quite as cordially as the writer of the Latter Day Pamphlets hates 
the like of it now.”60 In the Pamphlets Carlyle employs the familiar metaphor of the “ship of 
state” to explain the disjoint between democratic governance and the cosmic law. “[T]he ship, to 
get round Cape Horn will find a set of conditions already voted for, and fixed with adamantine 
rigour by the ancient Elemental Powers, who are entirely careless how you vote.” The tendencies 
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of human nature that circumscribe the moral and political environment are similar to natural 
conditions. What the state requires is a captain who is expert in these laws; it would be mutinous 
and absurd for the crew to assume the helm of politics, especially amidst the stormy sea of 
revolutionary change. Sadly, democracies tend to mutiny in this way, and often the captains they 
choose are more adept at appeasing the crewmen than navigating the sea.  
 This metaphor is obviously meant to show that there is a difference between true and 
false leadership, according to nature. True leadership is statesmanship, false leadership is 
demagoguery. Democracy cannot claim to be a superior form of government on account of its 
institutions alone, because the people may elect either type of leader. In fact, the figure of the 
ship of state warns us that democracy is the regime most inclined to demagoguery, precisely 
because demagogues feed on public approval and honors. The demagogue is the exact type of 
honor-seeker that Carlyle describes: one who would forsake the ship to gratify the crew. The 
demagogue may win the people’s favor easily, by appealing their lowest desires. However, on 
the whole he does the people a disservice by conniving to appease their appetites rather than 
pressing on them the sacrifices and demands of citizenship. The demagogue does himself a 
disservice also, by forsaking genuine virtue to achieve a facile popularity and illusory success. In 
the long run the ship of state will go aground on account of his non-leadership. The fickleness of 
public opinion guarantees that his fame will be fleeting in the long run. In the end the 
demagogue’s spirit would be better compensated by the knowledge of having done a good job 
well. 
 Much like Plato, Carlyle finds that good leadership is an art that depends on the ability to 
discern what is good and prudent. Ideally, “wise” individuals who have such vision ought to rule 
over the “ignorant” whose insight is dimmer. Of course this aristocratic standard is very hard to 
meet in practice; but like Plato, Carlyle refuses to reject it to join the growing chorus of hurrahs 
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for democracy. Much of the “doctrine of the hero” may be interpreted Carlyle’s restatement of 
the ancient notion that the wise should rule. Ernest Barker attests as much: 
 
[Carlyle’s] love of ordered rhythm is Platonic. The criticism of democracy, as a thing 
unstable and nugatory, is again Platonic. The Hero of Carlyle is the Philosopher King of 
Plato. Both opposed to democracy, Plato and Carlyle are none the less both radicals, 
anxious to pluck up society by the roots and plant it afresh in new soil... As Plato 
denounces in the Gorgias the shams and simulacra which usurp the place to truth, so 
Carlyle denounces in Sartor Resartus the clothes and quackeries which hide the light;... 
Plato denounces oratory ...Carlyle denounces the palavers and talking-shops which 
pretend to be the way of government. Both hasten from the phenomenal world to the 
divine Idea which alone is true...both hope for the realization of that Idea in the realm of 
politics by the hero who has seen and has attained unto wisdom.61 
 
Barker’s comparisons are apt. Yet we should qualify them with the observation that, despite their 
radicalism, both Plato and Carlyle are fully cognizant of the unlikelihood of ever realizing the 
divine Idea in political or practical history. To be sure, they never fail to uphold that the Idea of 
justice is the ultimate bar of moral conduct; but their radicalism consists in just this intellectual 
tenacity, and not in any pragmatic agenda to pull up society by the roots.  
 Carlyle’s immediate predecessor, Rousseau, is another radical whose philosophy set him 
at odds with contemporary civilization. In “The Emergence of a Cross-Cultural Discourse,” 
Wolfgang Iser explains the position of Carlyle as one of the first thinkers to follow Rousseau in 
the genre that was initiated “when Rousseau [argued]...that the arts and sciences had not, in 
actual fact, improved morals but had corrupted them. Such a devastating statement marked the 
beginning of...cultural critique, sparked off by a crisis of culture that had not been in the orbit of 
those who had pleaded the superiority of their own culture over the ancients.”62  
 Rousseau’s notion of incommensurable difference between ancient and modern culture, 
and his subsequent attempt to bridge that difference, opened up a new field of thought. It also 
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foreshadowed the crisis within Western culture that issued in the revolutionary era. The roots of 
postmodern, multi-cultural, discourse lay here in the West’s attempt to communicate with itself, 
and its own bygone culture. Carlyle plays a significant part in this effort. Iser continues: 
 
A past cut off from the present is pushed back into an irredeemable pastness, thus 
inverting the very relationship highlighted in the evolving discourse of history as it had 
grown out of the Querelle [of Ancients and Moderns]. Furthermore, the Industrial 
Revolution divided the very nation into two nations: one that participated in the growing 
wealth, and another that had to bear the hardships. Crisis as a waning belief in a set of 
values–a belief indispensable for the stability of a culture–meant a split within the nation 
that eventually resolved itself into a nation of two cultures.  
 Thomas Carlyle was one of the first intellectuals who not only had forebodings of 
such a situation but gave expression to his fears in order to remedy what the crisis had 
laid bare. The rifts that had opened up in what one had been led to believe was a 
homogenous culture could no longer be closed by the discourse of history, for its inherent 
optimism as regards achieving perfection by progress had been shattered. Consequently, 
a renegotiation between past and present became an issue for Carlyle, which he tried to 
solve by translating the past into the present and also by transposing different cultures 
into his own.63 
 
 There is good reason to believe that Carlyle understands himself as being engaged in a 
literary discourse with Rousseau, in particular. To Carlyle, Rousseau is especially important 
because of the way that Rousseau’s “political evangel” sets civilization against itself. In “The 
Hero as Man of Letters,” Carlyle reiterates the belief that “the French Revolution found its 
Evangelist in Rousseau. His semi-delirious speculations on the miseries of civilised life, the 
preferability of the savage to the civilised, and suchlike, helped well to produce a whole delirium 
in France generally.”64  
 As the French Revolution is the signal event of modern European history, Rousseau’s 
significance radiates far beyond France.  Carlyle sees the revolution as the one solid reality 
amidst a sea of semblance and confusion. “Cost what it may, reigns of terror, horrors of French 
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Revolution or what else, we have to return to truth. Here is a truth, as I said: a Truth clad in 
hellfire, since they would not but have it so!—”65 It may not be understatement to say that 
Carlyle saw the intellectual horizon of modernity embodied in Rousseau and the events that he 
inspired–for better or for worse.  
 Carlyle’s appraisal of Rousseau as a hero is instructive for two reasons: first, because it 
can tell us a great deal about Carlyle’s view of his times; and secondly, because Carlyle’s 
critique of Rousseau is a touchstone for Carlyle’s own social philosophy. By comparing his 
agreements and disagreements with Rousseau, we can gain a better understanding of what is 
“modern” and “anti-modern” in Carlyle’s politics. 
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Chapter Seven: Political Education in On Heroes 
 
Hero-worship would have sounded very strange to those workers and fighters in 
the French revolution. Not reverence for Great Men; not any hope or belief, or 
even wish, that Great Men could again appear in the world! Nature, turned into a 
‘Machine,’ was as if effete now; could not any longer produce Great Men: I can 
tell her, she may give up the trade altogether, then; we cannot do without Great 
Men! But neither do I have any quarrel with that of ‘Liberty and Equality’; with 
the faith that, wise great men being impossible, a level immensity of foolish 
small men would suffice. It was a natural faith then and there. ‘Liberty and 
Equality; no Authority needed any longer. Hero-worship, reverence for such 
Authorities, is itself a falsehood; no more of it! We have had such forgeries, we 
will now trust nothing…. I find this, among other things, in that universal cry of 
Liberty and Equality; and find it very natural, as matters then stood. 
 
Carlyle, On Heroes 
 
 
On Modern Heroes 
In this chapter we shall investigate Thomas Carlyle’s political thought with more depth and 
specificity than previous chapters, paying special attention to the side of Carlyle’s political 
thought that we called his “democratic morality.” Carlyle’s moral convictions, manifested in his 
heroic individualism, stand in tension with his chief political aim, namely the rehabilitation of 
authority. Most of the confusion and difficulty that attends the interpretation of Carlyle’s politics 
can be traced to this basic tension between Carlyle’s belief in the autonomy of the clear-sighted 
individual and his equally powerful recognition of the need for some concrete social authority, 
beyond mere public opinion. Following thinkers like Kant, Rousseau and Goethe.1 Carlyle turns 
inward to find the basis of authority in the moral autonomy of the individual. But for Carlyle, the 
philosophy of moral autonomy—the belief in the infinite moral value of the individual—does not 
underwrite the authority of the collective or general will. Carlyle has little faith in the wisdom of 
public opinion, that “level immensity of foolish small men,” as a guide to political action. Like 
Burke, Carlyle sees tradition as the authentic repository of collective wisdom; and the 
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manifestation of tradition is in customs and habits, not fickle opinion. This extreme philosophical 
and pragmatic distrust of public opinion signals Carlyle’s departure from Rousseau, who 
endorses the sovereignty of the “general will.” Carlyle’s defense of the “minority of one” against 
the whims of public opinion puts him in a class of sympathetic critics of democracy that includes 
thinkers like Tocqueville, J.S. Mill, and of course, Emerson and Nietzsche. 
 Yet this does not disqualify Carlyle as a modern democratic moralist. As Emerson 
observes, Carlyle belongs to a class of modern thinkers and artists who have “effected the 
elevation of what was called the lowest class in the state…. Instead of the sublime and beautiful, 
the near, the low, the common [is] explored and poetized” in their writing.2 
 
This writing is blood-warm. Man is surprised to find that things near are not less beautiful 
and wondrous than things remote. The near explains the far. The drop is a small ocean. A 
man is related to all nature. This perception of the worth of the vulgar is fruitful in 
discoveries. Goethe, in this very thing the most modern of the moderns, has shown us, as 
none ever did, the genius of the ancients.3 
 
Carlyle’s lectures on Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History is our central text. In 
Heroes, Carlyle, too, looks to Goethe as the chief writer of the age, the first of the moderns: 
 
I consider that, for the last hundred years, by far the notablest of all Literary Men 
is…Goethe. To that man too, in a strange way, there was given what we may call a life in 
the Divine Idea of the World; vision of the inward divine mystery: and strangely, out of 
his Books, the world rises imaged once more as godlike, the workmanship and temple of 
a God…. Our chosen specimen of the Hero as Literary Man would be this Goethe…. 
[For] I consider him to be a true Hero: heroic in what he said and did, and perhaps still 
more in what he did not say and did not do; to me a noble spectacle: a great heroic 
ancient man, speaking and keeping silence as an ancient Hero, in the guise of a high-bred, 
high-cultivated Man of Letters!4 
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On Heroes is a representative volume, not only because it resonates Carlyle’s Goethe-inspired 
elevation of the common. Heroes also gives voice to Carlyle’s assembled views on crucial 
political topics such as the meaning of liberty; the historical role of democracy; the perennial 
necessity of leadership; the relation between liberty and authority; and the relation between 
politics and religion. Throughout Heroes, Carlyle variously relates these topics to one another to 
compose a complete, if not systematic, vision of modernity. 
 Perhaps some more explanation is in order before we proceed to speak for “Carlyle the 
democrat.” To anyone familiar with the literature on Carlyle, “Carlyle the democrat” may seem a 
strange, even suspicious, persona. In particular, that portion of scholarship which does weigh in 
on Carlyle’s politics tends to depict the “prophet” and “sage” more as an authoritarian than a 
democrat. Carlyle has been labeled everything from arch-fascist arch-socialist. Owing to his 
political-philosophical radicalism and his polemical stance towards democratic institutions, he is 
rarely counted among the intellectual cheerleaders for liberal democracy.  
 To be sure, in Carlyle’s measurement, modern democratic institutions are unequal to the 
chief political task of forming the character of citizens. The sense in which he regards democracy 
as “anarchy,” “no-government,” inadequate to the needs of subjects and insensitive to the duties 
of rulers, is expressed unequivocally in a passage like this one, from the Latter Day Pamphlets: 
 
Alas, on this side of the Atlantic and on that, Democracy, we apprehend, is forever 
impossible! So much, with certainty of loud astonished contradiction from all manner of 
men at present, but with sure appeal to the Law of Nature and the ever-abiding Fact, may 
be suggested and asserted once more. The Universe itself is a Monarchy and Hierarchy; 
large liberty of “voting” there, all manner of choice, utmost free-will; but with conditions 
inexorable and immeasurable annexed to every exercise of the same. A most free 
commonwealth of “voters,” but with Eternal Justice enforced by Almighty Power!5 
 
This summary indictment of democracy contains the germ of all Carlyle’s reactionary affinities. 
For Carlyle, democracy is “impossible” if it means that mere devices such as ballot-boxes, 
declarations of right, or theories of government are capable of overruling the eternal law of 
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nature. Democracy is impossible, especially, if it suborns the fantasy that by such conventions 
the winds of public opinion can topple the monarchical edifice of fact; or that leaderless equality 
can produce better governance than loyal hierarchy between leaders and followers based on 
mutual recognition of a higher authority, submission to a common purpose. As we have seen, 
Carlyle characterizes this fallacious enthusiasm for democracy as a rotten fruit of the great 
political, economic and spiritual idol of his age: laissez-faire. 
 
Laissez-faire Revisited  
The philosophy of laissez-faire receives an inordinate amount of scorn in Carlyle’s political 
writings. The apparent reason is that, for Carlyle, this “hands-off” doctrine—a product, 
specifically, of the political economy of capitalism—symbolizes an entire set of social 
phenomena peculiar to the Industrial and Democratic age. More than just an economic principle, 
Carlylean laissez-faire is a synecdoche that characterizes a whole social order. Just as he portrays 
the corrupt aristocracy in economic terms, as false notes of currency, Carlyle satirically chalks up 
their abdication of noblesse oblige to the logical consequences of the laissez-faire creed.  
 In a manner befitting the modern prophet, Carlyle conceives of laissez-faire as a sort of 
gospel, an account of moral truth that aspires to hegemony over everyday, practical life. Carlyle 
declares this modern “Mammon-Gospel” to be hopelessly inadequate, and urges its speedy 
demise. He summarizes:  
 
In brief, all this…of Supply-and-demand, Competition, Laissez-faire, and Devil take the 
hindmost, begins to be one of the shabbiest Gospels ever preached; or altogether the 
shabbiest. Even with Dilettante Partridge-nets, and at horrible expenditure of pain, who 
shall regret to see the entirely transient, and at best somewhat despicable life strangled 
out of it?... Leave all to egoism, to ravenous greed of money, of pleasure, of applause:—it 
is the Gospel of Despair. Man is a Patent-Digester, then: only give him Free Trade, Free 
digesting-room; and each of us digest what he can come at, leaving the rest to Fate!6 
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Carlyle connects laissez-faire to all of the other despairing-gospels of the eighteenth century 
such as skepticism, materialism and atheism. For Carlyle, these hopeless creeds reflect the most 
“unbelieving” era in all of history; “such an ocean of sordid nothingness, shams, and scandalous 
hypocrisies, as never weltered in the world before.”7 
 It is proper that all these philosophies, so odious to the Sage, should be classified as 
gospels of despair. For, although the philosophical fruits of modern skepticism seem to liberate 
humanity from the oppressive burdens of ignorance and superstition, Carlyle discerns that they 
can do so only by resigning humanity’s fate to the more impersonal, and more inscrutable, forces 
of physical (and psychological) necessity. As Hume finally exposed, modern philosophy denies 
to the intellect any capacity for genuine knowledge regarding either the causes or purposes of 
things. In this view, man hardly can understand, let alone affect, his own destiny. Carlyle sees 
democracy and laissez-faire as social and economic concomitants of modern skepticism. 
Accordingly, these beliefs turn over the direction of human life to abstract causes—public 
opinion, the “general will,” or the invisible hand of the market, for example—mysterious 
invisible mechanisms the operation of which man can speculate about, but never understand. 
 This is not to say that Carlyle rejects modern ideas entirely. As we have seen, he takes a 
complex view of modernity, affirming the need to clear away the metaphysical dead weight of 
the past, while denying that modern philosophy contains in itself the resources to overcome its 
own skepticism. Appropriately, this relationship plays itself out in Carlyle’s own biography: in 
his early attraction to the philosophical radicals, the Utilitarians, and his later rejection of 
Benthamism as “an eyeless heroism.”8 Utilitarianism represents a noble attempt to ameliorate 
man’s estate, but one that fails ultimately, for want of insight. The amelioration of physical 
misery, however desirable, is not enough to satisfy man’s moral nature. For man is not a “Patent-
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Digester” but a rational and spiritual being whose ultimate satisfaction lay in fulfillment of the 
soul, not the stomach. 
Because of his tendency to indulge in pessimistic harangues, it may be hard to keep in 
mind that, in fact, Carlyle insists that the world is a place of hope. But only by recalling this 
point can we fully appreciate Carlyle’s abiding fear that the mechanistic fatalisms of modern 
philosophy would eventually obscure man’s inner, moral, nature from view. As he would 
reiterate to Emerson, Carlyle considers it the chief task of his century to correct these fatalisms 
by ushering in a new era of belief. Carlyle’s view of the hero is motivated in important ways by 
this sense of historical duty. Time and again his heroic figures emerge from a chaotic scene: 
Beginning in a “minority of one,” the hero bears the standard of invisible order like a divine 
missionary, to stake its claim in the everyday world. One by one the restless souls of common 
men come to see in this order the true path to moral and spiritual freedom. Freedom, for Carlyle, 
means answering to the call of moral reality, one’s duty; which, if one cannot always determine 
it for oneself, one can learn from the example of a wise leader or teacher.  
We have seen that Carlyle is among the first to regard the French Revolution not as a 
beginning, but as the end of the reign of enlightenment ideas. Ironically, it is the very attempt to 
put the enlightenment into practice that erodes its claim to improve in all respects on the ancient 
condition of man. Just as the Revolution visited wrath on the decadent aristocrats, the ensuing 
Terror proved the bankruptcy of enlightenment “theories of politics” for producing the kind of 
moral leadership necessary to rebuild from the ashes a nation that nearly destroyed itself. Not the 
intellectual “man of letters,” but the clever, scheming and industrious Bonaparte emerges as hero 
in this context; seizing the authority king from a republic incapable of directing its own affairs. 
Of course, Napoleon’s brand of heroism hardly rises to the standard set by most of 
Carlyle’s historical heroes. Frankly, it is hard today for the moralist to think of Napoleon as a 
great leader, let alone a great teacher. Indeed, in Carlyle’s view Napoleon ceases to be a hero in 
his own lifetime, as soon as he begins to employ falsehoods for the sake of his own glory and to 
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the detriment of his country. That Napoleon can be seen as a hero at all indicates how seriously 
Carlyle frets over the modern crisis of authority, however.  
The failure of eighteenth-century social theory can be traced to its propensity to neglect 
the human element of tradition and to rely instead on mechanical abstractions, as if society is a 
simple machine that will go on successfully with only self-interest to fuel it. This may be true 
within the circumscribed limits of economic theory. However, the important thing to recognize is 
that when Carlyle attacks laissez-faire he does not intend an economic policy; he does not even 
think of it primarily as an economic policy but rather as a major abandonment of custom that is 
bound to produce a new way of life, a new set of habits. In this sense Carlyle agrees with 
Rousseau’s basic position that the problems of political economy cannot be answered on their 
own terms, but must be seen from the perspective of a broader political philosophy.  
 
The Hero as King Revisited 
For both Carlyle and Rousseau, the historic shift that classical political economy reflects—the 
shift from the household to the state as the basic unit of production and distribution—calls for a 
re-conceptualization of paternal authority. In pursuit of this modern paternalism Carlyle, like 
Rousseau, attempts to renovate the ancient notion of the king as father of the people. More 
importantly, they both construct a new the role for the author as legislator, and for texts as moral 
and political institutions. But unlike Rousseau, who, within his text, identifies the king with the 
great legislator, Carlyle stresses the heroic side of kingship. In other words Carlyle puts the 
author before the text, while Rousseau puts the text before the author. 
As we saw earlier, heroic authority relies not only on the science of legislation but on 
strength of soul. Strength of soul is a personal quality that supports an authority different in kind 
from that of the collective wisdom embodied in traditions and institutions. In relation to the 
political wisdom for legislation, one may say that in a “great legislator” both qualities are 
present, more or less. Yet a tension must be recognized as well, between the personal authority 
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of strength of soul and the collective wisdom of the nomoi. Philosophers, in all ages, extol the 
superior virtues of the law as an impartial instrument of justice, yet philosophers also have 
observed the law’s greatest shortcoming: being composed of generalizations, the law cannot 
speak to every particular case. Strength of soul is that equanimity of character which allows the 
clear-sighted judge to assert that the law is inadequate, in those cases where it errs. This 
exceptional quality informs Carlyle’s portrait of the hero as an iconoclast, a minority of one. As 
an antidote to the modern fatalisms that Carlyle so deplores—laws of motion, laws of history, 
laws of interest—often the Carlylean hero figures the adversary of vulgar scientism:  
 
Napoleon lived in an age when God was no longer believed; the meaning of all Silence, 
Latency, was thought to be Nonentity: he had to begin not out of the Puritan Bible, but 
out of poor Sceptical Enclyclopedies… 
 Yet Napoleon had a sincerity: we are to distinguish between what is superficial 
and what is fundamental in insincerity. Across these outer manoeuverings and quackeries 
of his, which were many and most balamable, let us discern withal that the man had a 
certain instinctive ineradicable feeling for reality; and did base himself upon fact, so long 
as he had any basis. He has an instinct of nature better than his culture was. His savans, 
Bourrienne tells us, in that voyage to Egypt, were one evening busily occupied arguing 
that there could be no God. They had proved it, to their satisfaction, by all manner of 
logic. Napoleon looking up into the stars answers, ‘Very ingenious, Messieurrs: but who 
made all that?’ The Atheistic logic runs-off from him like water; the great Fact stares him 
in the face: ‘Who made all that?’ So too in Practice: he, as every man that can be great, or 
have victory in this world, sees, through all entanglements, the practical heart of the 
matter; drives straight towards that.9 
 
We have only to look to Luther for another obvious example; but nearly every Carlylean 
hero constitutes a faithful “minority of one” at some point or another. From this position the 
heroic individual stands in lonely opposition to the law: the law of physical nature; the law of 
tradition; the law of interests. The hero may not be the only soul who sees through the 
shortcomings of the law to the practical heart of the matter, but he is the only one with the 
audacity to stand up against it. “Luther did what every man that God has made has not only the 
right, but lies under the sacred duty, to do: answered a Falsehood when it questioned him, Dost 
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thou believe me?—No!—At what cost soever, without counting of costs, this thing behoved to 
be done.”10 
The prophetic persona of the hero as a “Breaker of Idols”11 is underplayed drastically in 
Rousseau’s account of the hero as legislator. Carlyle, on the other hand, celebrates this 
revolutionary aspect of heroism; even as he tries, like Rousseau, to confine its effects within the 
text. While the Carlylean hero’s silent allegiance lay with the invisible reality of moral order, he 
may be obliged, precisely on this account, to wrestle with semblances, and speak up against 
worldly institutions that claim to represent this order falsely. Carlyle commemorates Luther as “a 
Christian Odin,—a right Thor once more, with his thunder-hammer, to smite asunder ugly 
enough Jotuns and Giant-monsters [of semblance]!”12  
Thus, iconoclasm plays an important role in the drama of history as Carlyle conceives it. 
It is safe to say that Carlyle interprets this drama from a religious point of view. There are two 
interconnected and recurring conflicts in Carlyle’s history: On the one hand there is a conflict 
between belief and unbelief; on the other hand, there is a tension between spirit and matter. For 
Carlyle, an age of belief approximates an ideal condition in which material practices are 
consonant with spiritual insights. “Material practices”—customs and habit of life—are the same 
as laws in the broadest sense. In an age of belief, the letter of the law is consonant with its spirit. 
But how does one know whether everyday practices are in accord with spiritual truth? Although 
Carlyle steadfastly refuses to express spiritual truth in a dogmatic form, we have seen that he 
does define this phenomenally, as the state of “unconsciousness.”13 What Carlyle means by 
“unconsciousness” is un-self-consciousness, an enmity towards egotism at the level of basic 
motivations. Its opposite is psychological egotism, self-consciousness, Rousseauean amor-
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propre. Carlyle argues that excessive self-consciousness, or egoistic individualism, is a sure sign 
of disease in both souls and societies. Belief, then, is moral and psychological healthiness. 
 
The Religion of Literature Revisited 
Carlyle, like Rousseau, criticizes modern political thought for its failure to resolve the moral 
problems engendered by enlightenment rationalism. Where rationalism fails, Carlyle turns to 
religion for the moral adhesive necessary to bind individuals together in a community. However, 
following Rousseau and more especially Goethe, Carlyle’s religion is not traditional religion, but 
the so-called religion of literature. The central “sacraments” of the religion of literature are the 
habits of private reading and personal interpretation. Hence, from the beginning, the religion of 
literature faces an insurmountable obstacle. As we shall see, Carlyle is not oblivious to this 
problem but demonstrates sensitivity to the tragic flaws of the text as a moral institution, and the 
inherent shortcomings of writing as a type of action. Nevertheless, in spite of these 
shortcomings, Carlyle takes up the vocation of author in response to his insight into “the 
practical heart of the matter.” The world of private readers is and will remain a world of 
individuals; and the highest aspiration of this world is the seemingly paradoxical goal of a heroic 
individualism: “not abolition of Hero-Worship, but rather what I would call a whole World of 
Heroes. If Hero mean sincere man, why may not every one of us be a Hero?”14 
 The modern virtue of sincerity is Carlyle’s inheritance from Jean Jacques Rousseau. 
Rousseau identifies the moral corruption of civilization as the result of mankind’s increasing 
dependence on artifice. Sincerity means faithfulness to one’s nature over and against the demand 
of conformity to convention. Significantly, Carlyle’s and Rousseau’s renovation of civil religion 
is motivated by much the same concerns. Rousseau, like Carlyle, claims that the moral resources 
of modern philosophy are inadequate to the most comprehensive aim of politics—building the 
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character of good citizens. We have lost sight of the demands and rewards of good character in 
our feverish modern pursuit of commodious living: the main objective of modern political 
philosophy, and its offspring, political economy. 
Thus Rousseau attempts to correct the deficiency of political economy by renovating the 
ancient institution of civil religion. Earlier we saw that the figure of the “great legislator” and the 
institution of the civil religion form one half of Rousseau’s science of politics. Although Carlyle 
is ambivalent in his estimation of the ultimate worth of Rousseau’s political philosophy, he 
refuses to dismiss Rousseau’s achievement entirely. The undeniable achievement of Rousseau’s 
revolutionary “gospel” lay in its recognition that a gospel is necessary at all. If Carlyle cannot 
approve of Rousseau’s theory of government in its specifics, he can applaud Rousseau for 
unmasking the moral failing of rationalism. 
 Rousseau discovered that modern rationalism, proceeding unrelentingly by the analytical 
method, fails to give a compelling basis to moral or political authority but instead constantly 
undercuts its own conclusions. As Rousseau’s contemporary Hume had discovered (albeit in a 
different way) the analytical method finally yields to radical epistemological skepticism 
regarding all sorts of causes and first principles.15 The eventual result of modern rationalism, 
which takes as its foundation the doubting mind of the individual, is total collapse the world of 
meaning into the groundlessness of the individual mind. The cases of Rousseau and Hume 
demonstrate two alternative reactions to this discovery. For Hume meaning is externalized as 
pure syntax. And Rousseau, as Carlyle, and more recently, Jean Starobinski, describe him, is 
“intense.” As Rousseau himself claims, each individual is a world unto himself. All meaning is 
personal and the translation of personal languages may be impossible. In another context we saw 
that Carlyle demonstrates Rousseau’s intensity in terms of his constitutional inability to live with 
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others. Starobinski offers a more succinct diagnosis of Rousseau’s intensity, explaining how it 
relates to his religion of self-identity and his practice of authorship: 
 
Jean-Jacques decides to write and to hide. But he writes only in anticipation of the 
miraculous moment when words will cease to be necessary, and he hides only in the hope 
that there will come a time when he will only have to show himself in order to be 
recognized. In Rousseau’s mind ‘the detour of words’ is in fact a circular route, ending in 
a moment that resembles the primordial one before any words were uttered. Ideally the 
return ends all misunderstandings…. It is a rebirth…a new beginning, a reawakening. 
Under Rousseau’s pen, language denied the world of others: I am not like you, I do not 
recognize your values. But the moment of return denies this negative language. The 
writer’s absence, his exile in literature, is converted into a mute presence…. Words are 
abolished, leaving behind, in a pure state, what language was intended to prove, namely, 
Jean-Jacques’s innocence, truthfulness and uniqueness.16 
 
Clearly Rousseau’s religion of self-intensity—and consequently Carlyle’s—bears the lasting 
impression of modern philosophy. Although the two thinkers take quite different approaches to 
religion, both of them seek to preserve a residue of the doubt and ambiguity regarding ultimate 
things that reflects the uniqueness of individual experience. 
 What differentiates Carlyle’s approach to the religion of literature from Rousseau’s? The 
answer to this question is implicit in the “clothes-philosophy,” which is primarily a philosophy 
of language, custom and habit. (Carlyle intentionally plays on the double meaning of “habit,” as 
both garment and custom.) Carlyle demonstrates a different understanding of the limits of 
language. Instead of harboring Rousseau’s “Adamitic” illusion that transparent communication is 
possible, or even desirable, Carlyle likens language to clothing, and characterizes clothing as a 
sort of second skin.  
In the guise of his alter-ego, the German Idealist Teufelsdrockh, Carlyle flirts with 
Rousseau’s Adamism, but in the guise of the English Editor, Carlyle qualifies this radical view: 
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What, have we got not only a Sanscullotist, but an enemy of Clothes in the abstract? A 
new Adamite, in this century, which flatters itself that it is the Nineteenth, and destructive 
both to Superstition and Enthusiasm? 
Consider, thou foolish Teufelsdrockh, what benfits unspeakable all ages and sexes 
derive from clothes. For example, when thou thyself, a watery, pulpy, slobbery freshmen 
and newcomer in this Planet, sattest muling and puking in thy nurse’s arms…what hadst 
thou been, without thy blankets, and bibs, and other nameless hulls? A terror to thyself 
and mankind! ...Nay, now when the reign of folly is over, or altered, and thy clothes are 
not for triumph but for defence, hast thou always worn them perforce, and as a 
consequence of Man’s Fall; never rejoiced in them as in a warm moveable House, a Body 
round thy Body, wherein that strange THEE of thine sat snug, defying all variations of 
climate? 
…the truth is, Teufelsdrockh, though a Sanscullotist, is no Adamite: and much 
perhaps as he might wish to go forth before this degenerate age “as a Sign,” would 
nowise wish to do it, as those old Adamites did, in a state of Nakedness. The utility of 
clothes is altogether apparent to him: nay perhaps he has an insight into their more 
recondite, and almost mystic qualities, what we might call the omnipotent virtue of 
Clothes, such as was never before vouchsafed to any man.17 
 
It is important to take note that what Carlyle says of textiles applies equally, if not 
primarily, to texts. In contrast to Carlyle’s equanimity, Rousseau makes paradoxical demands of 
his texts. For example, in the Social Contract, Rousseau burdens his civil religion with the task 
of reconciling the true religion of the individual with the indispensable necessity of a public 
dogma. The civil religion itself takes the form of a number of articles of basic law, to which 
citizens must assent in public or face severe penalty. Rousseau does not endorse coercive force 
lightly, but his willingness to do so here, reflects his confidence that close adherence to the text 
will supply the excesses of self-preference, leading to the worthy result of ethically autonomous 
individuality.  
At the same time as Rousseau discovers the inadequacy of modern political philosophy—
in the essay on Political Economy—he expresses a belief that the Law as the exclusive voice of 
the authority of the community:  
 
How can it happen that men obey without having anyone above them to issue commands, 
that they serve without having a master, that they are all the freer when each of them, 
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acting under an apparent compulsion, loses only that part of his freedom with which he 
can injure others? These wonders are the work of the Law. It is to Law alone that men 
owe justice and liberty; it is this salutary organ of the will of all that makes obligatory the 
natural equality between men; it is this heavenly voice that dictates to each citizen the 
precepts of public reason, and teaches him to act in accordance with the maxims of his 
own judgment, and not to be in contradiction to himself.18 
 
For Carlyle, by contrast, the appeal to the law stands in need of supplement, namely, by 
an appeal to judgment. Accordingly, Carlyle recognizes a perennial difference between the law 
and the legislator-as-judge. This is not to say that Carlyle rejects the rule of law; yet, he 
recognizes an excess in a Rousseauean appeal to the authoritative text. “Thus unreliable as a 
means of contact between the mind and externality, words are not to be unduly revered: ‘Be not 
the slave of Words.’”19 Carlyle’s revelation of great souls aims to correct the appeal to 
authoritative words. For men make language, even as language makes men. 
 
Reverence as a Corrective to Titanism 
Hence, it is safe to say that, when Carlyle praises the character of Mohammad he has no 
intention of converting his audience to Islam. What, then, was his purpose? What in the voice of 
Mohammad so resonated with Carlyle that it emboldened him to proclaim the founder of a 
(potentially rival) religion, nation and empire, as a hero? Carlyle does not want to turn out 
Islamists, Catholics, Bardolaters, Protestants, Presbyterians, Puritans, Encyclopedists, Neo-
Adamists, or anything else—including of course “Carlyleans.” But who can doubt that Carlyle 
sees himself as a public evangelical, intent on proselytizing individual souls that they might 
become heroic, “sincere men, believing men”? This leads us to a question of pressing 
significance: what is the nature of Carlyle’s belief in belief? 
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To comprehend the sensationalism of Carlyle’s defense of Mohammad, it helps to recall 
that the prevailing image of Mohammad at the time was one of a quack and a charlatan. Carlyle’s 
effort to correct this image of the Prophet resembles his similar efforts on behalf of Cromwell, 
the protector; he undertakes to renovate a monumental historical figure, for no evident purpose 
but to return the figure to its due place in History’s pantheon, repaired of the distortions, gross 
magnifications and corrosive diminutions that come along with human tradition. Beneath all the 
disfigurement, Carlyle discovers that the heroism of Mohammad consists not in his adherence to 
“Mohammadenism” but in his character as a devout man. Of course Carlyle does not hide from 
his audience his own misgivings about the Islamic faith. Yet, he implores his listeners: “Call it 
not false; look not at the falsehood of it, look at the truth of it.”20 The truth that Carlyle invokes 
in this context is neither esoteric nor mystical, nor scriptural, but pragmatic: “For these twelve 
centuries, it has been the religion and life-guidance of the fifth part of the whole kindred of 
Mankind. Above all things, it has been a religion heartily believed.”21 
The prevailing attitude of the learned towards the pragmatic “belief in belief,” endorsed 
by thinkers of such questionable philosophical credentials as Carlyle and Emerson, is marked by 
anxiety and regarding its possible abuse, unintended or undesirable consequences. On the one 
hand, there is concern that a vague belief in belief conduces to loose discipline in the regime of 
religious discipline. On the other hand, belief in belief threatens to undermine the philosophic 
discipline of critical thinking in such a way that it may induce backsliding towards pernicious 
provincialism, or whole-hog fundamentalism. Such concerns are not without foundation. The 
postulate of a “will to believe”22 appears to some as covert way to bring in theological dogma 
through the back-door; to others, as an invitation to irrational fanaticism. To a few, the belief in 
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belief may subtend chilling images of twentieth-century ideological nightmares; German 
Fascism perhaps the first among a host of movements that abused the philosophy of volition in 
quasi-religious ways.  
These movements built on the fragments of the culture that allegedly was dissected by the 
Enlightenment, “aesthetic” political religions, as a mechanism for mobilizing the masses behind 
their self-destructive agendas. But the singular moral failure lurking behind all these atrocities is 
the failure of judgment; that weakness, incapacity or shallowness of character which, amputating 
the moral legs from the rational being, makes it impossible to take an ethical stand when it is 
necessary. For two difficulties already inhere in any moral judgment. The first is that one has to 
be free to judge. That this is an impossible demand—that no one is free from sin—is clear from 
the familiar proverb “judge not, lest ye be judged.” Yet, on the practical scene befalls a multitude 
of moments that call for our judgment, and often demand it. There is no way to exit this arena of 
decision without abdicating one’s freedom. This, then, adumbrates the second difficulty; that 
being free means making judgments. Hence, when first we judge we begin to err. 
Carlyle is sensitive both to the impossibility and the necessity of passing judgment upon 
others. Being a moralist at heart, the fact is that Carlyle’s turn to the heroic is not motivated by 
sinister intentions or reactionary fears; but by his confidence in the individual person, grounded 
in the personal religious experience of God as the true aim of “transcendent admiration.” At first 
this claim may seem too bold. Once correct the Great Misperception—that Carlyle, despairing 
anarchy, collapsed before the idols of authority and force, and mistakenly finding the divine 
essence embodied in Great Men, fell prostrate in “hero-worship”—and the plausibility of this 
claim increases. First, then, let us secure an antidote to the Great Misperception that Carlyle 
believes in the saving power of Titanic Men. The antidote is this: It is not that Carlyle desires 
Titanic Men; rather, he diagnoses the whole condition of modern humanity as Titanic. Without 
abandoning the belief in human nature, indeed, by relying on it as a guide to interpretation, 
Carlyle divines the following: 
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The truth is, men have lost their belief in the Invisible, and believe, and hope, and work 
only in the Visible; or, to speak it in other words: this is not a Religious age….The 
infinite, absolute character of Virtue has passed into a finite, conditional one…a 
calculation of the Profitable. Worship…is not recognized among us, or is mechanically 
explained into Fear of pain, or Hope of pleasure. Our true Deity is Mechanism. It has 
subdued external nature for us, and we think it will do all other things. We are Giants in 
physical power: in a deeper than metaphorical sense, we are Titans, that strive, by 
heaping mountain on mountain, to conquer Heaven also.23 
 
With certain grief, the modern prophet confirms the arrival of the mechanistic dispensation: 
Titanic man, wielding the ersatz-divine thunderbolt of Natural Science, now dominates and 
controls physical nature. What is more, Titanic man’s newfound power—like the indifferent laws 
of mechanism that lay behind it—is unrestricted by consideration of mere humanity. Titanic man 
may dispose of his thunderbolt at will; he has only to extend his limbs.  
From this it follows that “freedom,” understood as independence from physical nature, is 
another of the signs of the times. In his philosophy/rhetoric of freedom, Carlyle follows 
Rousseau and Kant (and lays some rhetorical ground for Marx), when he predicts that the aim of 
this “boundless grinding collision of the New with the Old,” of which the French Revolution 
“was not the parent…but its offspring,” portends a “higher freedom” than mere “Political 
freedom…freedom from oppression.”  However, instead of sketching a formal theory of moral 
freedom akin to Rousseau’s account of the General Will, Carlyle vaguely defines this “higher, 
heavenly freedom” at which the world “dimly aims” as “man’s reasonable service”24—a goal he 
restates in Heroes in terms of Napoleon’s Revolutionary faith, la carriere aux les talents.  
The philosophical rationale behind Carlyle’s dismissal of eighteenth-century “theory” in 
favor of figurative language lay in his sense that the theoretical—literally, “spectatorial”—mode 
of viewing nature does not accord with the social reality of life as active participation in a 
community of meaning, of shared meaning, more or less. To be sure, Titanic man’s incredible 
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sway over the physical world results precisely from exploiting the Archimedean perspective of 
theory to the limit. However, in this Archimedean aspect, the theoretical perspective is blind to 
pragmatic differences: it scrutinizes, criticizes, schematizes, generalizes, universalizes and 
quantifies everything, at the by now well-known cost of atomizing a reality that is given to 
experience as a whole. Moreover, spectator-consciousness abstracts the rational from the moral 
in life.   
Few can doubt that our physical life has become safer and more pleasant on account of 
“mechanism,” and practically no one will deny that it is good to feel safe and pleasant.25 But the 
application of mechanical technique to the life of the person in a community portends not 
commodious but reductive consequences. Carlyle foresees and criticizes the temptation, arising 
from physical success, to apply the methods of mechanism to the moral world, to man’s soul. 
 
On the whole, as this wondrous planet, Earth, is journeying with its fellows through 
infinite Space, so are the wondrous destinies embarked on it journeying through infinite 
Time, under a higher guidance than ours. For the present, as our astronomy informs us, 
its path lies towards Hercules, the constellation of Physical Power: but that is not our 
most pressing concern. Go where it will, the deep HEAVEN will be around it. Therein let 
us have hope and sure faith. To reform a world, to reform a nation, no wise man will 
undertake; and all but foolish men know, that the only solid, though a far slower 
reformation, is what each begins and perfects on himself.26 
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Personal Integrity as a Corrective to “Mechanism” 
For Carlyle the success of the scientific and industrial revolutions, and more especially that of 
the print revolution, render impossible any return to the tribal condition in which community 
meant collective identity. In other words, Carlyle recognizes individualism as a social fact. 
Carlyle’s defense of monumental figures like Mohammad and Cromwell amounts to a defense of 
their integrity. This should remind us that the overwhelming purpose of the “great man theory” 
of history is to correct the misperceptions of the “fanatic-hypocrite” theory. For the fanatic-
hypocrite hypothesis explains human action in mechanical rather than moral terms. Under the 
influence of this skeptical point of view, it becomes impossible to answer a question that 
nevertheless confronts the person at all times in this mortal life: “In whom do I place my trust?” 
Carlyle never wavers in the conviction that the true answer to this question is “God.” The 
substance of freedom lay in divine trust. Carlyle’s aim, then, is to defend the God of history and 
nature against the idols of natural science and vulgar scientism. In practice this results in an 
opposition to the “hermeneutics of suspicion,”27 and adherence to a hermeneutics of trust. 
Equally important, however, is that Carlyle does not reject the empirical truth of science. 
To the contrary, he proposes an alternative “universal history” based on what he sees as an 
empirically self-evident human capacity for “transcendent admiration” or practically limitless 
love. The follies of the history of religion result from misunderstanding the transcendent object 
of this love, specifically, from mistaking men for gods. Whereas the fanatic-hypocrite theory 
explains hero-worship from the outside, transcendent admiration explains it from the inside, on 
the basis of dives and emotions that are familiar to experience. These include the desire to have 
one’s wishes fulfilled, to overcome the fear of others, and to feel secure in one’s sense of moral 
reality, of duty. A historical science that reduces all human motives to self-preservation cannot 
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 The “Law of the Suspect,” on which Carlyle speculates in his French Revolution, is a possible Carlylean 
parallel to the hermeneutics of suspicion, with an implied connection to Rousseau. See Carlyle, The French 
Revolution, IV, vi. 
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account for the evident fact that human beings actually experience self-transcending passion. 
Denying this possibility at the outset, historical “materialism” begs the question, and tacitly 
commits itself to the view that phenomena of courage, self-sacrifice and saintly discipline are so 
many quaint “absurdities.” Carlyle rejects this view on empirical grounds. The religious impulse 
is not absurd, nor is it inaccessible to the reasonable mind. To the contrary, he suggests that the 
religious impulse expresses itself first through the natural feeling of wonder at a nature that is 
both beautiful and terrible. Secondly, recognition of the man’s moral nature is the culmination of 
religious insight. To the eye of analysis nature may be an infinitely divisible thing. But our 
ability to experience creation as creation, to love and revere physical and moral nature as no 
other creature can, is a datum of our participation in the very highest level of reality. This innate 
capacity to recognize nature as creation and God as its Creator and designer evinces the divine 
spark in man’s soul. 
Thus the fanatic-hypocrite theory deserves ridicule not because it is demonstrably false, 
or true—after all, it is non-falsifiable—but because it flies in the face of common experience, 
rendering the greatest things the smallest. Moreover, it valorizes the pursuit of convenience and 
wont of conviction characteristic of self-seeking “valet-souls.” Is there really no difference 
between the satisfaction of a den-dwelling animal and that of a philosopher? Were men really so 
benighted in the past, to have preferred immortal virtue or eternal grace over the interminable 
quest for creature comfort? Carlyle does not reject, but rather agrees that in the perspective of 
history great men shrink down to merely human proportions. Nevertheless, he rejects the 
implication that great men are merely acquisitive egoists, “valet-souls,” instruments of their 
circumstances at best, at worst, merely more clever than the rest of us at securing the ultimate 
goods of secular life. This reinforces the view that the root of “universal human nature” is 
psychological egoism, the biological imperative of self-preservation and its inescapable 
corollary, the unending pursuit of convenience. It reinforces Voltaire’s mundane definition of 
universal humanity; namely, that we all have the same vital organs, sensibility, and movement. 
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Carlyle denies this egoistic materialism not because he wants to dethrone the principle of 
“individualism” it claims to represent; for, he is no collectivist. He means to defend the dignity 
of persons against any shallow interpretation of individualism that would reduce man to his 
boorish appetites. Any reader of Heroes who can see past the anachronistic bogeyman of “proto-
fascism” hardly can doubt that Carlyle neither regards nor recommends Cromwell and Napoleon 
as terrestrial gods before whom we ought to fall prostrate in “transcendent admiration.” Indeed, 
that would be closer to Hegel’s view.28  
Despite that, often, Carlyle’s best critics fall prey the tendency to view him through 
Hegelian spectacles, Carlyle is no Hegelian; his character Teufelsdrockh was to write a refutation 
of Hegel. The tendency to see Carlyle as a Hegelian informs two misunderstandings of the 
“universal history” the Carlyle essays in Heroes, both of which contradict the sense of his text. 
The first overemphasizes the role of historical progress, while the second reinforces the 
deification of Carlyle’s “great men.” With respect to the first tendency, critics assume that 
Carlyle’s opinions on matters of immediate relevance will be found in his final lectures, “The 
Hero as Man of Letters” and “The Hero as King.” We saw one example of this tendency in 
Vanden Bosshe’s view, surveyed earlier, that Carlyle’s final two lectures externalize his inner 
dialogue on the pressing question of authority; and that his final note, “The Hero as King,” 
signals Carlyle’s ultimate choice for armed prophecy over the power of persuasion. Another 
critic, Richard Brantley, objects to this bias, asserting that in fact “The Hero as Man of Letters” 
is the “most pertinent” of Carlyle’s six lectures: “While he admired much of the literature of his 
                                                 
28
 The Hegelian “world-historic individual,” unlike the Carlylean hero, is a “product” of his time as well as 
an indubitable “premise” from which (whom?) ensues the intellectual faith of his temporal dispensation. The world 
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is nothing but a parade of “prejudices”—habits, customs, laws, beliefs, and so on—that are never more than 
approximations of truth. Carlyle’s historical sense is anti-historicist, so to speak, because he sees 1) that truth itself is 
not historically relative; and 2) the apparent relativity of truth is the result of a human fallibility that cuts to the core 
of the human logos. The fallacy of modern scientific materialism derives from the misplaced concreteness it 
attributes to the abstractions (e.g. “motives,” “material interests”) it employs to “theorize” history. If history is part 
of the field of irreducible particularity that, as Aristotle supposes, characterizes human affairs, then no (abstract 
systematic) “knowledge” of history such as Hegel desires is possible. 
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day, he found little other promise of heroes in Victorian Britain.”29 But Brantley reveals a similar 
historicist tendency when he isolates “The Hero as Man of Letters” because it is “closest to its 
historical context,” and proceeds to write off the rest of Heroes because it “addresses itself 
primarily to the nature of greatness in the far past.”30 In fact the lectures form a whole and, in 
particular, the last two lectures ought to be read together: “The Hero as Man of Letters” and “The 
Hero as King” point up the tension between writing-as-action and revolution-as-action, in an 
attempt to show the limits of both. 
Most importantly, the great man theory is a refutation of Hegel’s mechanistic historicism 
and a reflection on man’s most enigmatic ability to make his own world. The great man theory is 
always maligned and grossly misunderstood when this philosophical aim is kept out of sight. 
Then Carlyle comes off as a sort of fanatic-hypocrite himself, who, in the enthusiasm of his 
youth, replaces his native Calvinism with a secularized superstition in great men as the saviors of 
mankind, and then in old age tries to reinforce this withering faith by worshipping at the altar of 
power and writing the histories of state-builders like Frederick the Great. While no one doubts 
that Carlyle has his shortcomings, the proto-fascist caricature unduly obscures the legacy of a 
brilliant political author whom we ignore at our peril. Even if one thinks of Carlyle and his 
legacy—that is, a great deal of our own “Victorian” heritage—as something to be overcome, it is 
folly to presume that dismissing it as authoritarian pathology will suffice. It will not. A more 
serious confrontation with Carlyle reveals a philosophy that is less anachronistic or reactionary 
than the caricatures would lead us to believe. We may even find that the Victorian prophet has 
something yet to say to our time. 
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 Brantley, p. 65. 
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The Prophet 
The popular opinion of Carlyle as nothing but a naïve precursor of fascism stems from a 
misunderstanding of Carlyle’s motivation for pitting belief against doubt or skepticism. Carlyle 
is not the enemy of doubt, nor does he wish to overcome it. Carlyle regards doubt as natural. In 
no way does he recommend the “negation” of doubt through some kind of “irrational” leap. In 
fact, few know better of the horrendous outcome of this kind of revolutionary psychology than 
the author of The French Revolution. Carlyle merely defends belief qua belief. That he does 
nothing more—and nothing less—leads to the ambiguous consequence that he asserting our need 
for a quite specific thing, yet in very general terms. 
A heavy dose of irony, quite foreign to conventional piety, attaches to Carlyle’s moniker 
as the Victorian “prophet.” No one would dare to compare him, or for that matter any mere 
writer, to the founder of a religion. Yet one cannot deny the importance, to Carlyle, of the 
religious dimension of life. More specifically, one cannot doubt Carlyle’s faith in the sovereignty 
of moral virtue, which he takes for the crowning aspect of religion. If Carlyle finally abandons 
institutional Christianity, it is not because he fails to appreciate the role of religion or believes 
that religion is obsolete, but because he sees traces of the religious experience in too many places 
to define faith as one particular creed or institution. As we have suggested, Carlyle’s view of 
religion is pragmatic, not dogmatic. The point of overwhelming importance here is that, 
primarily, Religion is not one’s 
 
church-creed…. We see men of all kinds of professed creeds attain to almost all degrees 
of worth or worthlessness under each or any of them. This is not what I call religion, this 
profession and assertion; which is often only…from the mere argumentative [or logical] 
region of him, if even so deep as that. But the thing a man does practically believe…lay 
to heart, and know for certain, concerning his vital relations to this mysterious Universe, 
and his duty and destiny there, that is in all cases the primary thing for him, and 
creatively determines all the rest.31 
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 On Heroes, pp. 2-3. 
 232 
For Carlyle, then, the question of religion is inseparable from that of value, of “worth or 
worthlessness.” Creeds, just like some ministers, are mere paper currency. However useful and 
indispensable are professions of faith, the gold standard of value is moral action. For at bottom, 
words, like all images or signs are eidola, mere visible husks by means of which an unutterable 
person al meaning excites the moral imagination. In the flowering of time and culture, these 
seeds, actions in the highest sense, grow into the forms of human life—not more words, not 
primarily; but particular habits, institutions, customs, usages. In this belief Carlyle follows his 
“spiritual godfather,” Goethe: In the beginning was not the Word, but the Act. This Goethean 
axiom is a guiding principle of reflection for Carlyle, also. This principle leads away from the 
outer sense to the inner meaning; from word to thought. More specifically, it points toward a 
bottomless generative activity of thinking, a commotion at the limits of consciousness that lay 
underneath the apparent order of language. Constantly, Carlyle returns to the scene of the origin 
of language, to remind the reader that language is a human creation with mysterious, perhaps 
divine, origins. 
All of this is another way of acknowledging that Carlyle is not a “metaphysician.” 
Carlyle “never tried to give more than a ‘Life-Philosophy,’ and he never meant to separate this 
philosophy from his personal experience. In metaphysics as such, as a general system, he could 
see no more than a perennial disease.”32 Carlyle does not deny that metaphysical questions are 
important, nor does he take up a hostile stance towards metaphysical questioning, as if it is an 
obstacle to revolutionary action. Only he insists on the impossibility of achieving metaphysical 
certainty.  
 
What [man] can do and what he ought to do is to understand himself, his destiny and his 
duties. He stands as in the center of nature: ‘his fraction of time encircled by eternity, his 
handbreadth of space encircled by infinitude: how shall he forbear asking himself, What 
am I; and Whence; and Whither?’33 
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Psychologically, it is impossible that a person should act without revealing some indemonstrable 
belief answering to these ultimate questions of the meaning of action. Whether I decide that it is 
for me to fear and avoid pain, accordingly to pursue and hope for pleasure; or alternatively, if I 
regard considerations of both pleasure and pain, profit and loss, as of relative insignificance in 
the light of a good that transcends my mortal body, say, hope of eternal life, in either case I 
cannot escape belief in the practical sense of having settled upon an idea of the good that will 
inform my active character. Moreover, my capacity to respond to these questions reveals my 
character as a free being. Choosing what one believes—fixing oneself on a notion of goodness, 
or greatness—is the most sovereign capacity of moral being; but note well that the “act” of belief 
is sovereign and free precisely because it “creatively determines all the rest” of one’s character. 
Carlylean “belief” just is the moral foundation upon which persons can produce their own unique 
destinies; not, of course, by subduing human nature, but by establishing the manner in which one 
relates to it. This is the primary sense of “belief,” in this sense Carlyle claims that every person is 
by nature a “believer,” regardless of whether one knowingly chooses to believe at all. “It is well 
said, in every sense, that a man’s [practical] religion is the chief fact with regard to him…(and 
this is often enough without asserting it even to himself, much less to others)…”34  
 For Carlyle belief is the chief fact of a person’s life insofar as human life, moral life, 
necessarily orients itself in an invisible realm of meanings. Carlyle derides modern skepticism as 
“no-belief,” yet it is clear that in this context he does not mean the transcendence or positive 
overcoming of belief, but rather a sort of false consciousness and positive disbelief of the 
invisible. He is critiquing scientism: the skeptical or empirical attitude elevated to the status of 
religious truth. Unlike science, scientism is positively intolerant of the notion of invisible 
meaning; scientism opts for the stomach rather than the soul, the worldly facts of appetite and 
ambition eclipse the spiritual facts that support discipline under the moral law.  
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This does not exhaust the question, as if doubt or skepticism is mere dupery, however. 
That would be too simple; for, Carlyle knows the reality of doubt, not only from his own 
experience but from his observation of contemporary circumstances. He saw the reflection of 
Victorian urbanity as in a moral cesspool. Skepticism as a social force, Carlylean laissez-faire, 
was delivering a fatal blow to traditional religion, and increasingly demanding the rebuilding of 
social relations on its own foundations, a process that still is incomplete. The revelation of man, 
as the maker of his own history, was a fact no thinking mind could ignore, and a value that 
Carlyle the “prophet” undertook to proclaim. 
 Carlyle’s critical insight boils down to this: In history we do not wait for the facts to 
come in. In the nature of history, unlike physical nature, it is man who creates the facts. This is 
not to suggest that man “controls” historical destiny, nor can he; only that, so far as history is a 
humanly intelligible whole and not just a brute succession of events, it reflects a human nature 
that is meaningful. In history as in all fields of moral action, the best judge of how to act is the 
most scrupulous observer of other people’s actions. A certain capacity for disinterested 
observation characterizes all kinds of wisdom: this is what the ancients meant by science. But 
what makes a good observer of history? Is it the actively engaged person or the methodical, 
disinterested spectator? Much hangs on this question. For, if it is true that what happens in 
history is contingent—that there is an irreducible particularity about human pragmata—then 
there can be no historical knowledge of a theoretically demonstrable kind. Rather, what we know 
of specifically human affairs, we know from experience, and that means being out and about: 
participating. Since the only such experience we have is our own, then it is fair to say with 
Carlyle that history is biography. This is another way of saying that the nature of history is 
human: moral, not physical.  
Metaphorically, the creative fact of belief has been portrayed here in terms of the ability 
to found one’s own psychic or moral regime. Classical philosophy, similarly, discovered in this 
the most authentic form of human freedom. In its sovereign capacity to choose virtue, the 
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reasonable moral soul reveals a power that outshines empires and a liberty that defies 
imprisonment. But, for the classical philosophers, reason means more than mere calculation; it 
also includes insight, the ability to see through the ephemera and grasp at the eternal underlying 
truths. 
Before going any farther with our discussion of Carlyle’s moral philosophy, let us pause 
to recall some of the main points of what we have said so far. We took up the question of 
heroism from the perspective of democratic morality. How is it possible to reconcile the 
imperatives of individual freedom and equality, the twin bulwarks of democratic morality, with 
the classical insistence on sovereign virtue? Is it possible at all? Today, spurred on by fear or 
disbelief in such an enterprise, democratic culture has all but abandoned the notion of sovereign 
virtue. The whimsical suggestion of Plato’s Republic, that justice shall be obtained in this world 
only under the benign despotism of philosopher-kings (“the best at philosophy and the best at 
war”), not only is dismissed as an impractical ideal—that has always been the case—but is 
condemned as a blueprint for tyranny of the gravest sort. Plato has been held responsible for 
modern “totalitarianism,” as anachronistic as this may be. Parallel to the growing estrangement 
of modern democratic theory from classical political philosophy is the development of 
democratic ethics in a direction that is ever more hostile to the claims of what it calls moral 
perfectionism. Moral perfectionism is what we mean by “sovereign virtue.” When Carlyle 
characterizes great men as the “revealed texts” of human history, he is endorsing a classical 
preference for virtuous spirits over pedantic adherents to the letter. But how does Carlyle’s On 
Heroes demonstrate this relationship between the spirit and the letter? This is the question to 
which we now turn. 
 
Text and Voice in On Heroes: The Tragedy of Texts 
It has been said that the theme of Carlyle’s epic history, The French Revolution, is “Tools and 
the man.” We can say in a similar vein, that the theme of Heroes is: “Words and the man.” The 
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tragedy of the text is the driving theme of Carlyle’s lectures On Heroes. This may sound strange, 
since we have developed a habit of associating the lectures On Heroes with the highly politicized 
“great man” theory of history. One presumes that his theme is the relationship between the 
“great” man and the “small” man, the leader and the follower. Of course I do not want to suggest 
that Carlyle’s intent is not “political,” that is to say, that he does not intend to address in some 
way at the question of authority, of ruling and being ruled. But despite this political intent, the 
content of Carlyle’s vision of a “world of heroes” remains unclear. The thesis we shall take up 
here is that Carlyle’s reflection on words and the man is more profitably read in terms of 
democratic moral perfectionism than as an endorsement of authoritarianism. Carlylean sincerity 
is an expression, above all, of the virtue of being true to oneself. 
 One good place to start our inquiry into the meaning of On Heroes is with the 
controversial phrase, “hero-worship,” itself. The phrase “hero-worship” first appeared in David 
Hume’s Natural History of Religion, in the context of a discussion of the origins of religion. 
Doubtless, Carlyle was familiar with Hume, and it is very likely that the term is a direct 
borrowing from the latter’s book. What is more, before he ever wrote On Heroes, Carlyle 
criticized Hume’s natural history in such a way as to reveal the outlines of his own rival project. 
The general context of this remark is a familiar Carlylean criticism of cultural malaise brought 
about by the “logic-chopping,” analytical, point of view. In modern times, Carlyle complains, 
 
We enjoy, we see nothing by direct vision; but only by reflection and in anatomical 
dismemberment…. We have our little theory on all human and divine things. Poetry, the 
workings of genius itself, which in all times, with one or the other meaning, has been 
called Inspiration, and held to be mysterious and inscrutable, is no linger without its 
scientific exposition…. Hume has written a ‘Natural History of Religion’ in which one 
Natural History all the rest are included. Strangely too does the general feeling coincide 
with Hume’s in this wonderful problem; for whether his ‘Natural History’ be the right 
one or not, that Religion must have a Natural History, all of us, cleric and laic, seem to be 
agreed. He indeed regards it as a Disease, we again as Health; so far there is a difference; 
but in our first principle we are at one.35 
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Here is, in his own words, a brief instructive statement as to the motivations that Carlyle 
probably had for publishing On Heroes; which, if it is not billed as a natural history of religion, 
is the closest Carlyle gets to such a project. And indeed, in the lectures we find Carlyle affirming 
religion as health, while acknowledging simultaneously—and without trying to veil it from 
anyone—that religion, too, has a natural history. Carlyle goes on through six lectures to try to 
sketch that history, and he never offers us a theory. What Carlyle does offer is a sustained 
reflection on the relationship between the Text and the Voice that evinces the authors’ sensitivity 
to the way that man comports with divine and human reality through language, and expresses 
Carlyle’s view that, “there is, one would say, and must ever remain while man has a tongue, a distinct 
province for Speech as well as for Writing and Printing.”36 
 Carlyle’s hero is a pontiff of culture; literally, a bridge-builder between the general and 
particular, social and personal identity, heaven and earth. The primary power of the Carlylean 
hero is spiritual or moral power. This principle derives from Carlyle’s intellectualized adherence 
to Christianity as the highest revelation that all force is moral, and that the primary reality for 
man is moral or human reality, not physical reality. Thus any exercise of physical force is 
secondary for Carlyle, is meaningful only as allied to moral force. This, in brief gives sense to 
Carlyle’s dictum: “Right makes Might.”  
In this bridge-building function Carlyle’s hero very much resembles Rousseau’s 
legislator. There has been little comment on this affinity except that of Bertrand Russell, who 
dismisses Carlyle as a continuator of Rousseau’s “cult of the hero.” It would be more accurate to 
say “hero of culture,” but then Russell would have to account for himself as another continuator 
of the tradition of secular prophecy. Instead it is left for us to inquire: how does Carlyle conceive 
of the hero of culture?  
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The beginning of an answer may be found in Carlyle’s fictitious (speculative) “clothes-
philosophy,” which proposes that human nature is never accessible in its naked state, but only as 
clothed in convention. A philosophy of textiles, the clothes-philosophy is also a philosophy of 
language, and specifically of texts.  Ideas, too, come clothed in names, and never are seen as 
naked universal abstractions. As clothed thoughts, ideas assume differing aspects in various 
times and places. Since man’s soul is always embodied, it follows that the effusions of man’s 
spirit will assume differing sensible forms. Thus the clothes-philosopher is not averse to cultural 
change, but accepts it as part of what is necessary. With more or less precision, the pontiff of 
culture aims at a proper balance between appearance and reality. 
With regard to secular history Carlyle’s imaginative alter-ego, the clothes-philosopher, 
sympathizes with the revolutionary sansculottist. However, the clothes-philosopher cannot make 
common cause with “Adamism,” the quasi-Rousseauean view that a basically good human 
nature has been corrupted by social convention, and that, somehow, a return to nature (either 
back, or more likely “forward” by way of radically transfigured convention) will be necessary to 
restore “humanity” (a naked universal) to its pre-civilized goodness. The barbarity of the French 
Revolution reveals the utter inadequacy of this view of human nature; while its farcical scenes 
reveal that, by nature, men habitually observe “irrational” conventions, even under the most 
chaotic, unconventional, conditions. In short, modern revolution transforms everything but 
human nature. This transformation of the outside does not alter the inner facts of moral 
existence. Thus man acquires incredible power without necessarily advancing in the moral 
capacity to dispose of power well. Man liberates himself only to be enslaved by his own 
products. As we said, for Carlyle, Modern man is not disenchanted but self-enchanted: “Man has 
become titanic, in a more than metaphorical sense.”  
It is clear that Carlyle conceives his own occupation as a political evangelist in opposition 
to Rousseau, whom he called the “evangelist” of the French Revolution. By characterizing 
Rousseau as an evangelist Carlyle downplays Rousseau’s reputation as a theorist, although 
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Carlyle is aware of this reputation. As we have seen, Rousseau claims to base his theory of 
politics on theoretical science. But Carlyle associates “theory” with mere visuality (a word he 
introduces in On Heroes) and insists that the basis of society is not entirely visible, but in many 
ways is invisible, mysterious, a matter of nescience rather than science. Carlyle rejects 
Rousseau’s claim to have devised on the basis of science a suitable account of man’s moral and 
social life.  
In reaction to, or more particularly, with the aim of correcting Rousseau, Carlyle becomes 
the evangelist of literature and of one type of literature in particular: history. Carlyle’s notion of 
history is ironic, not at all progressive, it gestures again and again towards the significance of 
what is unknown, unseen and unheard in man’s past; that is to say, Carlylean history reminds the 
reader of all that the documents, which are the only things we really have, refuse to tell us. 
Carlyle deploys his notion of “history” with the intention of correcting the abstractions of 
“political philosophy” (political economy and “theories of government”).   
How is this view of history manifested in On Heroes? The simple way to get at this 
question is to follow the text—and the voice—throughout Carlyle’s lectures. This simple 
procedure yields a synoptic understanding of what Carlyle is trying to do in his religious history 
of nature. The unifying theme of On Heroes is the presence of language to man. Carlyle 
explicitly connects every one of his heroic figures with a text, from Odin, with his runes, to 
Napoleon, “false as a bulletin.” Accordingly the hero-as-author is the subject of every one of 
Carlyle’s lectures, not only the fifth and sixth. Accordingly, heroic readers are the sort of citizens 
Carlyle wishes to educate: 
 
If we think of it, all that a University or final highest School can do for us, is still but 
what the first school began doing,—teach us to read. We learn to read, in various 
languages, in various sciences; we learn the alphabet and letters of all manner of books. 
But the place where we are to get knowledge, even theoretic knowledge, is the Books 
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themselves! It depends on what we read, after all manner of Professors have done their 
best for us. The true University of these days is a Collection of Books.37 
 
Odin, Carlyle’s first hero, is the founder of a civilization (and a religion) and the creator 
of “runes.” This emphasis on Odin as a writer in “the hero as divinity” seems strained, but is 
necessary. The role of the heroic intellect is to give names to things, but the hero does not 
discover the essence of things themselves. It is the power of naming that interests Carlyle here. 
According to Carlyle, the untutored intellect is a “Hyper-Brobdingnagian business! Untamed 
Thought, great, giantlike, enormous;—to be tamed in due time into the compact greatness, not 
giantlike but godlike and stronger than gianthood, of the Shakespeares, the Goethes!”  
Carlyle is not an “irrationalist” exactly, but he takes little solace in the notions of 
theoretical/scientific certainty or clear and distinct ideas, especially when it comes to politics or 
the human things. Modern skepticism he claims is more superstitious and irrational than ancient 
paganism; the pagans at least could see that “nature is…what to the Thinker and Prophet it for 
ever is, preternatural.”38 
To the primeval intellect: 
 
All was Godlike or God…but there then were no hearsays. Canopus shining down over 
the desert…would pierce into the heart of the wild Ishmaelitish man, whom it was 
guiding through the solitary waste there. To his wild heart, with all feelings in it, with no 
speech for any feeling, it might seem a little eye, that Canopus, glancing down on him 
from the great deep Eternity; revealing the inner Splendour to him. Cannot we understand 
how these men worshipped Canopus…? Such to me is the secret of all forms of 
Paganism. Worship is transcendent wonder; wonder for which there is now no limit or 
measure; that is worship.39 
 
Nothing is as preternatural as the power of human nature to give names to things. 
History, or tradition, begins with language, and the media of tradition are, first, memory and 
then, writing. Speech and Writing bear an ironic relationship to each other. Speech unsettles 
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writing, while writing makes little of speech. In oral cultures, for example, the hero is more 
easily elevated into a god, but in literate cultures, debunking is the norm: 
 
What an enormous camera-obscura magnifier is Tradition! How a thing grows in the 
human Memory, in the human Imagination, when love, worship, and all that lies in the 
human Heart, is there to encourage it. And in the darkness, in the entire ignorance; 
without date or document, no book, no Arundel-marble; only here and there some dumb 
monumental cairn. Why, in thirty or forty years, were there no books, any great man 
would grow mythic, the contemporaries who had seen him, being once all dead. And in 
three-hundred years, and in three thousand years—!—To attempt theorising on such 
matters would profit little: they are matters which refuels to be theoremed and 
diagrammed; which Logic ought to know that she cannot speak of.40 
 
Both speech and writing are inferior by comparison to the divine silence that reveals the 
“inner Splendour” of Eternity. Nevertheless, for Carlyle human silence is the worst sort of 
idleness and folly: To remain without language is to stay in the primeval state of humanity. 
Carlyle’s ideal, then, would seem to involve a balance between the excesses of writing and 
speech. The remainder of On Heroes sees Carlyle trying to find the way to this balance. 
In “The Hero as Prophet,” Carlyle justifies his selection of Mohammad because he is the 
prophet we are most free to speak of. However, Carlyle must have been impressed by the oral-
aural character of Islam. Carlyle’s emphasis on the rough-hewn language of the Koran reflects 
the view that the power of this particular book derives from its oral quality. The Koran is written 
not for private reading, but for recitation. Mohammad, also, was illiterate, as Carlyle points out.  
 
The art of writing was but just introduced into Arabia; it seems to be the true opinion that 
Mahomet never could write! Life in the Desert, with its experiences, was all his 
education…. Curious, if we will reflect on it, this of having no books. Except by what he 
could see for himself, or hear by uncertain rumour of speech in the obscure Arabian 
Desert, he could know nothing. The wisdom that had been before him or at a distance 
from him in the world, was in a manner as good as not there for him. Of the great brother 
souls, flame-beacons through so many lands and times, no one directly communicates 
with this great soul. He is alone there, deep in the bosom of the Wilderness; has to grow 
up so;—alone with Nature and his own Thoughts.41 
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For Carlyle, man’s speech at its best has a prayerful quality that cannot fail to impress the 
earnest observer. Mohammad’s “companions named him ‘Al Amin, The Faithful.’… They noted 
that he always meant something. A man rather taciturn in speech; silent when there was nothing 
to be said; but pertinent, wise, sincere, when he did speak…”42 The prayerful, insightful and 
considered qualities of a man’s speech later will serve as Carlyle’s justification for defending the 
character of Oliver Cromwell. 
 Finally, there is another sense in which Carlyle’s wrestling with Mohammad (and Islam) 
epitomizes the problem in the West of an emerging secular culture, one that holds out the 
possibility of reuniting the two swords of secular and spiritual authority under the aegis of the 
modern democratic state. Carlyle’s uses his lecture on Mohammad as a vehicle for advancing, 
more or less, protestant individualism. Carlyle illustrates this personal religion with the Psalms 
of David. The Psalms portray the personal conversation between an individual man—in this 
case, a king—and God. It is the relationship between the Prophet and his God, then, rather than 
the Prophet and his Disciples, which is meant to instruct us here. Mohammad is instructive as a 
man, perhaps to be emulated in his piety, but not to be followed or imitated as the creator of a 
political religion. 
In “The Hero as Poet,” Carlyle suggests a potential identity between writers and readers: 
“At bottom, clearly enough, there is no perfect Poet! A vein of Poetry exists in the heart of all 
men; no man is made altogether of Poetry. We are all poets when we read a poem well.”43  
This position is crucial to Carlyle’s broader characterization of the hero as reader. Shelley 
had claimed that poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world. Carlyle attempts to give 
the poets their due by adumbrating how it is that such poets “legislate.” The great poets, too, are 
name-givers, nomothetes. As such, they neither devise nor discover anything new, but rather cast 
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familiar truths in a new light so that the reader appreciates them once more in an original way. 
Like all other heroes, the poet “read[s] the world and its laws; the world with its laws will be 
there to be read. What the world, on this matter, shall permit and bid is, as we said, the most 
important fact about the world.—”44 
Thus the originality of poets, like all originality, lay in the ability to penetrate 
appearances to apprehend the “open secret” of reality. Poetic insight assists the reader toward 
penetrating to this meaning for oneself. Poetry for Carlyle is “musical Thought.”45 The virtue of 
poetry lay in its proximity to spoken language:  
 
Nay, all speech, even the commonest speech, as something of song in it: Not a parish in 
the world but has its parish-accent;—the rhythm or tune to which the people there sing 
what they have to say! Accent is a king of chanting; all men have accent of their own,—
though they only notice that of others. Observe too how all passionate language does of 
itself become musical,—with a finer music than the mere accent; the speech of a man 
even in zealous anger becomes a chant, a song. All deep things are Song.46 
 
The great poem, like ancient epic, can be seen as a sort of dialect; as a moral dictionary or 
encyclopedia of a sort. But the poet makes no pretense to “clear and distinct” communication. 
Carlyle suggests that the distinction between poetry and history (understood as a social science) 
may be chimerical in an important sense. If history is similar to poetry in this way, then it is 
evident that no science of history is possible. 
Finally, in this lecture Carlyle introduces a distinction here between depth and breadth. 
Dante is “deep” while Shakespeare is “broad.” Depth reflects a certain parochialism, Dante 
makes real the spiritual world of medieval Catholicism; Shakespeare, by contrast a broad mind, 
gives us an early glimpse into the realm of world-history. If there is a difference between history 
and poetry properly speaking, it may be related to the difference between depth and breadth; for 
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example, the depth of the voice associated with the parochial parish-accent contrasts with the 
cosmopolitan breadth of the text, a breadth that gives rise to the imagination of universal history. 
In “the Hero as Priest,” Carlyle delves more deeply into modern themes. As we have 
seen, Carlyle regards Luther and Protestantism as the initial stage of a culture of print that 
continues to characterize modern society. Knox and Scotland illustrate the connection between 
Protestantism and political self-determination. Here Carlyle reiterates his view of modern history 
as a drama in three acts: first Protestantism, then Puritanism and the English Civil War, and 
finally, the French Revolution, are the three signal moments in the historical unfolding of 
modernity.47 In terms of logical possibilities, at least, the French Revolution marks the end of 
“modern revolutionism,” not its beginning. Protestants and Puritans evince the twin phenomena 
of print and privacy that is the center of gravity of modern revolutionism. The French Revolution 
finally lays bare the structure of the revolutionary mind and its tragic shortcoming: The 
revolutionary reformer fancies that he is not an idolater, but in reality the reformer is an idolater 
of texts—the first modern reformers are idolaters of the Bible, and the next, idolaters of “theory.” 
The French Revolutionaries merely supplant the Bible with a theory of politics. “All worship 
whatsoever must proceed by Symbols, by Idols:—we may say, all idolatry is comparative, and 
the worst idolatry is only more idolatrous.”48 
In light of this interpretation, Carlyle identifies the most immediate threat of 
revolutionary disorder in the ideologies of progress, and in what we call “scientism.” 
Progressivism and scientism are most apt to suborn the illusion that intellectual representations 
are identical to the moral reality they seek to represent. It is to correct this tendency that Carlyle 
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puts forward the notion that a devout imagination is the driving force behind reformism, and that 
“[all] true Reformers…are by the nature of them Priests, and strive for a Theocracy.”49  
Carlyle’s aim is not to discourage reform, but to keep it from devolving into revolution. 
In particular, Carlyle wishes to dash the dangerous belief that evil is the result of unfair social 
conditions and that a wholesale destruction of the existing order will of necessity result in an 
order that is more just. Again, this is how Carlyle understands the motivations of the French 
Revolutionaries, and for Carlyle, the French Revolution represents a point lower than which 
human affairs cannot possibly sink. 
The two concluding lectures On Heroes—“The Hero as Man of Letters,” and “The Hero 
as King”—deserve to be read as one, if it is true that Carlyle’s portrayal of modernity is 
circumscribed by the (unresolved) tension between the Text and Voice. It is true that Carlyle 
describes the hero-as-king as “practically the summary for us of all the various figures of 
Heroism.”50 Nevertheless, there is no reason to assume that this characterization of heroism in 
terms of ideal kingship does not apply backwards to all of Carlyle’s other “figures of Heroism.” 
In fact Carlyle reiterates the theme of ideal kingship throughout On Heroes; and there is another 
significant irony in the fact that both of Carlyle’s hero-kings in fact are hero-regicides. More 
specifically, just as he portrays the man of letters as homo politcus—“with his copy-rights and 
copy-wrongs, in his squalid garret, in his rusty coat; ruling (for this is what he does), from his 
grave, after death, whole nations and generations who would, or would not, give him bread while 
living”51—Carlyle portrays the king as a contemplative man—witness Cromwell’s prayerful 
speech, or Napoleon’s critique of the skeptical savans. 
Kings or chieftains we have had always; but Carlyle recognizes the uniqueness of men of 
letters as peculiarly modern figures of Heroism. In “The Hero as Man of Letters,” Carlyle makes 
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two related observations about the contemporary scene. The first regards the uniqueness of the 
man of letters as a product of print culture, while the second regards the role of the man of letters 
in history. Historical “progress,” for Carlyle, is the “ordeal” of literary men:  
 
This ordeal; this wild welter of a chaos which is called Literary Life: this too is a kind of 
ordeal! There is clear truth in the idea that a struggle from the lower classes of society, 
towards the upper regions and rewards of society, must ever continue. Strong men are 
born there, who ought to stand elsewhere than there. The manifold, inextricably complex, 
universal struggle of these constitutes, and must constitute, what is called the progress of 
society. For Men of Letters, as for all other sorts of men. How to regulate this struggle? 
There is the whole question. To leave is as it is, at the mercy of blind Chance; a whirl of 
distracted atoms…your royal Johnson languishing inactive in garrets, or harnessed to the 
yoke of Printer Cave; your Burns dying broken-hearted as a Gauger; your Rousseau 
driven into mad exasperations, kindling French Revolutions by his paradoxes: this, as we 
said, is clearly enough the worst regulation. The best, alas, is far from us!52 
  
Johnson, Burns and Rousseau are fallen giants for Carlyle, literary titans. Goethe is 
Carlyle’s best candidate for the true literary hero. “Alas, these men did not conquer like 
[Goethe]; they fought bravely, and fell. They were not heroic bringers of light, but heroic seekers 
of it.”53 
Carlyle is reluctant to discuss Goethe because, he says, the English audience is too 
ignorant of Goethe’s achievement to appreciate it. However, another reason for choosing not to 
focus on Goethe is that Carlyle’s aim as an author is more political than Goethe’s: for Carlyle the 
Good and the Beautiful are one and the same. Carlyle, more than Goethe, occupies himself with 
the problem of writing as action. Accordingly he puts forth the fallen heroes, Johnson, Burns and 
Rousseau as object-lessons illustrating the social significance of the literary “ordeal.” Carlyle 
considers each of these literary men to be failures, I think, because they fail to understand the 
limits of the text.  
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“Johnson’s opinions are fast becoming obsolete: but his style of thinking and of living, 
we may hope, will never become obsolete.”54 Similarly, earnest Rousseau expects too much from 
his scientific theories of government and only winds up “kindling French Revolutions by his 
paradoxes.”55 Finally, Burns succumbs to another extreme, attempting to recreate the “parish 
accent” in his poetry.  
Ironically Burns, who tries to make the voice present in his texts, dies beneath the hot 
gaze of literary “lion-hunters.” “Burns’s gifts, expressed in conversation, are the theme of all that 
ever heard him.”56 For Burns’s speech “was a speech distinguished by always having something 
in it…. The waiters and ostlers of Scotch inns, prying about the door, eager to catch any word 
that fell from Burns, were doing unconscious reverence to the heroic.”57 
 
And yet…Lion-hunters were the ruin and death of Burns. It was they that rendered it 
impossible for him to live! They gathered round him in his Farm; hindered his industry; 
no place as remote enough from them. He could not get his Lionism forgotten, honestly 
as he was disposed to do so…. These men came to see him; it was out of no sympathy 
with him, nor no hatred to him. They came to get a little amusement: they got their 
amusement;—and the Hero’s life went for it!58 
 
 Carlyle’s own contribution to man-of-letters heroism, manifest in On Heroes, consists in 
his recognition of the need to “regulate” the distinction between speech and writing, coupled 
with his conspicuous (perhaps intentional) failure to offer any programmatic answer to this 
regulatory need. Evidently, for Carlyle, the ironic relationship between speech and writing that 
gives structure to the whole of On Heroes has to suffice for this purpose. It is possible that 
Carlyle takes his cue here from Goethe. Goethe’s ironic novels, similarly, set up expectations of 
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the reader that the author never meets, with the intent of drawing the reader to reflect on the 
author-reader relationship, and the activity of private reading itself. 
 In light of this interpretation, it seems fair to challenge the view that Carlyle’s positioning 
of “The Hero as King” as the final installment of On Heroes signals his departure from literature 
and towards a new faith in coercive force as the mechanism of social regulation that he found so 
desperately wanting. I suggest that On Heroes makes more sense if we understand it as a whole, 
whose theme is the tension between the voice and the text. Carlyle’s two closing lectures, in 
particular, point to the mutual limits of the text and the voice. 
 That Carlyle sustains this theme in “The Hero as King” is evident from the way he 
situates Cromwell and Napoleon with respect to language. For Carlyle, the sincerity of Cromwell 
comes through in Cromwell’s prayers and speeches: 
 
Cromwell’s prayers were likely to be ‘eloquent,’ and much more than that. His was the 
heart of a man who could pray…. But indeed, his actual speeches, I apprehend, were not 
nearly so ineloquent, incondite, as they look…. With that rude passionate voice of his, he 
was always understood to mean something, and men wished to know what…. The 
Reporters, too, in those days seem to have been singularly candid; and to have given the 
Printer precisely what they found on their notepaper. And withal, what a strange proof is 
it of Cromwell’s being the premeditative ever calculating hypocrite, acting a play before 
the world, That to the last he took no more charge of his Speeches!59 
 
In contrast to Cromwell and his speeches, Carlyle illustrates the duplicity of Napoleon by 
pointing out Napoleon’s habit of exorcizing his vanity through counterfeit texts. With his 
democratic faith in careers open to talent, Napoleon started off as a hero. But not long after his 
success in bring order to France, Napoleon fell prey to egoism, “blameable ambition.” 
 
[there] are two kinds of ambition; one wholly blamable, the other laudable and inevitable. 
Nature has provided that the great silent Samuel shall not be silent too long. The selfish 
wish to shine over others, let it be accounted altogether poor and miserable…. The 
meaning of life here on earth might be defined as consisting in this: To unfold your self, 
to work what thing you have the faculty for. It is a necessity for the human being, the first 
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law of our existence. Coleridge remarks beautifully that the infant learns to speak by this 
necessity it feels.60 
 
Selfish ambition, the desire “to shine over others” leads to Napoleon’s ultimate downfall. 
But Carlyle uses Napoleon to illustrate the folly of vanity more generally. For, according to 
Carlyle, before Napoleon could believe that it is so easy to dupe others, he had to make a dupe of 
himself. Carlyle suggests that integrity, rather than duplicity, ought to inform political action. 
Action is inevitable; and accordingly, so are errors. But sincere moral strength will produce 
lasting results while duplicity is more likely to suborn the fleeting appearance of a false justice: 
 
‘False as a bulletin’ became a proverb in Napoleon’s time. He makes what excuse 
he could for it: that it was necessary to mislead the enemy, to keep-up his own men’s 
courage, and so forth. On the whole there are no excuses. A man in no case has liberty to 
tell lies.61 
 
 “The Hero as King” brings the reader back from the ethereal world of texts to the world 
of bodily reality. Fanatic-hypocrite theories are attractive on paper, but in the final analysis the 
attempt to reduce or explain away the phenomena of human greatness merely circumvents the 
reality of the heroic. “Multitudes of Great Men figure in History as false selfish men; but if we 
will consider it they are but figures for us, unintelligible shadows; we do no see into them as men 
that could have existed at all.”62 The intent of On Heroes is to awaken the reader’s sympathy to 
the heroic, to encourage the reader to lift his eyes from the text, and listen to heroic voices. Such 
voices need not be that of a Napoleon or a Cromwell, but the still small voice of one’s own 
conscience, or the voice of a true friend. “To men who believe in no reality at all, how shall a 
real human soul, the intensest of all realities, as it were the voice of this world’s Maker still 
speaking to us,—be intelligible?”63  
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Chapter Eight: Carlyle’s Heroic Individualism 
 
Doubtless there is still peculiar virtue in Speech; even writers of Books may 
still, in some circumstances, find it convenient to speak also,—witness our 
present meeting here! There is, one would say, and must ever remain while man 
has a tongue, a distinct province for Speech as well as for Writing and Printing. 
In regard to all things this must remain; to Universities among others. But the 
limits of the two have nowhere yet been pointed out, ascertained; much less put 
into practice… 
 
Thomas Carlyle, “The Hero as Man of Letters” 
 
 
One aim of my study has been to contextualize the so-called “great-man” theory of history, in 
terms of the politics of literature. It must be stressed that the view I take is quite opposite from 
the currently prevailing tendency to reduce literature to politics, or to political economy. If 
anything, the politics-of-literature tradition tends to the opposite extreme, portraying life as 
literature. This study has focused on the historian and essayist Thomas Carlyle, the thinker most 
often associated with the modern version of the great-man theory. This final chapter revisits the 
relationship between Carlyle and Nietzsche, with an eye to their status as democratic moralists 
or, as I have called then, ambitious authors. In my view, great men are ambitious authors and the 
great-man theory is part of the life-as-literature tradition. 
 The great-man theory lays stress on the significance of unique human beings in the drama 
of history. It is familiar to political scientists. Yet most scholars educated in political science 
probably think of the great man theory as unsophisticated, dated, and unworthy of scientific 
attention. Such “individual-level” theories defy quantification, or if they can be “verified” 
quantitatively, it is only by the use of questionable methods. Moreover, they seem to downplay 
the importance of those environmental or contextual causes that captivate modern social 
scientists. After all, the social sciences bear the imprint of minds such as Comte and Marx. These 
thinkers interpreted history from a “scientific” perspective that they adopted expressly to 
counteract the old-fashioned histories of great men and great institutions. 
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 When one delves deeper into the modern variants of monumental history, however, one 
finds a reality quite different from what educated common opinion might lead one to expect. As 
it turns out, modern adherents of this view are not ignorant but are keenly aware of, and 
concerned about, the implicit determinism of modern science. To varying degrees the great man 
theorists accept the implications of modern scientific discoveries. Nevertheless, they retain in 
some form or other the conviction that individuals affect history uniquely. Modern variants of 
the great-man view include literary and philosophical giants like Carlyle and Nietzsche, 
Emerson, Rousseau and a host of others whose importance for the modern mind is obvious, 
despite their allegedly outmoded views about the role of great human beings in shaping culture.  
Carlyle, in particular, is dismissed as a throwback, but in reality he epitomizes the strange 
combination of ancient and modern that goes into the perspective of monumental history. To be 
sure, upon its publication Carlyle’s great man thesis already seemed obsolete to some. That 
“Carlyle” is identical with the bite-sized formula, “the great-man theory of history,” partly 
explains why Carlyle’s work suffers even more neglect today. We tend to forget that Carlyle was 
also the first writer to use the word “environment” in its specifically modern sense, meaning the 
totality of circumstances that—dare we say it—determines or at least, conditions, one’s 
development. Perhaps the “contextualist” owes an unrecognized debt to the great-man theorist! 
 For the moment, we shall take this anecdotal evidence as sufficient cause for a serious 
reexamination of Carlyle’s philosophy. As this discussion unfolds, perhaps we shall uncover 
more evidence to vindicate our decision. Here, again, we return to Carlyle and Nietzsche. We 
want to inquire: What have Carlyle and Nietzsche in common? About what do they disagree? 
What is Nietzsche’s critique of Carlyle? How might Carlyle reply? 
 
 
 
  252  
Carlyle and Nietzsche 
It is fair to say that learned opinion leans toward Nietzsche’s diagnosis of Carlyle: “Carlyle” is 
an “unwitting and involuntary farce, [a] heroical-moralistical interpretation of dyspepsia.”1 
Carlyle’s belief-in-belief betrays a tragic absurdity: the titanic intellect bringing to bear all its 
might in an attempt to conceal from itself its own nature.  “A continual passionate dishonesty 
towards himself—that is his proprium, because of that,” Nietzsche declares, “[Carlyle] is and 
will remain interesting.”2 Interesting? Perhaps Carlyle could have made an early candidate for 
psychoanalysis. 
Nietzsche himself does some psychoanalyzing here. Carlyle’s “desire for a strong faith,” 
Nietzsche remarks, “is not the proof of a strong faith, rather the opposite. If one has it one may 
permit oneself the beautiful luxury of skepticism: one is secure enough, fixed enough for it.”3  
Thus insecure, drowning in a chaotic sea of skepticism, and too weak to swim, Carlyle 
mistakes for the substance of faith the sound of his own voice, crying out for God’s aid. One 
might say that Nietzsche portrays the tragedy of Carlyle’s life in terms of a classically English 
parody on that classically German virtue, self-annihilation. “Carlyle deafens something within 
him by the fortissimo of his reverence for men of strong faith and by his rage against the less 
single-minded: he requires noise.”4 
This analysis typifies Nietzsche’s own brand of the fanatic-hypocrite theory. A self-
appointed Physician of Culture, Nietzsche’s bill of health might read thus: “Adrift on the 
rapturous currents of his own voice, the subject, Carlyle by name, floats unwittingly out of 
reality and into make-believe, until finally and inexorably ‘something in him’ (evidently the 
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authentic self) is pulled in by the undertow created by a ‘strong faith’ in ‘men of strong faith.’ 
Thus, the real Carlyle, having succumbed to the ocean of unconsciousness, never will swim 
again in daylight, or breathe the fresh air of sanity.” A post-script reads: “Still, the case interests 
us not least because the English so admire this mystical dervish—and that, for his honesty!”5 
Nietzsche’s judgment of Carlyle might have differed—though probably not by much—
had the occasion for this analysis been Carlyle’s writings, instead of Froude’s biography of 
Carlyle. The “life of Thomas Carlyle,” about which Nietzsche formulates these views, is 
renowned for the liberty it took with Carlyle’s liberal bequest to his biographer to strive for 
honesty in representation. The result was a book that, “while none of [it] shocks today,” was 
“seismic” in its impact on Victorian England.6 “The public, led by some of Carlyle’s family, 
were plunged into moral outrage. Even disciples, reading the innermost thoughts of their master 
in the letters and journal extracts Froude included in his work, found themselves repelled by 
aspects of Carlyle.”7  
Carlyle’s latest biographer, Simon Heffer, agrees that Froude overstepped the bounds of 
decency, but with the qualification that, probably, Froude “wrote the book he felt the sham-
hating Carlyle would have wanted.”8 To support this claim Heffer points out that, after all, 
Froude “justified himself by quoting Carlyle’s own precepts.”9 Froude cited Carlyle’s censure of 
Walter Scott’s biographer, in his own defense: “The poor biographer, having the fear not of God 
before his eyes, was obliged to retire as it were into a vacuum; and write in the most melancholy, 
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straitened manner, with only vacuum for a result…there was no biography, but some vague ghost 
of a biography.”10 
One of Nietzsche’s latest biographers, Rudiger Safranski, exercises poetic justice against 
Nietzsche on Carlyle’s behalf. As if to reply to Nietzsche’s putative diagnosis of Carlyle, 
Safranski puts forward a Carlylean diagnosis of the catatonic Nietzsche: 
 
A metaphysical endgame was being enacted before “Europe’s top putrescence” in the 
Villa Silberblick [where Nietzsche’s sister, Elisabeth, had put the philosopher’s 
somnolent body on public display]. Half a century earlier, Thomas Carlyle, who was 
esteemed in these circles (although Nietzsche did not think very highly of him), had 
described what was at stake in endgames of this sort: “[Man] enlarges somewhat, by 
fresh discovery, his view of the universe, and consequently his Theorem of the 
Universe,—which is an infinite Universe, and can never be embraced wholly or finally by 
any view or Theorem, in any conceivable enlargement.” Carlyle warned against 
attempting to embrace the universe. Any individual who employed the powers of logic in 
this quest would be devoured in the process. Nietzsche dared to conceive of the 
inconceivable, and was ultimately undone by his efforts to do so. He fell victim to the 
colossal dimensions of life.11 
 
  Since we do not wish to let biographers intervene unduly on the row between Carlyle 
and Nietzsche, let us put them aside for the time being. Instead, let us follow Carlyle and 
Nietzsche as they cast their nets over the phenomenon of biography itself. Biography is the 
genuine subject at the heart of the great man theory of history. For, as Carlyle famously claimed, 
history is biography. Moreover, from his earliest independent writings Carlyle explicitly 
connects biography and belief. In the article “On History,” Carlyle maintains that history is “the 
root of all science [and]…the first distinct product of man’s spiritual nature; his earliest 
expression of what can be called Thought.”12 History, expression, intellect and man’s spiritual 
nature appear here as one, suggesting that, for Carlyle, the common nature of humanity lay in the 
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human condition. Man is a being unknown apart from language; man’s intelligible life is 
significant, then, always and already. Moreover, since Carlyle defines “History [as] the essence 
of innumerable biographies”13 and Universal History, “all things we see standing accomplished 
in the world [as]…the outer material result…of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into 
the world,” it is evident that any account of Carlyle’s “heroic” view of history will have to 
account for the internal matters of biography and belief. These are matters of the first importance 
for all human beings, not just the so-called “great.” 
In addition to the biographies, there is a significant amount of scholarly writing on 
Carlyle and Nietzsche. The scholarly literature on Carlyle and Nietzsche displays an interesting 
pattern. Actually, what is interesting is that it exhibits two patterns. Among scholars of literature, 
comparisons of Carlyle and Nietzsche are commonplace. By contrast, the Carlyle-Nietzsche 
connection has not captured the attention of most political theorists, in spite of the current 
interest in Nietzsche.  
Among students of literature, the most astute interpreter of Carlyle in relation to 
Nietzsche is probably Albert LaValley. In his Carlyle and the Idea of the Modern,14 LaValley 
argues that Carlyle and Nietzsche understood themselves as the first of a new type of social 
prophet. Their social views cannot be understood if one fails to acknowledge this prophetic self-
understanding. LaValley15 warrants a lengthy examination of the Carlyle-Nietzsche relationship 
with the following observation:  
 
that none of the social proposals of the later Carlyle or Nietzsche can be understood 
without understanding their own sense of playing a unique prophetic role totally without 
precedent in religion or literature, their own peculiar social alienation, and their 
extraordinary reaction to disinheritance, the loss of tradition and social confusion. 
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LaValley goes on to claim that “Nietzsche...sheds more light on Carlyle than any author in the 
nineteenth century,” because he acts out the alienation and disinheritance that he and Carlyle 
share “to the futile end.”16  
 Certainly, Nietzsche’s radicalism is one reason for his being established as a 
“philosopher,” in marked contrast to the confusion that exists over whether Carlyle is “really” a 
philosopher, historian, or man of letters. What the two clearly have in common, however, is that 
Carlyle and Nietzsche both are prophets, or at least paradigmatic representatives, of a peculiar 
new social and moral experience: namely, radical individualism, total alienation from the 
community. Having this in common, they are sure to have much else in common. 
 LaValley concludes his analysis by observing a significant difference between Carlyle 
and Nietzsche, to which we shall later return: That Carlyle lacks Nietzsche’s radicalism means 
that his philosophy leaves open a way of communication (albeit imperfect) that is lacking in 
Nietzsche. 
 
Carlyle’s version of Ecce Homo is the reversal of Nietzsche’s; though marred 
occasionally by sentimentality and maudlin moments, it is a crucifixion with others, 
through memory, and through a realistic assessment of the century’s disinheritance, not 
through the lonely and exalted acting out of impossible heroic roles that lead into 
madness and irremediable futility.17 
 
Turning to political science—where studies of Nietzsche abound but Carlyle remains off the 
map—one rarely finds LaValley’s sensitivity to the problem of communication. On occasions 
when Carlyle does come up, typically political scientists put off any discussion of the apparent 
similarity between Carlyle’s and Nietzsche’s views. To this end, typically authors cite Nietzsche 
himself—the passage cited above for example, or the following, in which Nietzsche rebukes “the 
insipid muddlehead Carlyle, who tried to conceal behind passionate grimaces what he knew of 
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himself—namely what was lacking in Carlyle: real power of spirituality, real profundity of 
expression; in brief, philosophy.”18 
In spite of the fact that heroism is a signature Carlylean theme (arguably, the Carlylean 
theme), Leslie Paul Thiele, in his otherwise excellent study of Nietzsche’s “heroic 
individualism,” diminishes any connection between Nietzsche and Carlyle. Thiele declares 
tersely that “Nietzsche was most anxious to distance himself from those coarse relatives who 
also were concerned with the heroic. He repudiated all forms of ‘hero-worship,’ specifically 
Carlyle’s.”19 Thiele’s case is only the most outstanding example of political theorists’ Carlyle 
anxiety. 
 In the passage just cited, Thiele refers the reader to Ecce Homo, 261, where Nietzsche 
puts down Carlyle as an “English atheist who held it as a point of honor not to be one.” If Thiele 
means to point out the one obvious disagreement between Carlyle and Nietzsche, he has chosen 
the right passage. For, here Nietzsche himself articulates exactly what separates him from 
Carlyle, namely, that Carlyle “believes,” while Nietzsche does not.20 More specifically: On the 
one hand, Nietzsche is an unbeliever and he knows it; on the other hand, Carlyle is (really) an 
atheist but refuses, or lacks the strength, to admit it. This is, at least, Nietzsche’s say in the 
matter. It should be noted, however, that Nietzsche opens this same passage with qualified praise 
of Carlyle—whom, he says, of all English minds, comes closest to the truth.  
To be frank, it is rare that Nietzsche mentions any other thinker without disparaging that 
thinker to some extent. It is not too much to say that Nietzsche was “anxious to distance himself” 
from everybody. For example in one book alone Nietzsche says or implies of his most celebrated 
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influence, Schopenhauer, that he is superstitious, prejudiced by public opinion, and trapped 
“under the spell and delusion of morality.”21  
However, Nietzsche observes elsewhere (with Schopenhauer in mind) that “the errors of 
great men are venerable because they are more fruitful than the truths of little men.”22 That great 
men often are wrong, then, does not mean that we cannot learn anything from them. 
 This is not to say that Nietzsche thinks of Carlyle as a great man. Indeed, Nietzsche is 
more sympathetic to Emerson than he is to Carlyle (Emerson being the most apt emissary 
between he and Carlyle); and even quotes Emerson now and then. Ultimately, though, Nietzsche 
laments of Emerson: 
 
I do not know how much I would give if only I could bring it about, ex post facto, that 
such a glorious, great nature, rich in soul and spirit, might have gone through some strict 
discipline, a really scientific education. As it is, in Emerson we have lost a 
philosopher...23 
 
One suspects that, in Carlyle, Nietzsche doubts we ever had a philosopher to begin with. 
But perhaps Carlyle deserves credit for being more honest in his role as “prophet.” In any case, if 
we put aside these curiosities about Nietzsche’s appraisal of Carlyle, the preponderance of 
evidence will suggest to us, as observers, that a comparison between Nietzsche’s and Carlyle’s 
ideas is not futile, after all. Although Nietzsche and Carlyle disagree about a matter of such 
obvious importance as belief, closer investigation turns up considerable agreements that shed 
light on what Nietzsche thinks Carlyle was right about. Moreover, the disagreement between 
Nietzsche and Carlyle forces us to reconsider the equivocal meanings of both Carlyle’s “belief” 
and Nietzsche’s “atheism.” 
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 Before moving on we ought to mention one final study of the Carlyle-Nietzsche 
relationship. In A Century of Hero-Worship24 Eric R. Bentley links Carlyle and Nietzsche as twin 
progenitors of a diabolical ideology Bentley dubs “heroic vitalism.” Bentley hangs on heroic 
vitalism much of the intellectual responsibility for the fascist political experiments of the 
twentieth century, especially Nazism. Now, Bentley approaches this problem as a student of art 
(theater, in particular) interested in politics. We, on the other hand, approach the problem as 
students of politics interested in art and literature. The student of politics is too aware of the 
particularity of political things to issue a too-universal judgment on these complicated questions. 
Nevertheless, Bentley has seen the potentially dangerous aspect of agreement between Carlyle’s 
and Nietzsche’s politics and he properly designates the ideological category into which both, 
considered as “ideologues,” properly belong; namely, right radicalism. 
 Unfortunately, there are as many varieties of “right-ism” as writers politically so inclined. 
Therefore the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to offering a more detailed assessment of the 
Carlyle-Nietzsche relationship. We shall begin with Nietzsche’s evaluation of Carlyle, culled 
from Nietzsche’s scanty remarks about Carlyle, as well as his own subscription to the heroic 
attitude as described in Schopenhauer as Educator. Following this, we shall imagine a likely 
Carlylean rejoinder to Nietzsche (since Carlyle obviously could not reply for himself). We 
conclude by considering Carlyle’s and Nietzsche’s alternative politics of heroism. 
 
Heroism: What Carlyle got Right 
We have already indicated the main line of disagreement between Nietzsche and Carlyle. Before 
going on, let us specify their main point of agreement, which lay in the importance of the heroic 
attitude. Nietzsche and Carlyle both agree that the heroic attitude is the highest moral stance one 
can adopt—under modern conditions, at least. 
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 For all of his contempt Nietzsche seems genuinely to rate Carlyle among of the best of 
English thinkers. But even this is dubious praise, since Nietzsche claims that the English are 
congenitally incapable of philosophy. The problem we encounter is that Nietzsche says nothing 
more specific about Carlyle than that he was “most aware” of what the English lacked; or that he 
came “closest” of all British thinkers to the truth. In order to get a more certain grasp of what 
Nietzsche thought Carlyle was right about, then, we have to draw inferences from Nietzsche’s 
other writings. One in particular, Schopenhauer as Educator, stands out for its long discussion of 
the heroic disposition. In Schopenhauer, Nietzsche portrays the moral philosopher’s role as 
creator of an “image of man.” Nietzsche then surveys three modern images of man—Rousseau’s, 
Goethe’s and Schopenhauer’s. He finally confirms a preference for Schopenhauer’s “heroic” 
image. 
 Nietzsche’s delineation of the three images of man occurs in section four of 
Schopenhauer. The purpose of section four is “to explain how through Schopenhauer we are able 
to educate ourselves against our age—because through him we possess the advantage of really 
knowing this age.”25  Being the third Untimely Meditation, “Schopenhauer” is one part of a 
sweeping Nietzschean philippic against modernity. Throughout the Meditations, all things seem 
tainted by modernity; even the heroic education bequeathed by Schopenhauer is dubious: 
“Supposing, that is, that [the advantage of really knowing this age] is an advantage!”26 
 Schopenhauer’s image is the last to appear of Nietzsche’s “three images of man which 
our modern age has set up one after the other and which will no doubt long inspire mortals to a 
transfiguration of their own lives.”27 Rousseau’s is the first image, and Goethe’s, the second, of, 
what turns out to be, transfigured man. According to Nietzsche, Rousseau’s image of man 
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“produces the greatest fire and is sure of producing the greatest popular effect”; Goethe’s image 
is for the few, contemplative men, but does not appeal to the many; finally, of Schopenhauer’s 
image Nietzsche concludes that it “demands contemplation only by the most active men; only 
they can regard it without harm to themselves, for it debilitates the contemplative and frightens 
away the crowd.”28 
 Rousseau’s image of man, with its deceptively simple appeal to “‘holy nature’” against 
ossified, oppressive tradition, manages to polarize the discontented masses, which in turn 
become violent forces of nature themselves. “In every socialist earthquake and upheaval it has 
always been the man of Rousseau who, like Typhon under Etna, is the cause of the 
commotion.”29 Nietzsche, like Carlyle, sees Rousseau’s gospel of nature and its calamitous 
consequences as a historical inevitability (and in some ways even salutary). But both of them 
also disparage the excesses of Rousseauean men.   
 When Rousseauean man replies to the call of nature, he genuinely is stirred by its appeal, 
and aspires to something higher than himself. “He despises himself and longs to go beyond 
himself: a mood in which the soul is ready for fearful decisions but which also calls up from its 
depths what is noblest and rarest in it.”30 However, danger lurks in the ambivalence of 
Rousseau’s “nature” which, as it turns out, does not necessarily aim at any telos. The capacity to 
make “fearful decisions” in pursuit of one-knows-not-what is, of course, not necessarily 
beneficent. “The man of Rousseau can easily become a Catalinist,”31 wrote Nietzsche. (Carlyle 
represents the scheming “Catalinism” of Rousseauean men more bluntly, as cannibalism.32) 
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 Next Nietzsche surveys Goethe’s image of man, a partial “corrective and sedative for 
precisely those excitations of which the man of Rousseau is the victim.”33 Goethean man is 
keenly aware of the dubiety of Rousseau’s gospel of nature; he knows that the appeal to nature 
may only be an appeal to sheer violence and, therefore—although he, too, fixes on nature—
Goethean man refuses to act. With disillusionment, Goethean man realizes the aimlessness and 
futility of activism. “The man of Goethe here turns away from the man of Rousseau; for he hates 
all violence, all sudden transition—but that means: all action; and thus the world-liberator 
becomes as it were only a world-traveller.”34 Ultimately Goethean man descends into 
dilettantism, into philistinism. For Goethean man the real is reduced to a smattering of 
appearances seemingly intended for epicurean consumption. He finds solace in these pleasures, 
and proceeds rapidly to feast, given a relatively short lifetime—remarkably, “even Helen does 
not detain him long.”35 
 Nietzsche detects a bit of this philistinism in “Goethe’s own enthusiastic participation in 
the world of the theater” but graciously acknowledges Goethe’s awareness of his own excesses.  
 
Goethe seems to have realized where the danger and weakness of his type of man lay, 
and he indicates it in the words of Jarno to Wilhelm Meister: ‘You are vexed and bitter, 
that is very good; if only you would get really angry for once it would be even better.’36 
 
Before moving on from Goethe’s to Schopenhauer’s image of man, we must return for a 
moment to Carlyle. The reason, as anyone familiar with Carlyle will know, is that Carlyle takes 
himself to be a disciple of Goethe’s. Carlyle called Goethe his “spiritual godfather.”  
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Thus we may be tempted to take a detour here; to stop, and let Nietzsche’s critique of 
Goethean man stand in for a Nietzschean critique of Carlyle. But there is a problem with this 
approach. For, Carlyle obviously shares Nietzsche’s reservations about Goethean man’s 
proclivity for inaction. The Carlylean “hero” is, precisely, an action-man; he is “the infinite 
conjugation of the verb To do.”37 Carlyle’s relentless stress on action sets him apart most clearly 
from Romanticism in general, and from certain latent tendencies of Goethe’s, in particular. 
Carlyle’s interest in German idealism is mitigated farther by his staunch puritan background. 
“One of the paradoxes of modern literature,” notes Cassirer, “is that this Puritan became the 
interpreter and defender of Goethe’s moral character.”38 Like Nietzsche, Carlyle is attracted to 
another side of Goethe, one that Carlyle captured in a favorite maxim (translated in the following 
form by Carlyle’s own hand, in his version of Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship), that “doubt, of 
whatever kind, can be ended by action alone.”39 
 Thus it would seem that Carlyle approaches more closely to Nietzsche’s position, being 
duly aware of the flaws of Goethean men. Accordingly, allowing Goethe to stand in for Carlyle 
would be of limited use. For the time being, then, let us observe instead the similarity between 
Carlyle and Nietzsche manifest in Nietzsche’s praise of the “heroic disposition” that 
characterizes Schopenhauer’s image of man. 
 Nietzsche praises Schopenhauer for being the first modern “philosophical teacher” to 
instruct man in how to resolve human nature’s “mighty longing for sanctification and salvation.” 
Schopenhauer’s teaching may be described as the lesson of heroic truthfulness. The only 
meaningful activity for modern man is to be truthful. This seems to entail denying every illusion 
that has the effect of consoling man in the face of violent nature, or for the deficiency of human 
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nature. Schopenhauer’s teaching, briefly, is this: “‘A happy life is impossible: the highest that 
man can attain to is a heroic one.’”40 
 Schopenhauerean man transforms reality by choosing to accept the truth even though it 
involves suffering. This is not as easy as it sounds; recall that Nietzsche recommends this image 
of man for “contemplation only by the most active of men.” Schopenhauerean truthfulness 
requires one to adopt the most militant and thoroughgoing skepticism: 
 
All that exists that can be denied deserves to be denied; and being truthful means: to 
believe in an existence that can in no way be denied and which is itself true without 
falsehood. That is why the truthful man feels that the meaning of his activity is 
metaphysical, explicable through the laws of another and higher life, and in the 
profoundest sense affirmative.41 
 
Nietzsche elaborates here, that radical truthfulness affects reality in such a way that action is not 
given up, but transfigured and made “metaphysical.” By denying everything that can be denied, 
Schopenhauerean man necessarily repudiates the possibility of his own happiness.42 But this 
courage somehow clears the way for metaphysical action. Nietzsche portrays this act in dramatic 
terms as a total renunciation or sacrifice of oneself: “He too wants to know everything, but 
not...to preserve himself and to take delight in the multiplicity of things; he himself is his first 
sacrifice to himself…. His strength lies in forgetting himself.”43  
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 There can be no solace in nature, and specifically human nature must be accepted as a 
perpetual source of discomfort, or unhappiness. As Nietzsche later explains, the ambivalence of 
nature flows from the specific quality of human nature, as a force that presses perpetually against 
terrestrial nature:  
 
and if all nature presses towards man, it thereby intimates that man is somehow necessary 
for the redemption of nature from the curse of the life of the animal, and that in him 
existence at last holds up before itself a mirror in which life appears no longer senseless 
but in its metaphysical significance. Yet let us reflect: where does the animal cease, 
where does man begin—man, who is nature’s sole concern!44 
On principle, this reflection never comes to an end. Yet, upon recognizing this, one is not 
necessarily bound to the bloodless sullenness or satiated torpor of the alienated dilettante. 
Schopenhauer’s heroic example shows how radical truthfulness can open up the possibility of 
infinite transfiguration: 
 
for him who seeks untruth in everything and voluntarily allies himself with unhappiness a 
miracle of disappointment of a different sort has perhaps been prepared; something 
inexpressible of which happiness and truth are only idolatrous counterfeits approaches 
him, the earth loses its gravity, the events and powers of the earth become dreamlike, 
transfiguration spreads itself about him as on summer evenings. 
 
The knowledge of eternal becoming is dreadful to accept. However, once fully internalized, 
Nietzsche speculates that it is the precondition of genius. For the knowledge of eternal becoming 
does not annihilate the specifically human aspect of nature, rather, it is here that man’s humanity 
properly speaking—human nature as the creative source of order—comes to self-awareness. All 
other men are duped by becoming. “To the question: ‘To what end do you live?’ they would all 
quickly reply with pride: ‘To become a good citizen, or scholar, or statesman.’” But Nietzsche 
insists that every human being is something “that can never become something else.”45 
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 Nietzsche singles out three superlative types of men, the Philosopher, the Artist and the 
Saint, as representatives of the heroic disposition. These types exhibit the courage to resist 
eternal becoming, despite knowing it for what it is. Overcoming the animal self, they achieve the 
highest potential of humanity and, therefore, they also fulfill nature. “They are those true men, 
those who are no longer animal...nature, which never makes a leap, has made its one leap in 
creating them, and a leap of joy moreover, for nature then feels that for the first time it has 
reached its goal.46 Through the autonomous creation of order, the man of heroic disposition is 
able to redeem both mankind, and nature. 
 
Belief: The Matter of Disagreement 
Thomas Carlyle also conceives of human nature as resistance to ephemeral disorder; his heroes, 
like Nietzsche’s, appear at least partly as creators of order; and Carlyle’s unorthodox theology, 
like Nietzsche’s unconventional atheism, threatens to put man in the place of the creator God of 
the Jewish, Christian and Islamic religious traditions. But in spite of all this, Carlyle never 
conceives his heroes as solely responsible for the redemption of mankind. The fact is that one 
cannot be sure what Carlyle believes about God. He avoids dogmatic controversy as a matter of 
principle. It is certain that he rejects the Scottish Calvinism of his upbringing, although it is still 
popular to dub Carlyle a Calvinist without theology. Two biographical facts appear to be 
significant to Carlyle’s religious thinking: On the one hand, Carlyle’s belief was shaken by the 
skepticism of Hume, Gibbon, and even Voltaire; on the other, he found in German literature and 
philosophy a new avenue for faith.47  
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In certain respects Carlyle’s thought is essentially religious, if it is not theological. 
Certainly he would have been concerned with the matter of salvation, although he rarely speaks 
of the niceties regarding how salvation is to be achieved. Rather, Carlyle makes an effort to 
observe “sacred silence” regarding such questions. Be that as it may, Carlyle also thinks of 
(religious) “belief” as the mark of a healthy soul or society, and of “unbelief,” as the inevitable 
symptom of decline. Carlyle applies this diagnostic principle in his interpretation of history. Here 
following Goethe, Carlyle interprets history as oscillating between periods of belief and 
skepticism. The eighteenth century was one such period of skepticism, which manifested in the 
wholesale destruction of society during the French Revolution. Rousseau was the evangelist of 
this orgy of practical “unbelief,” and Carlyle, by exposing the situation and its unhealthiness, 
hopes to promote the renewal of order without resorting to the futile proposition of a wholesale 
return to “tradition.” 
 This is one reason why Carlyle’s notion of belief is so sketchy. Like Nietzsche, Carlyle 
tries to approach the historical-social problem as a “physician of culture,” not as an adherent of 
one or another contending belief. The familiar conclusion that Carlyle winds up being just a 
Calvinist without the theology, implies that he did not quite succeed in this. However, laying 
aside the questionable results of Carlyle’s enterprise, one cannot ignore the significance of his 
novel approach to belief. Carlyle’s view of belief is what we might call functional, or even 
pragmatic. The sign of belief is “unconsciousness,” or the non-reflective identity of idea and 
action. Describing Mohammad, Carlyle elaborates on his notion of unconsciousness: 
 
Not the sincerity that calls itself sincere…that is a very poor matter indeed;—a shallow 
braggart conscious sincerity; oftenest self-conceit mainly. The Great Man’s sincerity is of 
the kind he cannot speak of, is not conscious of: nay, I suppose, he is conscious rather of 
insincerity; for what man can walk accurately by the law of truth for one day? No, the 
Great Man does not boast himself sincere…perhaps does not ask himself if he is so: I 
would say rather, his sincerity does not depend on himself; he cannot help being sincere! 
The great Fact of Existence is great to him…. Fearful and wonderful, real as Life, real as 
Death, is this Universe to him. Though all men should forget its truth, and walk in a vain 
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show, he cannot…. A little man may have this, it is competent to all men that God has 
made: but a Great Man cannot be without it.48 
 
 Carlyle’s use of unconsciousness prefigures later philosophers, though he often 
equivocates on the term, which has for him always a moral bearing. 
 
Carlyle now champions, now fears the unconscious. He heralds the capacity of the 
dynamic unconscious to destroy false social and religious forms...and to connect man 
with his ultimate nature, but then he quickly withdraws...fearing the groundlessness of the 
unconscious...and the psychological and social chaos it may prelude.49 
 
It is his notion of the unconscious that underlay Carlyle’s belief in the inescapability of 
belief: even skepticism is a belief (or anti-belief) with practical consequences. This equivocation 
is written large in his cyclical sense of history, and is reflected also in Carlyle’s ambivalence 
towards his own historical situation. 
 Explaining to Emerson his sense of the historical moment, its relation to belief and 
skepticism, (and describing Emerson’s transcendentalism as a “symptom” of the time) Carlyle 
writes the following: 
 
The Visible becomes the Bestial when it rests not on the Invisible. Innumerable tumults 
of Metaphysic must be struggled thro’ (whole generations perishing by the way), and at 
last Transcendentalism evolve itself (if I construe aright) as the Euthanasia of 
Metaphysic altogether. May it be sure, may it be speedy! Thou shalt open thy eyes, O son 
of Adam; thou shalt look, and not forever jargon about the laws of Optics and the making 
of spectacles! For myself, I rejoice very much that I seem to be flinging aside 
innumerable sets of spectacles (could I but lay them aside—with gentleness!) and hope 
one day actually to see a thing or two. Man lives by Belief (as it was well written of old); 
by logic he can only at best long to live. Oh, I am dreadfully afflicted with Logic here, 
and wish often (in my haste) that I had the besom of destruction to lay to it for a little! 
    
“WHY, and WHEREFORE?—God wot simply THEREFORE! Ask not WHY; ‘tis 
SITH thou hast to care for.”50 
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The remarkably candid self examination in this passage provides an excellent point of contact 
with Nietzsche’s criticism of Carlyle. It appears that, to a considerable degree, Nietzsche is 
correct to say that Carlyle’s crusade on behalf of “Belief” is halfhearted, and that, at bottom 
Carlyle’s own belief is dubious. Carlyle here includes himself in an indictment of enlightenment 
culture, as “dreadfully afflicted with Logic.” Yet another puzzle presents itself: If, in 1835, 
Carlyle acknowledged Nietzsche’s critique and even agreed with it, why did he not give up 
Belief altogether and admit the dreadful truth of Logic? 
 There can be no definitive answer here. And since we are already at one speculative 
remove from our principals, it may not pay to press the matter any farther. But there is something 
here worth considering for a moment; namely that Carlyle is not merely an “insipid 
muddlehead.” While his views may have come off as logically “muddleheaded,” Carlyle clearly 
knew what he was doing. He sides with belief rather than logic because belief seems to him the 
more substantial element of the two. The instrumentalism and mechanism that Carlyle abhors in 
modern philosophy, is directly the result of mistaking this relationship, trying to let belief subsist 
on logic. Ultimately Carlyle traces this modern prejudice to the dominance of the visible and 
demonstrable, a prejudice that he further associates with the privileged position of texts over 
voices. With this in mind, Carlyle’s aversion to dogmatic disputes becomes a little more 
understandable. 
 Spectacles are unavailing without an object to see. As Nietzsche also recognizes, logic 
can calculate, but it can never evaluate. Carlyle takes “belief” in a universal sense as the 
substance of value: “Worship is Worth-ship,” he surmises, in On Heroes. Upon reflection, then, 
Carlyle’s pursuit of belief proves to be on the same track as Nietzsche’s celebrated revaluation of 
values, even if it “derails” in a different way. 
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 The heart of Carlyle and Nietzsche’s disagreement is also easier to see: Nietzsche 
predicates a revaluation of values in the individual self, specifically in the heroic self typified by 
Artists, Philosophers and Saints. Nietzsche describes these men as individuals in the most 
profound sense, having sacrificed themselves to themselves to attain to the substance of genius. 
This, perhaps, explains how for Nietzsche they alone are responsible for the redemption of nature 
and mankind, why “mankind” has “nothing else [as] its task,” but to “work continually at the 
production of individual great men,” and so on. They are plenum-men. By contrast, Carlyle’s 
great man significantly lacks this intense, dialectical, self-awareness—as his view of 
“unconsciousness” would seem to require.  
Carlyle’s characterization of the hero is more along the lines of Plato’s depiction of the 
poet in Ion; he is the medium, not the maker, of revealed truth.51 In “The Hero as Poet,” Carlyle 
identifies Shakespeare as “the...melodious priest of a true Catholicism,” that will keep a hold on 
mankind long after some religions die out.52 “Is he not an eye to us all; a blessed heaven-sent 
Bringer of Light?—And, at bottom, was it not perhaps far better that this Shakespeare, everyway 
an unconscious man, was conscious of no Heavenly message?”53 
 Both Carlyle and Nietzsche turn to nature in their quest to renovate value, and each has to 
come to terms with the ambivalent concept of nature/self handed down by Rousseau. But Carlyle 
and Nietzsche overcome the ambivalence of nature in divergent ways. The Nietzschean hero 
gives birth to his authentic self by rejecting aggressively all inherited beliefs. Nietzsche claims: 
“Almost every genius knows, as one stage of his development, the ‘Catalinarian existence’—a 
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feeling of hatred, revenge, and rebellion against everything which already is, which no longer 
becomes. Cataline—the form of pre-existence of every Caesar.”54  
The scheming character of a Cataline is a long way from Carlyle’s humble “Stratford 
peasant” who by mere sincerity gives England its voice, and still rules a great portion of the 
world from his grave. It is not by aiming to conquer that Carlyle’s Shakespeare is so victorious. 
In contrast to Nietzsche, Carlyle at least portrays the hero as an utterly sincere and humble 
man.55 
 In the end, Nietzsche embraces radically his sense of alienation, holding that the absolute 
substance of individual genius can replace the corroded substance of traditional metaphysics. 
That Carlyle’s thinking tends in a similar direction can be seen in his rejection of metaphysics 
and his similar turn to the self as a new source of value. But the Catalinarian individualism of 
Nietzsche’s great man implies conscious scheming, while Carlyle’s heroes act on unconscious, 
moral, intuition. Carlyle’s remarks to Emerson also show how Carlyle despised even his own 
self-consciousness, holding it to be a symptom of his personal disease. “Carlyle never fully 
confuses himself with his heroes...but Zarathustra returns as Nietzsche in Ecce Homo.”56 
 If the two were ever to meet—and it is unfortunate that there are no conferences for 
“physicians of culture”—Carlyle and Nietzsche would reprove each other with the same adage: 
“Physician, heal thyself.” For, both, in their way, conceived projects of self-redemption that, 
from our vantage point seem more and more to be ill-conceived. These two physicians easily 
could have recognized the other’s symptoms. But, sadly, they possessed a blind spot for their 
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own, because they failed to see that self-redemption is everyway impossible. The later Carlyle 
seems to tilt the balance, abandoning the individual “self” and monumentalizing state-builders 
(i.e. Cromwell, Frederick) like terrestrial gods. Nietzsche takes another path, pursuing the self 
into dark abysses into which he finally loses his own consciousness. Carlyle’s and Nietzsche’s 
images of man both suffer from this radicalism: Carlyle’s hero threatens to become the whole 
object of belief, eclipsing the transcendent truth of which he ought to be the representative; while 
Nietzsche’s genius stands as an authority for himself alone, and cannot make available authority 
or value that is communicable to others. 
 
Perfectionism, Belief and the Pathos of Distance: The Question of Democracy 
Let us acknowledge at the outset Carlyle and Nietzsche’s political common ground: they both 
detest democracy. However, in spite of Carlyle’s conviction that leadership is the one needful 
thing in politics (which underwrites his trust in social hierarchy), Carlylean “belief” is a great 
social equalizer. True belief makes all men free, false belief is the stuff of slavery. Nietzsche, on 
the other hand, making individualism into a religion, fervently approves of aristocracy. He even 
proposes the physical separation of “noble” and “base” orders of society. In the remainder of this 
chapter we shall think over a final puzzle: How does philosophy relate to politics, in Carlyle and 
Nietzsche? We shall approach this problem by comparing Nietzsche’s moral and political 
perfectionism to Carlyle’s theory of (authentic) belief as the end of political community. 
 “Perfectionism” describes the political doctrine articulated by Nietzsche in Schopenhauer 
as Educator: that “Mankind must work continually at the production of individual great men—
that and nothing else is its task.” Importantly, perfectionism is not a Nietzschean invention, but a 
teaching shared by many of the greatest Western philosophers. Stanley Cavell attributes it to 
Emerson, especially; who was a longtime companion of Carlyle’s and, as we now know, had a 
pointed influence on Nietzsche. Cavell associates Plato and Aristotle, also, with perfectionism, 
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along with Emerson, Nietzsche, and at least forty other philosophers and artists. Carlyle is 
conspicuously absent in Cavell’s list. 
Despite that it is demanding perfectionism is basically optimistic. It is “the dimension of 
moral thought directed less to restraining the bad than to releasing the good, as from a despair of 
good (of good and bad in each of us).”57 Perfectionism carries strenuous burdens only because it 
reflects the absolute claim of the good, and so it cannot stand (the inevitable) compromise. 
Cavell renders the political side of perfectionism as “the sense of compromise done to my life by 
the society to which I give my consent.”58 
 This sense can be particularly acute in a democracy, which is, after all, the quintessential 
regime of uncertainty and compromise. Yet, Cavell attests that perfectionism and democracy are 
not incompatible. It is possible to consent to a society, and still feel continually compromised by 
that consent. Indeed, perfectionism has a significant political role to play in the life of a 
democracy precisely because it awakens us to the personal drama of consent and recalls our 
mutual ownership of the community with all its hopes and miseries. Here Cavell depicts 
Emersonian perfectionism:  
 
The idea is that the mode of character formed under the invitation to the next self, 
entering the next state of society, is one capable of withstanding the inevitable 
compromise of democracy without cynicism, and it is the way that reaffirms not only 
consent to a given society but reaffirms the idea of consent as a responsiveness to society, 
an extension of the consent that founds it…. The [unexplained misery of a society] 
compromises my happiness, but it does not falsify it nor its show of consent.59 
 
Now, the democratic perfectionism that Cavell here describes is not specifically Nietzsche’s (or 
Carlyle’s), but Emerson’s. We have too little room here to sort out all of the differences between 
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Emersonian and Nietzschean perfectionism. Let it suffice to say that Nietzsche’s credentials as a 
“democrat” are rather more dubious than Emerson’s. Neither are Emerson’s democratic 
credentials indisputable. Indeed, at least one prominent scholar links together Emerson and 
Nietzsche as representatives of “aristocratic radicalism,” opposed to any manner of democracy.60 
However, Cavell binds Nietzsche to Emerson loosely to democracy, through their shared appeal 
to the (next) self. 
 Both Nietzsche and Emerson champion the moral perfection of the individual as of 
teleological value. In this respect, Cavell finds both of their teachings to be invaluable 
instruments of democratic education, since without the premise of the moral value of the 
individual democracy comes off as an intolerably deficient form of government. But both 
Emerson and Nietzsche press moral perfectionism to such an extent that the value of the one 
seems to eclipse that of the many. Emerson’s and Nietzsche’s sovereign individualism, as a rule, 
is hostile to the “mob,” or the “herd.” This is where the ambiguity enters, where their teachings 
bring sovereign individualism into conflict with popular sovereignty. Emerson, however, makes 
a compromise with democracy by endorsing “natural aristocracy,” in the manner of Jefferson or 
Adams. Cavell does not address this point, but Nietzsche refuses to make any compromise with 
democracy, and often castigates it for underwriting mediocrity, even elevating mediocrity to the 
position of greatness. So, how is Nietzsche’s teaching compatible with democracy? 
 In an attempt to clear up this oversight, Daniel Conway has proposed that Cavell’s 
(partial) endorsement of Nietzsche relies on an implicit distinction between his moral and 
political perfectionism. While the latter is incompatible with democracy, the former is 
compatible, perhaps even beneficent to it. “Following Cavell’s cue,” Conway brings out the 
distinction between these two categories: “Political perfectionism...provides for the rigid 
stratification and hierarchical organization of society and its resources, with the aim of 
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producing, as a matter of design, those exemplary human beings whose exploits alone warrant 
the future of humankind.”61  
Strict aristocracies are requisite to the attainment of political perfectionism—“as a matter 
of design”—because, according to Nietzsche, social stratification engenders the pathos of 
distance that is essential to initiating within the self a desire for (moral?) perfection. Nietzsche 
adumbrates the connection between stratification, the pathos of distance and moral perfection: 
 
Without that pathos of distance which grows out of the ingrained difference between 
strata...that other, more mysterious pathos could not have grown up, either—the craving 
for an ever new widening of distances within the soul itself...in brief, simply the 
enhancement of the type “man,” the continual “self-overcoming of man,” to use a moral 
formula in a supra-moral sense.62 
 
Conway insists that Nietzsche’s endorsement of aristocracy is separable from his moral 
perfectionism, and that “the essential element of his political thinking lies not in his yearning for 
an institutionally reinforced hierarchy, but in his perfectionism.”63 Conway goes on to say that 
Nietzsche’s moral perfectionism is not incompatible with democracy or with modern decadence.  
 Although one may be inclined to agree with Conway on this point, Nietzsche’s own 
words alert us to two important difficulties. The first is that Nietzsche’s perfectionism is not 
moral, but as he says, supra-moral. For Nietzsche, the authentically great individuals just are 
those supra-moral souls who as lawgivers create values: To be morally valuable is to put oneself 
beyond morality. Secondly, Nietzsche suggests that aristocratic structures create aristocratic 
souls, not the other way around. Therefore he cannot endorse democracy as a bridge to natural 
aristocracy (which he, too, holds as the ideal government). Only conventional aristocracy can 
sustain natural aristocracy. To be sure, there is a lot of nuance to Nietzsche’s claims. But in the 
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end, Nietzsche still regards the lot of the many as accidental, or better, as instrumental to the fate 
of the one. For Nietzsche, the essential thing is the majesty of the individual. It is not clear on the 
basis of Nietzsche’s texts that this (supra) moral perfectionism is possible without of political 
perfectionism. 
 Nietzsche’s suspicion of democracy, as it turns out, furnishes another point of contact 
with Carlyle. Carlyle despised democracy as the social projection of laissez-faire. Democracy is 
neglect of leadership, “anarchy” and “no-government.” Carlyle suspects it will not last long as a 
social form and he often views it as a transitional phase between the ancien regime and a future 
hierarchy.  
By contrast, Carlyle’s view of democracy’s future as a political form is ambiguous. To be 
sure, Carlyle rejects the notion that democratic procedures (“the ballot-box”) alone will produce 
just outcomes, as if government can be conducted by mechanical expedients. But Carlyle is no 
mere reactionary, traditionalist or throwback. He hopes to see a new, more natural hierarchy 
flourish. He calls on “captains of industry” to seize responsibility for moral leadership of society 
(granted, without much success). Sometimes Carlyle expresses a hopeful vision of a future 
“world of heroes.” Surely political democracy could sustain good enough justice, if its citizens 
were “heroic” citizens.  
 Carlyle, too, endorses an “aristocracy of natural talent” as the ideal regime. He sees this 
as the implicit goal of the human drive towards freedom. But for Carlyle this future is not 
necessarily heralded by the creation of democratic states. The future is portended, rather, by the 
appearance of heroic authors like Rousseau and Burns, and heroic kings like Cromwell, 
Frederick and Napoleon—men who pick up the tools, and use them—the builders of modern 
nations. These men often fulfill the promise of natural aristocracy by refusing to let the strictures 
of democratic procedure get in their way. These images are fearsome, no doubt. They also 
describe accurately the genesis of democratic culture in the West. 
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 With respect to the question of democracy, Carlyle and Nietzsche share a tendency to 
abandon the law to venture after a destiny, or an identity. Nietzsche prizes the individual’s 
identity, whereas Carlyle focuses on the identity of a people, or nation, as manifest in its heroes. 
(Among other places, Nietzsche excoriates Carlyle in the section of Beyond Good and Evil 
entitled “Peoples and Fatherlands.”) Both of these alternative ways of figuring authority have 
their shortcomings. Both also meet the need to figure personal authority over and against the 
parchment authority of statutes. 
Earlier in this study I attempted to show that Carlyle’s concept of the hero-king has an 
archetype in Rousseau’s figure of the “great legislator.” Both Carlyle and Rousseau exhibit the 
persistence of ideal kingship in democratic literature. Like the great legislator, Carlyle’s attempt 
to associate the hero and the king personifies Rousseau’s political venture of synthesizing civil 
society (or the nation/national identity) with the state, (or sovereignty/coercive power). Carlyle 
criticizes Rousseau for attempting to solve this dilemma on the level of theory, however. 
Rousseau does not take the same approach as Carlyle; he merely suppresses the challenge that 
heroic (personal) authority presents to kingly (sovereign) authority. Rousseau confines heroic 
authority to his great legislator, who impresses his personality onto the regime with the result 
that citizenship in Rousseau’s republic winds up being the mimesis of the heroic legislator. 
 Nietzsche also conceives of the great man as a great legislator. However, following 
Emerson (and, arguably, Carlyle), Nietzsche abandons Rousseau’s theoretical aspiration to a 
perfected democratic republicanism. Instead Nietzsche focuses his attention on the moral 
perfection of the individual. As we have seen, this quest for moral perfectionism leads to a 
discovery that democracy and perfectionism may be incompatible, at the radical extreme. 
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Conclusion 
Insofar as Carlyle, also, presupposes a conflict between democratic procedure and moral 
perfectionism, his theory of the hero anticipates Nietzsche’s. Carlyle plays up the moral authority 
of the great man while neglecting the question of legal limits, or, what is more likely, taking their 
existence for granted. Unlike Nietzsche, however, Carlyle believes that his subordination of the 
law to belief serves a more authentic equality.  
Carlyle sees law as the garment of belief, as “habit” in a double-sense. As a political 
prophet Carlyle rebukes those who would make idols of democratic formalities, imploring them 
to attend only to the substance of a just society, which is the same regardless of form. Social 
hierarchy notwithstanding, Carlyle suggests that, in a good society, leaders and followers are 
equal to each other by way of a common pathos. Pathos just is experience, or suffering. Carlyle 
suggests that the germ of belief is a shared pathos regarding one’s condition, and that pathos is 
given concrete expression by heroes. Heroic leaders merely discover and articulate this common 
pathos; they may lend it a certain complexion, but strictly speaking they do not create it. 
LaValley64 describes Carlyle’s alternative to the pathos of distance when he asserts that 
“Carlyle’s Ecce Homo...is a crucifixion with others...through memory [and realism]...not through 
the lonely and exalted acting out of impossible heroic roles.” 
 Recall that Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo is a sacrifice of oneself to oneself. Nietzsche, like 
Rousseau, is an egoist. From this perspective, the pathos of distance is the only authentic pathos. 
From the perspective of egoism, all homonoia is artificial. Moreover, it is impossible for one’s 
own pathos to reflect a morally binding claim on another’s soul. Of course, this presents a 
strange dilemma for political theory because it reduces all ties between men to legal obligations 
upheld by coercive force. 
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 Rousseau tries to get around this problem by drawing clear boundaries between the 
constituted government and the legislator—“an extraordinary man in the State in all respects.”65 
According to Rousseau the same man who “legislates,” or constitutes a republic, should not also 
rule; in fact, the legislator cannot play any role within the republic. But this makes of the 
legislator a prophet. Rousseau’s legislator is isolated from the ordinary citizen/subject not only 
“by genius,” but also “by his function. It is not magistracy, it is not sovereignty. This function, 
which constitutes the republic, does not enter into its constitution. It is a particular and superior 
activity that has nothing to do with human dominion.”66 The uncertainty of personal authority 
requires Rousseau’s legislator to be cordoned off into a mystified background space, and 
protected (and protected against) by the rigid legal edifice of the state. 
 Nietzsche also characterizes great men as “lawgivers.” But Nietzsche rejects Rousseau’s 
tenuous distinctions and admits that anyone may be a lawgiver to oneself, so long as one has the 
psychic wherewithal. Nietzsche’s turn has the same effect as Carlyle’s insofar as legal authority 
is shoved aside in favor of personal authority. Yet it differs from Carlyle’s to the extent that 
personal authority is morally meaningful to oneself alone. The effect of this is what LaValley 
described as Nietzsche’s “lonely and exalted acting out of impossible heroic roles.”  
 Seen in this light, the notion of a community of pathos that underlies Carlyle’s theory of 
belief may be attractive, but it, too, is open to serious criticism. With respect to democracy and 
the rule of law, Carlyle winds up on the “wrong side of history.” Carlyle and Nietzsche both 
have been castigated for promoting “fascist” political views, and their attachment to personal 
authority is not a little to blame for this. In addition, although there is a clear difference between 
Carlylean “belief” and Nietzschean “pathos of distance,” both of these key moral concepts suffer 
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from a lack of clarity. Doubtless, this is partly intentional, since both philosophers mean to leave 
their concepts open to possible future content.  
 To interpret kindly (and not unfairly), this openness shows that Nietzsche and Carlyle 
share a tendency towards pluralism, if they do not care for democracy. They both suggest that 
there are many more valid conduits of moral authority than one might imagine. But they may be 
criticized for preferring to reject inauthentic claims to authority, rather than identifying authentic 
ones. Then again, it is no small benefit to a free people to have been taught to assess moral 
claims of authority for themselves. 
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